Amir Herzberg and Mike Luby, "Public Randomness in Cryptography", proceedings of CRYPTO 1992, ICSI technical report TR-92-068, October, 1992. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Pseudorandom Functions Revisited: The Cascade.. - Bellare, Canetti.. (1996) (31 citations) (Correct)
....ingredients, explicit security parameters and carefully quantified security reductions, form the basis for what we call concrete security analysis. In the case of pseudorandom functions this study was initiated in [4, 3] Security preserving reductions are the subject of other works as well, e.g. [9, 11]. Following [4] we say that a function family G is (t; q; l; ffl) secure if a program that runs in time t (more precisely, the running time plus size of the description of the program, in some fixed RAM model of computation, must be bounded by t) given an oracle for a function E and allowed to ....
A. HERZBERG AND M. LUBY, "Public Randomness in Cryptography. " Advances in Cryptology -- Crypto 92 Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 740, E. Brickell ed., Springer-Verlag, 1992.
Synthesizers and Their Application to the Parallel.. - Naor, Reingold (1995) (16 citations) (Correct)
.... breaking this construction in time t and success ff (success ff means that the observer has advantage of at least ff in distinguishing the pseudo random function from the random one) then there is an algorithm that works in time poly(t) and factors Blum integers with probability ff=poly(t) See [32, 40] for a discussion of security preserving reductions 1 . 1 In their terminology, such a reduction is called poly preserving. In fact, most of our reductions (as the reduction from the security of the pseudo random functions to the security of the pseudo random synthesizers) are ....
....simplifies the presentation of the paper. However, from each one of the proofs in this paper one can easily extract a more quantitative version of the corresponding result. As mentioned in the introduction, the different reductions of this paper are security preserving in the sense of [32, 40]. 3 Pseudo random Synthesizers As mentioned above, we introduce in this paper a new cryptographic primitive called a pseudorandom synthesizer. In this section we define pseudo random synthesizers and describe their properties. 3.1 Motivation Pseudo random synthesizers are efficiently ....
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A. Herzberg and M. Luby, Public randomness in cryptography, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '92, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 740, Springer-Verlag, 1992, pp. 421-432.
Tolerant Combiners: Resilient Cryptographic Design - Herzberg (2002) Self-citation (Herzberg) (Correct)
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Amir Herzberg and Mike Luby, "Public Randomness in Cryptography", proceedings of CRYPTO 1992, ICSI technical report TR-92-068, October, 1992.
Construction of a Pseudo-Random Generator - From Any One-Way Self-citation (Luby) (Correct)
No context found.
Herzberg, A., Luby, M., "Public Randomness in Cryptography", proceedings of CRYPTO
Cryptanalysis-tolerant Commitment and Hashing - Herzberg (2002) Self-citation (Herzberg) (Correct)
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Herzberg, A., Luby, M., "Public Randomness in Cryptography", proceedings of CRYPTO 1992, ICSI technical report TR-92-068, October, 1992.
A Pseudorandom Generator from any One-way Function - Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin.. (1999) (85 citations) Self-citation (Luby) (Correct)
....involve a reduction from one type of primitive to another. We make the following definitions to quantify the strength of reductions. The particular parameterization of security and the different quantitative measures of the security preserving properties of a reduction are derived from [Luby96] [HL92]. Intuitively, a reduction constructs from a first primitive f on inputs of length t n a second primitive g (f) on inputs of length t 0 n . The reduction also specifies an oracle TM M ( Delta) such that if there is an adversary A for breaking g (f) then M (A) is an adversary for ....
Herzberg, A., Luby, M., Public Randomness in Cryptography, CRYPTO '92, 1992.
A Pseudorandom Generator from any One-way Function - Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin.. (1999) (85 citations) Self-citation (Luby) (Correct)
....a reduction from one type of primitive to another. We make the following definitions to quantify the strength of reductions. The particular parameterization of security and the different quantitative measures of the security preserving properties of a reduction are derived from [Luby : 96] HL : 92] Intuitively, a reduction constructs from a first primitive f on inputs of length t n a second primitive g (f) on inputs of length t 0 n . The reduction also specifies an oracle TM M ( Delta) such that if there is an adversary A for breaking g (f) then M (A) is an adversary for ....
Herzberg, A., Luby, M., "Public Randomness in Cryptography", proceedings of CRYPTO 1992, ICSI technical report TR-92-068, October, 1992. 44
Construction of a Pseudo-Random Generator From Any.. - Håstad, Impagliazzo.. (1993) (81 citations) Self-citation (Luby) (Correct)
No context found.
Herzberg, A., Luby, M., "Public Randomness in Cryptography", proceedings of CRYPTO 1992, ICSI technical report TR-92-068, October, 1992.
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