P. Zimmerman. PGP User's Guide. MIT Press, 1994.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....Current email protocols, including SMTP [15] POP3 [12] and IMAP [5] are tailored towards an infrastructure based on dedicated servers. Minimal security is provided in these protocols, and the email service does not provide confidentiality, verifiability, or data integrity. Extensions like PGP [24] provide secure email, but are not widely used. There has been much work to allow email services to scale more effectively through the use of cluster based servers, such as the Porcupine System [18] as well as Hotmail and Yahoo s mail services. ePOST instead utilizes a completely decentralized, ....

P. Zimmerman. PGP user's guide, December 1992. 6

....Usenet Eternity [4] is a Usenet based censorship resistant publishing system. Utilizing Usenet greatly simplifies the design of the system as the underlying Usenet protocols handle the publication and replication of a document. Published documents are specially formatted and signed using PGP [47] and posted to the alt.anonymous.messages newsgroup. A piece of software called the eternity server is used to read the anonymously posted articles in the alt.anonymous.messages newsgroup. The eternity server is capable of caching some newsgroup articles. This helps prevent the loss of a document ....

Phil Zimmerman. Pgp user's guide. December 4, 1992. 19

....o Filtering of incoming ALARM messages according to the trust level of the reporting node. A mechanism similar to the trust management in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) for key validation and certification is used here for mobile ad hoc networks for trust management for routing and forwarding. In PGP [18], several levels of trust can be expressed, e.g. unknown , none , marginal , and complete . When PGP is calculating the validity of a public key, it examines the trust level of all the attached certifying signatures. It computes a weighted score of validity. For example, two marginally trusted ....

P. Zimmerman. PGP user's guide, 1993. 8

....a Sybil attack [30] on the system. It is tempting to envision a system in which established identities vouch for other identities, so that an entity can accept new identities by trusting the collective assurance of multiple (presumably independent) signatories, analogous to the PGP web of trust [37] for human entities. However, our results show that, in the absence of a trusted identification authority (or unrealistic assumptions about the resources available to an attacker) a Sybil attack can severely compromise the initial generation of identities, thereby undermining the chain of ....

....especially if the potential for damage is disproportionate to the fraction of the system that is compromised. The issue of establishing on line identities for humans has been studied for some time [12, 32] with solutions that generally depend on some direct interaction in the physical world [13, 37]. 5. Summary and conclusions Peer to peer systems often rely on redundancy to diminish their dependence on potentially hostile peers. If distinct identities for remote entities are not established either by an explicit certification authority (as in Farsite [3] or by an implicit one (as in CFS ....

P. Zimmerman, PGP User's Guide, MIT, 1994.

....a filtering of incoming ALARM messages according to the trust level of the reporting node. A mechanism similar to the trust management in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) for key validation and certification is used here for mobile ad hoc networks for trust management for routing and forwarding. In PGP [19], several levels of trust can be expressed, e.g. unknown, none, marginal, and complete. When PGP calculates the validity of a public key, it examines the trust level of all the attached certifying signatures. It computes a weighted score of validity. For example, two marginally trusted signatures ....

P. Zimmerman. PGP user's guide, 1993.

....o Filtering of incoming ALARM messages according to the trust level of the reporting node. A mechanism similar to the trust management in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) for key validation and certification is used here for mobile ad hoc networks for trust management for routing and forwarding. In PGP [18], several levels of trust can be expressed, e.g. unknown , none , marginal , and complete . When PGP is calculating the validity of a public key, it examines the trust level of all the attached certifying signatures. It computes a weighted score of validity. For example, two marginally trusted ....

P. Zimmerman. Pgp user's guide, 1993. 8

....components can only be accessed by authorized users. Protection is accomplished through the use of authentication and authorization mechanisms. Authentication refers to the presence of an authentication protocol (e.g. password, Kerberos ticket [24] or public key certificate (X. 509 [16] PGP [39], etc. that identifies the requesting party (the principle) while authorization grants access only if the principles identity (credentials) is included in a specific list (the access control list) or if the principle can assume a specific role (role based authorization) Both authentication and ....

ZIMMERMAN, P., PGP User's Guide, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994.

....described, together with a simple electronic commerce example. Presently, the Software Engineering group at Politecnico di Milano is designing and implementing a first prototype of the SALTA language. The prototype is written in Java, while cryptographic functionalities are implemented using PGP [33]. Aside from the tracing mechanism described in this paper, the SALTA language includes mechanisms to protect sites against malicious agents. We plan to use SALTA to implement electronic commerce applications that require accountability and a high degree of protection against frauds. ....

P. Zimmerman. PGP User's Guide, March 1993.

....a subject in addition to principals. JAAS refers to such generic security related attributes as credentials. A credential may contain information used to authenticate the subject to new services. Such credentials include passwords, Kerberos tickets [16] and public key certificates (X. 509 [9] PGP [21], etc. and are used in environments that support single sign on. Credentials might also contain data that simply enables the subject to perform certain activities. Cryptographic keys, for example, represent credentials that enable the subject to sign or encrypt data. JAAS credentials may be any ....

P. Zimmerman. PGP User's Guide. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1994.

....the trust negotiation framework described earlier, once that becomes available. 6. Related work Credential based authentication and authorization systems fall into three groups: identity based, propertybased, and capability based. Originally, public key certificates, such as X. 509 [17] and PGP [18], simply bound keys to names, and X.509 v. 3 certificates later extended this binding to general properties (attributes) Such certificates form the foundation of identity based systems, which authenticate an entity s identity or name and use it as the basis for authorization. Identity is not a ....

P. Zimmerman, PGP User's Guide, MIT Press, 1994.

....and authorizes it, as attached credentials satisfy the SGP. 8. Related Work Credential based authentication and authorization systems can be divided into three groups: identity based, property based, and capability based systems. The original, public key certificates, such as X. 509 [19] and PGP [17], simply bind keys to names (although X.509 version 3 certificates later extended this binding to general properties) Such certificates form the foundation of identity based systems, which authenticate a subject s identity or name and use it as the basis for authorization. Identity is not a ....

P. Zimmerman, PGP User's Guide, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1994.

....in the number of credentials possessed by the client. 6 Related Work Credential based authentication and authorization systems can be divided into three groups: identity based, property based, and capability based systems. Originally, public key certificates, such as X. 509 [x509a, x509b] and PGP [pgp], simply bound keys to names (although X.509 version 3 certificates later extended this binding to general properties (attributes) Such certificates form the foundation of identity based systems, which authenticate an entity s identity or name and use it as the basis for authorization. Identity ....

P. Zimmerman, PGP User's Guide, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1994.

....negotiation to manage distribution of sensitive credentials. 9. Related Work Credential based authentication and authorization systems can be divided into three groups: identitybased, property based, and capability based systems. The original, public key certificates, such as X. 509 [22] and PGP [20], simply bind keys to names (although X.509 version 3 certificates later extended this binding to general properties) Such certificates form the foundation of identity based systems, which authenticate a subject s identity or name and use it as the basis for authorization. Identity is not a ....

P. Zimmerman, PGP User's Guide, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1994.

....and the conditions to be verified in order to be able to detect attacks, provides support to the design of security protections. 7.2.1 Sniffing The only effective mean to protect from sniffing is the encryption of traffic. Such protection must be implemented at the application level (e.g. [24]) since the TCP IP protocol suite does not provide any mechanisms to protect the transmitted data. Nonetheless, the model may provide useful information. When sending a datagram to H k , H j (actually its network software) may use the network topology description in order to compute all possible ....

Philip Zimmerman. PGP User's Guide, March 1993. 27

....in order to accept mobile EUs from selected hosts only. Apart from this simple identifier based CE CE security mechanism, Agent Tcl provides no other inter CE security mechanisms. An extension that allows EUs and CEs to authenticate each other and to support privacy and integrity using PGP [112] is under development. Inside the CE there is no mechanism to protect EUs from each other and to protect EUs from CEs. Protection of the CE from EUs is delegated to the underlying operating system mechanisms, and therefore EUs may access any resource that is accessible to the principal that is ....

P. Zimmerman. PGP User's Guide, March 1993.

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P. Zimmerman. PGP User's Guide. MIT Press, 1994.

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P. Zimmerman. PGP User's Guide. MIT Press, 1994.

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P. Zimmerman. PGP User's Guide. MIT Press, 1994.

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Phil Zimmerman. PGP User's Guide. Online Documentation, 1994.

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P. Zimmerman. The PGP user's guide.

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Zimmerman, P., "PGP User's Guide", 1992.

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P. Zimmerman. PGP user's guide, December 1992. 5

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Phil Zimmerman. PGP User's Guide. Online Documentation, 1994.

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Phil Zimmerman. PGP User's Guide. Online Documentation, 1994.

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P. Zimmerman. PGP User's Guide. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1994.

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