Clancey, W. (1991). The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines: In K. vanLehn, (Ed.), Architectures for intelligence: The twentysecond Carnegie symposium on cognition.(pp. 357-424). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....system use can begin, we claim that in a real world, largescale design memory, knowledge engineering must occur throughout the lifespan of the memory. There are three reasons we make this claim. First, recent work in both social science (Lave, 1988; Suchman, 1987) and artificial intelligence (Clancey, 1991; Gaines, 1989; Winograd Flores, 1986) argues that the knowledge encoded in AI knowledge bases is at best a partial, finite rendition of human knowledge. Thus, a knowledge base is always subject to additional refinement and re interpretation, and users of a knowledge base may need to contact ....

Clancey, W. (1991). The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines: In K. vanLehn, (Ed.), Architectures for intelligence: The twentysecond Carnegie symposium on cognition.(pp. 357-424). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

....have a sense of meaning 140 Connectionist explanation: taking positions in the mind brain dilemma computing power. It relates to the principled impossibility of maintaining a consistent symbolic model of a dynamically changing world. Essentially the frame of reference problem [Clancey 1989, Clancey 1992] conceptualizes the relation between the observer, the designer (or the modeller) the artifact (e.g. the expert system, the robot) and the environment. Let us take the example of building a classical expert system. The knowledge engineer is at the same time observer and designer. He or she ....

Clancey W.J.: The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines, in Lehn K. van (ed.): Architectures for Intelligence, Proc. 22nd Carnegie Symposium on Cognition, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 357--423, 1992.

....system use can begin, we claim that in a real world, largescale design memory, knowledge engineering must occur throughout the lifespan of the memory. There are three reasons we make this claim. First, recent work in both social science (Lave, 1988; Suchman, 1987) and artificial intelligence (Clancey, 1991; Gaines, 1989; Winograd Flores, 1986) argues that the knowledge encoded in AI knowledge bases is at best a partial, finite rendition of human knowledge. Thus, a knowledge base is always subject to additional refinement and re interpretation, and users of a knowledge base may need to contact ....

Clancey, W. (1991). The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines: In K. vanLehn, (Ed.), Architectures for intelligence: The twentysecond Carnegie symposium on cognition.(pp. 357-424). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

....that they lack historical benchmarks . Validation of systems is often left to vague heuristics such as: If the result is similar to a human expert then it is okay. Perhaps validation poses such a problem due to the difficulty of trying to validate models that are by their very nature inaccurate (Clancey 1991). Another reason for trying to get the system right at the start is that in standard production rule systems changes do not occur locally and even small changes can result in major effects that are not easily resolved (Gaines 1991, Li 1991) To avoid the problem of side effects that occur when ....

Clancey, W.J., (1991) The Frame of Reference Problem in the Design of Intelligent Machines In K. VanLehn, ed.

....a standard ontology for representing circuit diagram information. Although such a domain may employ standard terms to encode knowledge, in actuality, the knowledge engineer s expertise provides an implicit context for this module, making the module appear to have a universal interpretation (Clancey, 1991). From the viewpoint of the expert system shell under assembly, however, such a domain ontology module has no meaning until it is mapped to the current shell s application ontology. In prot eg e ii, mappings define the semantics of the assembled modules. 6.3 Generation of Knowledge Acquisition ....

Clancey, W. J. (1991). The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines. In VanLehn, K., editor, Automating Knowledge Acquisition for Expert Systems, pages 357--423. Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ.

....but it can also produce indications of the corrections needed in various programs. 1. Introduction Substantially new computational technologies are required to support the development of learning environments under more recent learning paradigms such as agent based learning [12] constructivist [4, 7, 8], and problem based learning. Based on our experience in developing several Smalltalk programming learning environments using cognitive apprenticeship [5] and goal based scenarios [6] we find that in order to support interactions with various pedagogical strategies in a programming learning ....

Clancey, W.J. (1991). The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines. In K. VanLehn (Ed.), Architectures for Intelligence, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 357-423.

....a user interacts with his or her environment strongly depends on the individual cognitive capabilities and the user s experience. Modeling a situation would imply having to define how a human perceives his or her situation and how he or she interprets the environment. The frame of reference issue[8] and other fundamental problems, such as the frame problem[33] and the symbol grounding problem[14] would be unavoidable. In addition, each and every non trivial case is different in principle since the case itself is in a way situated in the environment. It follows from these ....

.... means, although at least some common understanding has developed[11] Often, interest is merely an attribution applied after a document has been selected [1] Therefore, the attribution of an interest or an information need might be an instance of the so called frame of reference problem [8]: the interest or information need is generated in the head of the observer, rather than in the head of the observed subject. The information need is not so much inside the user s head [5] but a result of the interaction of the user with a continuously changing situation: information need ....

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William J. Clancey. The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines. In K. van Lehn, editor, Architectures for Intelligence. The 22nd Carnegie Mellon Symposium on Cognition, pages 257--423. 1991.

....a kind of hangover (for a pointed summary see Landauer, 1995) Secondly, research in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science has uncovered a number of fundamental problems. Some of these problems are well known: the symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 1990) the frame of reference problem (Clancey, 1991), the frame problem (McCarthy Hayes, 1969; Pylyshyn, 1987) and the lack of situatedness (Suchman, 1987; see also Greeno, 1993) These problems have become particularly obvious in the field of expert systems, a sub discipline of Artificial Intelligence. Although they have been identified by ....

Clancey, W. (1991). The Frame of Reference Problem in the Design of Intelligent Machines. In K. van Lehn (Ed.), Architectures for Intelligence, (pp. 257-423).

....as selecting a particular document or spending a sufficient amount of time reading a document, can be reasonably interpreted as indicators for interest in the corresponding document. However, even supposedly clear expressions of interest are always subject to the frame of reference problem [5]. The frame of reference problem states that things might appear different from the user s and observer s perspective. In other words, the observer must be careful not to mix up observable behaviors with the user s internal mechanisms causing these behaviors. In case of information seeking ....

William J. Clancey. The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines. In K. van Lehn, editor, Architectures for Intelligence. The 22nd Carnegie Mellon Symposium on Cognition, pages 257--423. 1991.

....devices is a reasonable assumption) but there is no such given circuit for cognitive diagnosis. We cannot assume that we, as diagnosticians, know what circuits are or should be in students heads (indeed, it is controversial whether or not any such representations exist in students heads (Clancey, 1990)) Even if we adopt the view that intelligent tutoring demands some representation of student knowledge we need to consider the appropriate form of that representation. And even for a process as simple as subtraction there are at least two standard procedures taught in school, never mind the ....

Clancey, W.J.: 1990, `The Frame of Reference Problem in the Design of Intelligent Machines. In K. van Lehn and A. Newell (eds.): Architectures for Intelligence. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.

....4] One important implication of situatedness is that the way a human interacts with a situation continuously changes based on his or her experience. Supposedly clear expressions of interest , such as the selection of a specific document, are always subject to the frame of reference problem[3]. The interest or information need is generated in the head of the observer, rather than in the head of the observed subject. The information need is not only inside the user s head [2] but a result of the interaction of the user with a continuously changing situation: the objectivity of a ....

....the selection and the selection of the next document (i.e. time supposedly spent to read documents) etc. These user actions are used to find out about in which discussions the user is not interested in. Since the interpretation of situated (user) actions always involves a frame ofreference issue[3], we have based the design of the augmented newsreader on the following working hypotheses[9] 1. Not too much value should be attributed to (single) user actions; they should not be interpreted as clear indicators of interest. sometimes, humans make faults, or they are under the influence of ....

William J. Clancey. The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines. In K. van Lehn, editor, Architectures for Intelligence. The 22nd Carnegie Mellon Symposium on Cognition, pages 257--423. 1991.

....requiring interpretations which require further interpretations, and so on, with the corresponding regress of interpretive homunculi to perform these feats. Whatever internal representation is, it cannot be the same kind of thing as external representation (Bickhard Terveen, 1995; Clancey, 1991). Considering Morse code in a different respect, we note that the dot and dash patterns of the code are stand ins for the characters that they encode. They stand in for those characters in the sense that we define them and use them and interpret them that way. It is useful to do so because, for ....

Clancey, W. J. (1991). The Frame of Reference Problem in the Design of Intelligent Machines. In K. VanLehn (Ed.) Architectures for Intelligence: The TwentySecond Carnegie Symposium on Cognition. (357-423). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

....so that an ILE may directly refer to them. Thus SMILE is based on the following hypotheses: More or less domain independent metacognitive schema exist and can be represented computationally. This, of course, is denied (with respect to domain knowledge) by advocates of situated cognition (e.g. Clancey, 1990), though it is not so clear whether they deny the existence of domain independent knowledge or insist that that is situated as well, which seems rather self contradictory. Vague notions of metacognition can be made more precise by expressing them within the frameworks of meta level architectures ....

Clancey, W.J. (1990). The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines, in K. van Lehn and A. Newell (eds.), Architectures for Intelligence, Hillsdale: Erlbaum.

....being described is above that one of individual agents. Therefore, a knowledge level description cannot be identified with (isomorphically mapped to) something pre existing inside an individual head, but rather concerns patterns that emerge in interactions the agent has in some (social) world [2] Thus, we conceive a KL description as a characterisation of an entire system as a whole, while the system s components, the agents, are SL entities. 3 Consequently, we can distinguish between two levels of co ordination: Knowledge level co ordination refers to whole systems. It is a property, ....

W. Clancey. "The Frame of Reference Problem in the Design of Intelligent Machines". Vanlehn (Ed.): Architectures for Intelligence, Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991, p. 357-423

....the pertinent reasoning is all about. But in FEELER it seems that there is somewhat of a confusion between an intentional attributional level and the underlying mechanisms. The intentional stance (Dennett, 1971) and the emotional stance are instances of the socalled frame of reference problem (Clancey, 1991) which conceptualizes the relation between observed subject, observer, designer, artifact (the model) and environment. It is especially crucial to distinguish observer based attributions from underlying mechanisms. 3. Situatedness Real world environments are characterized by the following ....

....situations it is possible to determine relevance beforehand, and mostly these situations tend to be highly artificial. The problem of situatedness has not been appropriately taken into account by most AI models. This is also true of AI models of emotion (for more detail see, e.g. Suchman (1987) Clancey (1991), Winograd Flores (1986) or the special issue of the Journal Cognitive Science (1993) on situated cognition) 4. Connection with bodily activities A particular problem with most AI models of emotion is their inability to deal appropriately with physiological processes or bodily activities in ....

Clancey, W.J. (1991). The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines. In: K. van Lehn (ed.). Architectures for intelligence. The 22nd Carnegie Mellon Symposium on Cognition, 357-423.

....we have proposed a new method and knowledge representation to incrementally elicit knowledge. Knowledge representation with situation nodules has been designed having in mind the Situated Cognition critics to traditional Artificial Intelligence approach (Lave, 1988; Compton and Jansen, 1990; Clancey, 1991; Clancey, 1993; Menzies, 1996) What has been retained from these works is, in short: Knowledge representation is only representation, Knowledge is bound to its context of use, KB are inherently incomplete and incorrect, KB revision plays a primordial part in a KBS life, Generalization must be ....

Clancey, W.J., (1991). The Frame of Reference Problem in the Design of Intelligent Machines, in K.

....problems (i.e. problems apart from those caused by the lack of operating system support, etc. may be interpreted as being the same problems as experienced in expert system design. The most prominent problems in this domain are the frame problem (Pylyshyn 1988) the frame of reference problem (Clancey 1991), the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990) and the lack of situatedness (Suchman 1987) Since a basic discussion of all these problems is far beyond the scope of this paper, 4 we focus on the lack of situatedness since it is the most important problem in this domain and is directly related to ....

Clancey, W. 1991. The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines. In Architecture for Intelligence. The 22nd Carnegie Mellon Symposium on Cognition, 257--423.

....designs of the agents directly as the set of principles outlined above, they provide suggestions on how to proceed. These principles are less well articulated and will not be discussed here. They include compliance with the design principles, taking the frame of reference problem into account (Clancey, 1991), incorporating constraints of the ecological niche, capitalizing on system environment interaction, viewing the complete agent as a dynamical systems, etc. 5 Discussion The design principles outlined above do not cover all the insights of the very rich field of animats. But we do believe that ....

Clancey, W.J. (1991). The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines. In K. van Lehn (ed.).

....norms, etc. are coordinating the behavior of participants and come into being during the interaction. In other words, the behavior of participants and organizations emerge from a dynamic interaction of individual and external structures. This idea that is the basis for situated cognition ( 27] [8]) contrasts with the prevalent view in cognitive psychology, which has had and still has great influence on software engineering, especially on the design of expert systems. Many cognitive psychologists view people as having representations of the environment and taking action based on ....

W. Clancey, "The Frame of Reference Problem in the Design of Intelligent Machines". In K. Van Lehn (ed.), Architectures for Intelligence. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 1991, pp. 357-423.

....analyzes to which extent widely used artificial neural networks feature biological neural network properties, such as incremental learning or fault tolerance. It turns out that most models lack these important properties. This paper also discusses the frame of reference problem (FOR problem) (Clancey 1991) and it revisits widely used technical terms, such as supervised and unsupervised learning, generalization and so forth; in the context of autonomous agents, these technical terms need new interpretations. This paper then analyzes how to design ideal network models for autonomous agents and it ....

....and rotations without further enhancements. For example, a translational shift of one pixel is normally considered as an entirely new pattern, since both patterns have a very large Hamming distance. THE FRAME OF REFERENCE PROBLEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS The frame of reference problem (FOR problem) (Clancey 1991) basically states that the transfer of concepts from one context to a different context is very problematic, especially if the new context cannot be precisely described in advance. In other words, a concept that describes a situation well in one context can fail, if applied to the same problem but ....

Clancey, W. (1991). The Frame of Reference Problem in the Design of Intelligent Machines. In Lehn (ed.), Architectures for Intelligence. The 22nd Carnegie Mellon Symposium on Cognition, 257--423.

....both reasoning and learning, though, as a research strategy, these factors will be minimized or ignored. Such a position is consistent with traditional cognitive science perspectives, although it is indeed at odds with some recent stances, such as the situated cognition paradigm (Suchman, 1987; Clancey, 1991). We also assume, given the general arguments in the introduction, that the multistrategy framework is appropriate for cognitive tasks. The generic task view of Chandrasekaran (1989) provides additional support for this assumption by arguing that various general methods exist that apply to various ....

Clancey, W. J. (1991). The Frame of Reference Problem in the Design of Intelligent Machines. In K. Van Lehn (ed.), Architecture for Intelligence: The twenty-second Carnegie Melon symposium on cognition. Lawrence Erlbaum, Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 357-423.

....process. Hence, in addition to the represented structures themselves, their interpretation within the contexts they are applied, and by whom they are interpreted and applied, becomes important. The latter aspect leads to the frame of reference problem of data, information, and knowledge [16], in which interpretation processes and the agents (humans or machines) performing the interpretations are interrelated. By the term agent we mean a system with the capability of reasoning and of taking actions on the basis of its reasoning. The crucial question here is which agent a particular ....

.... frame of reference problem has been suggested by some AI researchers who question the physical symbol systems hypothesis, and based on a framework developed by Winograd and Flores [72] advocates a situatedness view to the understanding of decision making and other cognitive processes (e.g. [16]) According to that view, knowledge is not represented in explicit structures, but dynamically constructed in an interactive process between an agent and the rest of the environment in which the agent is situated. Hence, the frame of reference of knowledge is not a particular reasoning agent, but ....

W.J. Clancey, The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines, In K. VanLehn (ed.), Architectures for Intelligence (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991) 357-423.

....just like dipsomania, erotomania, homicidal mania: it produces a character out of balance. It is not at all true that a scientist goes after truth. It goes after him. It is something he suffers from. Judson 1979 p. 97, attributed to Kierkegaard by Wilkins) In the cognitive science literature Clancey (1990) has presented a detailed critique of the adverse influence of over emphasis on the knowledge level in both theoretical and practical paradigms. He sees knowledge as something which we impute to an intelligent agent to account for its behavior: Knowledge is an observer s characterization, not ....

....observer s characterization, not something that the agent owns. The strong claim is that representations do indeed play a crucial role in human behavior, but they are created fresh, out where they can be perceived; they are not manipulated, indexed, and stored by hidden, inaccessible processes. (Clancey, 1990) This line of argument has had a strong influence on, for example, the knowledge acquisition community in suggesting that what happens in knowledge engineering is not so much the elicitation of an expert s pre existing knowledge, but rather the support of the expert s processes in overtly modeling ....

Clancey, W.J. (1990) The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines. In K. van Lehn & A. Newell, Architectures for Intelligence: The TwentySecond Carnegie Symposium on Cognition. Hillsdale: LEA.

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Clancey, W (1990), The frame reference problem in the design of intelligent machines. In Van Lehn and Newell, A (Eds.) Architectures for Intelligence. Erlsbaum: Hillsdale, NJ.

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