C. Park, K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto, and S. Tsujii, "On key distribution and authentication in mobile radio networks," Advances in Cryptology - EuroCrypt'93, pp. 461--465, 1993, lNCS Volume 765, Springer-verlag.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....F and H are secure message authentication codes, and F , G, and H are independent. Then AP AKA is a secure authentication and key agreement protocol. 5. 4 Comparison with Other Proposals Over the last decade, numerous protocols speci cally designed for wireless networks have been proposed, e.g. [4, 9, 10, 11, 26, 27, 28, 30]. Most of the proposed protocols were designed based on ad hoc approaches (i.e. breaking and xing) and have been found containing various aws [14, 17, 18] Based on the underlying cryptographic primitives, the proposed protocols can be divided into two classes: public key protocols and ....

....of large scaled (or even, global) public key infrastructure in order to support global roaming. There are also concerns on the processing power of mobile stations and the bandwidth consumption in exchanging public keys of large size. In most of the proposed symmetric key protocols, e.g. [22, 11, 26, 28], a foreign network basically acts as a proxy of the home network. The home network is on line involved in every authentication process in the foreign network. In addition, most of the symmetric key protocols were designed in the three party setting and might not be ecient in the home network. In ....

C. Park, K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto and S. Tsujii, On key distribution and authentication in mobile radio networks, Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt'93 Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 765, 1993, pp. 461-465.

....freshness, then Kerberos would have greater security. 9 The node needs significantly more memory resources than our current sen sor nodes to store the key chain. 9. Related work Tatebayashi et al. consider key distribution for resourcestarved devices in a mobile environment [52] Park et al. [37] point out weaknesses and improvements. Beller and Yacobi further develop key agreement and authentication protocols [4] Boyd and Mathuria survey the previous work on key dis tribution and authentication for resource starved devices in mobile environments [8] The majority of these approaches ....

C. Park, K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto and S. Tsujii, On key distribution and authentication in mobile radio networks, in: Advances in Cryptology EuroCrypt'93, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 765 (1993) pp. 461-465.

.... this protocol is also vulnerable to a man in 1 Tatebayashi, Matsuzaki, and Newman proposed the first key establishment protocol using public key cryptosystem [3] After that, Park, Kurosawa, Okamoto, and Tsujii showed that the protocol is not secure and proposed a new key establishment protocol [4]. However, these protocols are End to End protocol for providing secure communication channel between mobile stations, and this paper focuses on the link security between a mobile station and a base station. the middle attack and immunized it [1] We describe these protocols in detail in Section ....

C. Park, K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto, and S. Tsujii, "On key distribution and authentication in mobile radio networks," in Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt'93, pp. 461--465, Springer Verlag, 1994.

....suggested in [13] The rst two countermeasures incorporating structure into r 1 and r 2 , and prepending timestamps to r 1 and r 2 do not prevent our passive attack. The third, which assumes a shared secret key between the server and each party, appears to withstand our attack. Park et al. [7] exploited the use of e = 3 in TMN to show that after the same two parties exchange a session key three times, each has enough information to impersonate the other in future protocol executions. In contrast, our attack enables any eavesdropper to recover the session key exchanged in any run of the ....

....a session key three times, each has enough information to impersonate the other in future protocol executions. In contrast, our attack enables any eavesdropper to recover the session key exchanged in any run of the protocol. Nevertheless, our attack does not immediately apply to the x proposed in [7]. 5.2 Veri able signature sharing In [3] Franklin and Reiter presented a scheme to eciently share an RSA signature of a known message among n 5t 1 servers so that the servers could verify the signature relation, despite the malicious misbehavior of up to t of the servers. As part of this ....

C. Park, K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto, and S. Tsujii. On key distribution and authentication in mobile radio networks. In Advances in Cryptology|EUROCRYPT '93 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 765), T. Helleseth, Ed. 1994, pp. 461-465, Springer-Verlag.

.... of attacks have been published on the TMN protocol, some of which rely on the specific cryptographic algorithms used, and others exploiting problems in the message structures [10] For example an attack based on the algebraic properties of the encryption algorithms has been found by Park et al. [14]. They also suggest improved protocols. However, since S has a shared secret with all parties in the repaired protocols it is worthwhile questioning whether the use of public key cryptography is justified in this case. 5.2 Varadharajan Mu A set of protocols proposed by Vardharajan and Mu [19, 20] ....

C. Park, K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto and S. Tsujii, "On Key Distribution and Authentication in Mobile Radio Networks", Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt'93, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 461--465.

....suggested in [13] The first two countermeasures incorporating structure into r 1 and r 2 , and prepending timestamps to r 1 and r 2 do not prevent our passive attack. The third, which assumes a shared secret key between the server and each party, appears to withstand our attack. Park et al. [7] exploited the use of e = 3 in TMN to show that after the same two parties exchange a session key three times, each has enough information to impersonate the other in future protocol executions. In contrast, our attack enables any eavesdropper to recover the session key exchanged in any run of the ....

....session key three times, each has enough information to impersonate the other in future protocol executions. In contrast, our attack enables any eavesdropper to recover the session key exchanged in any run of the protocol. Nevertheless, our attack does not immediately apply to the fix proposed in [7]. 5.2 Verifiable signature sharing In [3] Franklin and Reiter presented a scheme to efficiently share an RSA signature of a known message among n 5t 1 servers so that the servers could verify the signature relation, despite the malicious misbehavior of up to t of the servers. As part of this ....

C. Park, K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto, and S. Tsujii. On key distribution and authentication in mobile radio networks. In Advances in Cryptology---EUROCRYPT '93 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 765), T. Helleseth, Ed. 1994, pp. 461--465, Springer-Verlag.

....it provides better security, this protocol takes much more computation than others. In fact, public key encryption does not necessarily take much computation time. For example, by choosing a small public key in RSA scheme, it takes only a small portion of average operation time as demonstrated in [2, 20, 23]. By incorporating public key techniques with temporary ID concept, confidentiality of terminating subscriber identity can be easily achieved as demonstrated in Lin Harn s protocol without much computation. If RSA public key techniques are used to implement security services among (wired) ....

C. Park, K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto, and S. Tsujii, "On key distribution and Authentication in Mobile Radio Network", Eurocrypo'93.

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C. Park, K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto, and S. Tsujii, "On key distribution and authentication in mobile radio networks," Advances in Cryptology - EuroCrypt'93, pp. 461--465, 1993, lNCS Volume 765, Springer-verlag.

No context found.

C. Park, K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto, and S. Tsujii. On key distribution and authentication in mobile radio networks. In Advances in Cryptology - EuroCrypt '93, pages 461--465, 1993. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 765.

No context found.

C. Park, K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto, and S. Tsujii. On key distribution and authentication in mobile radio networks. In Advances in Cryptology - EuroCrypt '93, pages 461--465, 1993. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 765.

No context found.

C. Park, K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto, and S. Tsujii. On key distribution and authentication in mobile radio networks. In Advances in Cryptology - EuroCrypt '93, pages 461--465, 1993. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 765.

No context found.

K. Kurosawa, T. Okamoto, C. Park, and S. Tsujii, "On Key Distribution and Authentication in Mobile Radio Networks", Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT '93, Lofthus, Noray, May 1993, 461-465.

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