B. D. Gold et al. A security retrofit of VM/370. In National Computer Conference, volume 48, pages 335--344. AFIPS Conference Proceedings, 1979. 19 Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Design and Verification of Secure Systems - Rushby (1981) (20 citations) (Correct)
....was then) the Royal Signals Radar Establishment. 1 Introduction A formally verified security kernel is widely considered to offer the most promising basis for the construction of truly secure computer systems, at least in the short term. A number of kernelized systems have been constructed [12,19,25] and various models of security have been formulated to serve as the basis for their verification [6, 9, 28] Despite the enthusiasm for this approach, there remain certain difficulties and problems in its application (see, for example [1] I shall expand on these later, but briefly they include ....
.... each of its users with a separate, simulated copy of its hardware base (VM 370 is, perhaps, the best known example of such a system) It is widely recognised that VMMs provide a suitable basis for the construction of secure systems and at least two systems have been constructed along these lines [12, 26]. However, the type of kernel which I am proposing differs from a VMM in that there is no requirement for it to provide VMs which are exact copies of the base hardware (or even for all the VMs to be alike) but there is a requirement for it to provide communications channels between some of its ....
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B. D. Gold et al. A security retrofit of VM/370. In National Computer Conference, volume 48, pages 335--344. AFIPS Conference Proceedings, 1979. 19
Security Design In Distributed Computing Applications - Zeleznik (1993) (Correct)
.... 70s [13] In response, the Air Force sponsored several studies to design and verify secure multilevel operating systems [200] The methodology that grew was founded on the security kernel concept, which was based on the reference monitor model of 12 security [2] These operating systems, such as [183, 78, 167, 84, 93, 141, 27], were based on more formal approaches to design and verification. Conventional database systems were also addressed, as with integrity issues, or the inference aggregate problems in statistical databases[60, 79] Also in the 1970s, with the onset of networking, new efforts were launched toward ....
Gold, B., et al. A security retrofit of vm/370. In 1979 National Computer Conference, AFIPS Conf. Proc. Vol. 48 (1979), AFIPS, pp. 335--44.
Kit: A Study in Operating System Verification - Bevier (1989) (23 citations) (Correct)
....to complete only an initial portion of this sequence of goals. The goals were met with varying degrees of success. Many security kernel projects are reported in the literature: PSOS [Feiertag 79, Neumann 77] KSOS [McCauley 79, Berson 79] UCLA Secure Unix project [Popek 79, Walker 80] KVM 370 [Gold 79] and SCOMP [Fraim 83] The Secure Ada Target (SAT, now called LOCK) Boebert 85] is an ongoing project at Honeywell. Landwehr [Landwehr 83] gives a useful summary of the state of the art circa 1983. Rushby criticizes the kernel approach to system security [Rushby 81b] We do not repeat his ....
B.D. Gold, R.R.Linde, R.J. Peeler, M. Schaefer, J.F. Scheid, P.D. Ward. A Security Retrofit of VM/370. In AFIPS Conference Proceedings, pages 335-344. 1979.
Simple Timing Channels - Moskowitz, Miller (1994) (4 citations) (Correct)
....From a security viewpoint, the capacity of a covert channel is the standard metric with which to measure its potential damage. In fact, the value of the capacity leads to different levels of secure system certification [7] However, STC s may crop up on their own, e.g. in the disk arm channel [8], or as in the recent paper by Mathur and Keefe [20] Further, STC s can be used as capacity bounds for more complicated types of timing channels [13] i.e. STC s may give a worst case scenario. STC s therefore warrant special attention. Implicit in the study of timing channels is the assumption ....
B.D. Gold, R.R. Linde, R.J. Peeler, M. Schaefer, J.F. Scheid, and P.D. Ward. A security retrofit of vm/370. In AFIPS Conference Proceedings, 1979 National Computer Conference, volume 48, pages 335--344, Montvale, NJ, 1979.
A Verified Operating System Kernel - Bevier (1987) (12 citations) (Correct)
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B.D. Gold, R.R.Linde, R.J. Peeler, M. Schaefer, J.F. Scheid, P.D. Ward. A Security Retrofit of VM/370. In AFIPS Conference Proceedings, pages 335-344. 1979.
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