Humphrey, N. K. (1976). The social function of intellect. In Growing points in ethology (ed. P. P. G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde), pp. 303-17. Cambridge University Press.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....heart of the criticisms of common sense reasoning in artificial intelligence and therefore of naive psychology. I am avoiding the term naive psychology , then, to distance myself from these methodological assumptions. Theory of mind; also known as mindreading (Whiten, 1991) natural psychology (Humphrey, 1976). The term theory of mind was first used by Premack and Woodruff (1978) but since this work in comparative psychology, it has become one of the favoured terms for common sense psychology in psychology as a whole. Theory of mind is perhaps the most problematic candidate term; here the problems ....

....of our perceptions as scientists; I will return to the role of intuition in levels of explanation later in chapters 8 and 14. Another strong argument against eliminative materialism is evolutionary (e.g. Clark, 1987) According to this, common sense psychology evolved through natural selection (Humphrey, 1976), and is therefore every bit as real as arms and legs. Of course it is possible, even today, to construct an explanation which dispenses with arms and legs in favour of a lower level description in terms of muscles, bones, cells, and so on, but arms and legs still survive as terms in our ....

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Humphrey, N. K. (1976). The Social Function of Intellect. In P. P. G. Bateson & R. A. Hinde (Eds.), Growing Points in Ethology (pp. 303-317). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

....heart of the criticisms of common sense reasoning in artificial intelligence and therefore of naive psychology. I am avoiding the term naive psychology, then, to separate myself from these methodological assumptions. Theory of mind; also known as mindreading (Whiten, 1991) natural psychology (Humphrey, 1976). The term theory of mind was first used by Premack and Woodruff (1978) but since this work in comparative psychology, it has become one of the favoured terms for common sense psychology in psychology as a whole. Theory of mind is perhaps the most problematic candidate term; here the problems ....

....of our perceptions as scientists; I will return to the role of intuition in levels of explanation later in chapters 8 and 14. Another strong argument against eliminative materialism is evolutionary (e.g. Clark, 1987) According to this, common sense psychology evolved through natural selection (Humphrey, 1976), and is therefore every bit as real as arms and legs. Of course it is possible, even today, to construct an explanation which dispenses with arms and legs in favour of a lower level description in terms of muscles, bones, cells, and so on, but arms and legs still survive as terms in our ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Humphrey, N. K. (1976). The Social Function of Intellect. In P. P. G. Bateson & R. A. Hinde (Eds.), Growing Points in Ethology (pp. 303-317). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

....human tendency and ability to ascribe mental states to others and to themselves in short, to recognise and understand other minds; the psychological solution to the philosophical problem. Naive psychology belongs in a category of psychological concepts rooted in an evolved natural psychology (Humphrey 1976), a real psychological faculty that offers an evolutionary advantage to animals living in complex societies. It is closely related to folk psychology, but Clark uses the term both to relate it to Hayes (1979) naive physics and to distance it from being taken, as folk psychology sometimes is, ....

Humphrey, N. K. (1976) The social function of intellect. In: Growing points in ethology, eds. P. P. G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde, Cambridge University Press.

....able to reconstruct its own and other people s experiences, an agent with a history, an agent which has a body as the point of reference which gives a unique perspective on the (social) world, which allows to generalize from experiences and to reconstruct specific, individual experiences. Humphrey (Humphrey 1988), in a famous paper (originally published in 1976) which discusses primate intelligence, argues for the necessity of developing a laboratory test of social skill . His suggestion is: The essential feature of such a test would be that it places the subject in a transactional situation where he ....

Humphrey, N. K. 1988. The social function of intellect. In Byrne, R. W., and Whiten, A., eds., Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 13--26.

....and individuals have a human flexibility which can be added, if needed, to make sense of a situation. This requires at the minimum a kind of naive physics [11] an ability to make commonsense predictions about the behaviour of objects, but also and more importantly a kind of naive (what [12] calls natural ) psychology. This natural psychology is not the same as academic psychology, more it is the ability of humans to understand and predict the behaviour and feelings of other humans. It is the psychology of motivation as well as that of cognition, dealing with feelings, emotions, and ....

N. K. Humphrey, "The Social Function of Intellect," in Growing Points in Ethology, P. P. G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

....under close study in scientific discussions about the origin of human intelligence. The social intelligence hypothesis, which is also called the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, goes back to the ideas of several researchers, namely Chance, Humphrey, Jolly, Kummer and Mead ( CM53] Jol66] Hum76] KG85] According to the social intelligence hypothesis, see [BW88] or [Byr95] chapter13 for an overview) primate intelligence originally evolved to solve social problems and was only later extended to problems outside the social domain [CS92] In contrast to non human primates, which are ....

N. Humphrey. The social function of intellect. In P. P. G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde, editors, Growing points in ethology, pages 303--317. Cambridge University Press, 1976.

....under close study in scientific discussions about the origin of human intelligence. The social intelligence hypothesis, which is also called the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, goes back to the ideas of several researchers, namely Chance, Humphrey, Jolly, Kummer and Mead ( CM53] Jol66] Hum76] KG85] According to the social intelligence hypothesis, see [BW88] or [Byr95] chapter13 for an overview) although most research on animal and human intellect has focussed on how intelligence deals with the physical or technical world (and the very concept of intelligence has been ....

N. Humphrey. The social function of intellect. In P. P. G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde, editors, Growing points in ethology, pages 303--317. Cambridge University Press, 1976.

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Humphrey, N. K. (1976). The social function of intellect. In Growing points in ethology (ed. P. P. G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde), pp. 303-17. Cambridge University Press.

No context found.

Nicholas K. Humphrey. The social function of intellect. In P. P. G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde, editors, Growing Points in Ethology, pages 303--317. Cambridge University Press, 1976.

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