Yong-Gwan Kim and Joel Sobel. An evolutionary approach to pre-play communication. Econometrica, 63(5):1181--1193, 1995.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....in practice. This paper shows that some of these complexities can be manageably handled, resulting in some structural observations not otherwise discernible (see also Morris 1996) Some coordinations, such as driving on the right (Young 1996a) and especially language (Blume, Kim, and Sobel 1993, Kim and Sobel 1995, Warneryd 1993) result from adaptation, but some are achieved through explicit communication. Sweden s switch from driving on the left to the right on a single day would be inconceivable without mass media ( They ve done it 1967) corporations try to make brand names into household words not ....

Kim, Yong-Gwan, and Joel Sobel. 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication. " Econometrica 63: 1181--1193.

.... does not even constitute a Nash strategy since players with signal s 1 would strictly prefer to send m i in order to obtain the maximal payoff b: So pre play communication destroys evolutionary stability whenever players are sure to be facing an opponent in a different role (Schlag, 1994, Kim and Sobel, 1995). This phenomenon will also effect evolutionary stability whenever pre play communication occurs in several rounds before the actual game is played. Consider the following simple model of sequential pre play communication without 18 external signals. There are two rounds of pre play ....

....With lack of common interest, evolutionarily stable outcomes of the basic game without communication are extremely unfair. Play will be at a strict equilibrium with one population always better off than the other. When pre play communication is added, evolutionary stable outcomes cease to exist (Kim and Sobel, 1995, Schlag, 1994, see also Section 4.4) Neither commitment nor the extent of communication (i.e. number of messages) plays a role. Other mechanisms to reach efficiency in coordination games have been suggested. The option of publicly burning money before choosing actions will not guarantee ....

Kim Y.-G. and J. Sobel (1995). "An evolutionary approach to pre-play communication," Econometrica, 63, 1181-1193.

....innately (Hauser, 1996) That communicative behavior tends to be encoded genetically is, perhaps, largely explained by the fact that natural selection provides a very effective means of tuning innate systems of communication. Game theoretic approaches (Warneryd, 1993; Blume, Kim, and Sobel, 1993; Kim and Sobel, 1995; Skyrms, 1996) and an increasingly large literature of computational modeling work (Werner and Dyer, 1991; Oliphant, 1993; Oliphant, 1996; MacLennan and Burghardt, 1994; Ackley and Littman, 1994; Levin, 1995; Cangelosi and Parisi, 1996; Bullock, 1997; Werner and Todd, 1997; de Bourcier and ....

Kim, Y. and J. Sobel (1995). An evolutionary approach to pre-play communication.

....be too expensive. In consequence, they reduce their signalling to some sort of word of mouth communication, hoping that this already provides su#cient information to the consumer side. The e#ects of signalling in problems of coordination have been analyzed in di#erent models by Matsui (1991) and Kim and Sobel (1995). The common result is that signalling in the sense of cheap talk or preplay communication does in fact lead to e#ciency. Having the possibility to announce their willingness to play either this or the other equilibrium agents do no longer coordinate on the risk dominant but on the ....

Kim, Y.-G. and Sobel, J. (1995) "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre--Play Communication ", Econometrica, 63, 1181-1193.

....games of common interest, this and other static evolutionary criteria alone do not predict efficiency in the conventional framework. 1 Consequently, much effort has been focused on constructing evolutionary dynamics that would have the efficient outcome as a stable state. Among others, Kim and Sobel (1995) and Matsui (1991) obtain positive results. This note shows that when the message space used in pre play communication is continuous, or when communication is over infinitely many rounds rather than one shot, efficiency is implied by a set wise extension of evolutionary stability known as an ....

Kim, Y.-G. and J. Sobel (1995), "An evolutionary approach to pre-play communication," Econometrica, 63, 1181-1193.

....receiver have a fitness related stake in the outcome of a communicative exchange. Through the use of evolutionary game theory, it has been shown analytically that optimal communication is the only outcome that is evolutionarily stable in this situation (Warneryd, 1993; Blume, Kim, and Sobel, 1993; Kim and Sobel, 1995; Skyrms, 1996) Furthermore, it can 35 Success Failure Transmitter 1.0 0.0 Receiver 1.0 0.0 Figure IV.3: Payoff matrix for common interest communication. Both the sender and the receiver get a high (1.0) payoff when communication between them is successful, and a low (0.0) payoff when it is ....

Kim, Y. and J. Sobel (1995). An evolutionary approach to pre-play communication.

....much interest in evolutionary models for equilibrium selection in coordination games. Subsequent models have refined this work by introducing local interaction (e.g. Ellison, 1993; Blume, 1993, 1995) or by enlarging the strategy space of an agent (Ely, 1995; Bhaskar and Vega Redondo, 1997; Kim and Sobel, 1995). The present paper belongs to the first category in featuring local interaction. It follows a new line in studying alternative ideas for modelling the individual behavior of an agent. The usual story in the evolutionary approach is that there is a large population of agents, each facing a ....

Kim, Y.-G. and Sobel, J. (1995) "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," Econometrica, 63, 1181-1193.

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Yong-Gwan Kim and Joel Sobel. An evolutionary approach to pre-play communication. Econometrica, 63(5):1181--1193, 1995.

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