Luce, R.D., Raiffa, H., 1957. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Wiley, New York.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... the traffic types is obviously a multiple objective optimization problem[2] As a branch of analysis tool developed to provide a mathematical process for decision making in a conflict situation, the use of game theory concepts has been widely considered for resolving network optimization problems[3]. From the game theory viewpoint, each separate class of traffic competing for the shared resources is considered as one of the players of the game, which has its own performance objective and can make its own decision. If each player only tries to optimize its own performance, then the ....

Luce R. Duncan, Raiffa, Howard, "Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey", New York: Dover Publications, 1989.

....as sum) of state features. We are not aware of work along the axiomatic approach that has attempted to give characterization of policies in this manner (either using the maximal expected utility criterion or other criteria) although there is well known work on structured utility functions (see [37] and reference therein) It should be noted, though, that as implicit representation of policies, in uence diagrams are somewhat problematic because the process of showing that an actual policy is optimal (and hence represented by the diagram) is NP hard [10, 42] However, we believe that ....

R. D. Luce and H. Raia. Games and Decisions- Introduction and Critical Survey. John Wiley and Sons, 1957.

....as sum) of state features. We are not aware of work along the axiomatic approach that has attempted to give characterization of policies in this manner (either using the maximal expected utility criterion or other criteria) although there is well known work on structured utility functions (see [37] and reference therein) It should be noted, though, that as implicit representation of policies, influence diagrams are somewhat problematic because the process of showing that an actual policy is optimal (and hence represented by the diagram) is NP hard [10, 42] However, we believe that ....

R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa. Games and Decisions- Introduction and Critical Survey. John Wiley and Sons, 1957.

....trying to achieve their own goals. Our work follows this latter. When one considers the bottom up models, we have previously shown in [12] that they can also be distinguished in two subclasses: utility based models and complementary based models. According to utilitarian models, like game theory [24, 1], social world is considered a locus of agents interferences. The very existence of other agents mainly limits both the autonomy and power of each agent belonging to the society. Models based on complementarity, on which our work is based 3 , propose a di erent vision of social interaction. ....

R. D. Luce and H. Raia. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1957.

....Figure 2: Di erent kinds of coordination techniques and protocols have been devised for multi agent systems so far. Nwana, Lee, and Jennings give an overview in [NLJ96] For a system of competitive agents several forms of negotiation have been proposed. They are mostly based on game theory [LR57] local planning [KvM91] or on theories of human negotiation [BM92] Organizational Structuring. This is one of the simplest coordination scenarios which exploits an a priori organizational structure. The organization implicitly de nes the agent s responsibilities, capabilities, connectivity ....

R. D. Luce and H. Raia. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. John Wiley and Sons, 1957.

....player. Theorem 3.3 Let # = 2, #, u be a two person unilaterally competitive game which has an equilibrium pair. Consider a player i s strategy s i # # i . The three following statements are equivalent: a) s i is maximin; b) s i is minimax; c) s i is a Nash equilibrium strategy. Proof In [LR57], Luce Rai#a prove this result for the set of all two person strictly competitive games 10 which is a proper subset of the class of two person unilaterally competitive games. Their proof trivially holds also for the latter class. # We know from Theorem 3.1 and 3.2 that in a unilaterally ....

R.D. Luce and H. Rai#a. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1957.

....then be viewed as a coordination game; and the question becomes whether or not the adaptive agents of these systems can coordinate upon Paretooptimal NE while avoiding deficient NE in a repeated game scenario. The paper assumes the reader has some basic knowledge of game theory terminology (see [Luce and Raiffa, 1985] or [Kreps, 1990] for an introduction to game theory) The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a formal definition of the shop floor routing problem. Section 3 first briefly describes two multi agent systems for the problem that are based on ant trail following behavior ....

R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Dover Publications, Inc., New York, 1985.

....strategy he himself selects. Analyses of the N person cooperative game circumvent the di#culties associated with strategic interaction in a di#erentwaybyintroducing detailed decision rules concerning such things as the relative power of the players #e.g. the Shapley value and the Nash solution#Luce Rai#a 1957, Nash 1950##. Some game theorists #e.g. #Harsanyi Selten 1972## have soughttoachieve determinate solutions for nonzero sum games byintroducing the notion that each player may be able to assign subjective probabilities to the choices of the other participant. In other words, it is possible to ....

....this way, we ensured that the zone of agreement always exists. Note that learning takes place within each run of the experiment rather than between the experiment runs. We measured the quality of a particular bargaining process using the normalized joint utility fashioned after the Nash solution#Luce Rai#a 1957#. Suppose the buyer and the supplier agree on a particular price P # , the joint utility is then de#ned as: #P # , RP s # # #RP b , P # # #RP b , RP s # 2 It can be easily shown that the joint utility reaches the maximum 0:25 when P # is the arithmetic average of RP b and RP s . Note that in ....

Luce, R. D. & Rai#a, H. #1957#. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, New York, Wiley.

....the minimum occurring at maximum uncertainty regarding the possible events. This corresponds to the situation which, in our view, provides minimum information about the nature of A that B would like to know to improve his model. The model of agent interaction that we consider is a two level game [LR57] where the modeler (B) has to choose from a set of possible actions fb i g m 1 , which lead to the other agent (A) adopting from its own set of actions. The jth action of agent A in response to the ith action of agent B, b i , is denoted as a ij , to be chosen from the set fa ij g j=n j=1 . ....

....denoted as a ij , to be chosen from the set fa ij g j=n j=1 . The agent B models the factors that influence A s action choice including its own actions, as a Bayesian 7 Network. The trustworthiness of A is one of the crucial factors that guides A s response to B s actions. We present a maximin [LR57] mechanism that allows B to select actions that help it to form increasingly better estimate of A s trustworthiness, given its response to B s actions. The set of actions available to A in response to each action of B are known to B and the latter has prior estimates of the probabilities of ....

R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Dover, New York, NY, 1957.

.... by all such coalitions is maximized [SLA 99] Decision mechanisms for forming coalitions: How should agents decide on which coalition to join [Ket94,SL97,SK95,SK96,ZR94] Payo division in a coalition: How should the revenue generated in a coalition be divided among the partners [Ket94,LR57] Almost all of this body of research ignores, as we do, the issue of how the coalitions generate their revenues or the nature of problem solving adopted by individual agents after they form a coalition. We address a slightly di erent problem of coalition selection under uncertainty. Perhaps ....

....using the rules for multinomial distribution of probability values, and conditional probability. 5 Comparative evaluation with a decision mechanism for in nite interactions To compare our decision mechanism with a standard reference we chose the Expected Utility Maximization Principle (MEU) LR57] The MEU principle prescribes interacting with partnership i given by i = arg max j2Partners nk X k=1 u j k p j k ; where Partners is the set of partners the agent can interact with. This principle is guaranteed to maximize the total utility received by the agent if the agent ....

R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raia. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Dover, New York, NY, 1957.

....account the fact that actions may have several different outcomes, some of which may be more desirable than others. They must balance the potential of some plan achieving a goal state against the risk of producing an undesirable state and against the cost of performing the plan. Decision theory (Luce Raiffa 1957) provides an attractive framework for weighing the strengths and weaknesses of a particular course of action, with roots in probability theory and utility theory. Given a probability distribution over the possible outcomes of an action in any state, and a reasonable preference function over ....

Luce, R. D., and Raiffa, H. 1957. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Wiley.

....game theory does produce some useful information about the kinds of strategy that can be used to induce co operation and the relative success of various strategies [Axelrod 1984] Group Decision Making is the normative study of how individual preferences can be combined into a group decision. Luce and Raiffa [1957] define the problem as that of finding a method, or welfare function for combining individual preference rankings into a social preference, which satisfies properties such as fairness and representativeness. Work on group decision making extends decision theory to cope with more than one decision ....

Luce, D. L., and Raiffa, H. (1957) Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, J. Wiley & Sons, NY.

.... systems: majority voting is common for national and state elections around the world while hare voting, plurality voting, tournament voting and chairman s preferential voting are commonly employed in boardrooms and committees for directors representatives to come to a consensus [Davis, 1986; Luce and Raiffa, 1957] Each of these systems is designed to fulfill certain purposes. For example, to avoid rapid changes in a majority voting system, one may specify 5 8 or 3 4 majorities of the electorate for the new motion rather than a simple one vote majority. More drastically, veto power may be invoked by ....

....of zero is assigned to block the inconclusive result from feeding into the voting result selection process. Any voting result that exceeds the capped degree will be constrained to its maximum capping degree when entering the selection round. Corresponding to the maximum utility decision making in [Luce and Raiffa, 1957], the final result of the proposition is selected based on the transformed voting result(s) with a maximum degree of support as follows: If a transformed voting result has a maximum degree then it is selected as the final result. If there is a set of transformed voting results with a ....

Duncan Robert Luce and Howard Raiffa. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1957.

....is the need for negotiation. Studies of conflict resolution show that the most successful methods require a degree of creative input [Fisher Ury 1981] Formal approaches to conflict resolution have a tendency to produce compromise solutions which do not properly satisfy any participant s needs [Luce Raiffa 1957]. The uncertainty and the need for creativity means that requirements engineering can never be fully formalised. However, there is plenty of scope for prescriptive methods and tools to support the process. Cunningham et al. 1985] give a number of dangers that proposed specification models have ....

....are inconsistent whenever there are three or more choices, so that no welfare function can satisfy them all. Subsequent work then, has examined the result of relaxing this set of conditions. While no rule can satisfy all of Arrow s conditions, some are still more acceptable than others. Luce Raiffa [1957] discuss majority rule as one of the most popular means of determining social preference. One of the biggest problems with majority rule is that it can lead to intransitive social preferences. For example, given three options, x, y, and z, society can end up preferring x to y; y to z; and z to x. ....

Luce, D. L., and Raiffa, H., 1957, "Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey", J. Wiley & Sons, NY.

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Luce, R.D., Raiffa, H., 1957. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Wiley, New York.

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R. Duncan Luce and Howard Rai#a. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Dover, 1957.

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Luce, R. D. and Rai#a, H.: Games and Decisions - Introduction and Critical Survey. John Wiley & Sons, Inc, New York (1957).

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R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. New York: Wiley, 1957.

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R. D. Luce and H. Rai#a, "Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey," John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1957.

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R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and decisions: Introduction and critical survey, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1957.

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Luce, R.D. and H. Raiffa. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Wiley, New York, 1957.

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R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Dover, 1957.

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R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Dover, 1957.

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R.D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, John Wiley & Sons, NewYork, 1957.

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