R. Savani and B. von Stengel. "Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game". Proceedings of 45th FOCS, pp. 258-267, 2004. 13  Home/Search Document Details and Download
Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium - Constantinos Daskalakis Paul (Correct)
No context found.
R. Savani and B. von Stengel. "Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game". Proceedings of 45th FOCS, pp. 258-267, 2004. 13
The Complexity of Games on Highly Regular Graphs - Exte Nd Ed (Correct)
No context found.
R. Savani, B. von Stengel "Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game," FOCS, 2004.
Unknown - (Correct)
No context found.
R. Savani, B. von Stengel "Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game," FOCS 2004.
Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria - Sandholm, Gilpin, Conitzer (2005) (Correct)
No context found.
Savani, R., and von Stengel, B. 2004. Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game. In FOCS.
A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and.. - Conitzer, Sandholm (2005) (Correct)
No context found.
Savani, R., and von Stengel, B. 2004. Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game. In FOCS.
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC