A. Ockenfels and A. E. Roth. Late bidding in second price internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction. Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming, 2004.

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Simulations for Evaluating Electronic Markets - An.. - Clemens Czernohous.. (2005)   (Correct)

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A. Ockenfels and A. E. Roth. Late bidding in second price internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction. Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming, 2004.

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