Dworkin, R. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. Duckworth, London.  Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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States of Affairs, Events, and Rules: An Abstract Model of the.. - Verheij, Hage (1997) (Correct)
....We take a closer look at the freedom of expression. If P has the freedom of expression, this has several consequences. The first and foremost consequence is that P is in principle permitted to express his opinion about any issue. Remember the defeasibility of rule application. If we follow Dworkin [1978, pp. 184f. having a human right also involves that regulations that infringe these rights are invalid. In other words, for regulations that infringe these rights, the rule that regulations which were validly made contain valid law is not applicable [cf. Hage 1997, p. 173] Legal systems ....
Dworkin, R. (1978). Taking Rights Seriously, 2nd ed. Duckworth, London.
The Law as a Dynamic Interconnected System of States of Affairs - Hage, Verheij (1999) (4 citations) (Correct)
....of opposing reasons resulting from legal principles. In section 7.1, we discuss an example of an exception to a rule from the point of view of our abstract model. Hage [1996, 1997] and Verheij [1996] among others) discuss the topic of defeasibility more extensively. 5. 3 Rules and principles Dworkin [1978] has argued that the intuitive differences between reasoning with rules and principles in the law require a logical distinction. As an example of a typical legal rule, he mentions A will is invalid unless signed by three witnesses , while No man may profit from his own wrong would be a typical ....
....We take a closer look at the freedom of expression. If P has the freedom of expression, this has several consequences. The first and foremost consequence is that P is in principle permitted to express his opinion about any issue. Remember the defeasibility of rule application. If we follow Dworkin [1978, pp. 184f. having a human right also involves that regulations that infringe these rights are invalid. In other words, for regulations that infringe these rights, the rule that regulations which were validly made contain valid law is not applicable [cf. Hage 1997, p. 173] Legal systems ....
Dworkin, R. (1978). Taking Rights Seriously, 2nd ed. Duckworth, London.
REASON-BASED LOGIC: a logic for reasoning with rules and reasons - Hage, Verheij (1994) (2 citations) (Correct)
....principles. 2 This means that the classical theory of meaning in which terms are said to have an intention , that consists precisely of such a set of conditions, is wrong. cf. Schwartz 1977 and Smith 1990. 3 cf. Dworkin s account of the difference between legal rules and legal principles. [Dworkin 1978, pp. 22f. 5 Legal rules, on the contrary, seem either to apply or not. If a rule of law applies, it seems that its conclusion follows necessarily. Application of two rules of law with incompatible conclusions would necessarily lead to an inconsistency, and should therefore be avoided. The role ....
Dworkin, R. (1978). Taking Rights Seriously, 2nd ed., Duckworth, London.
Modelling Reasoning with Precedents in a Formal Dialogue Game - Prakken, Sartor (1998) (9 citations) (Correct)
....calls the theory formation aspect of legal argument. 3 By a rule we mean any general warrant (or inference policy) according to which a certain factor defeasibly supports a certain conclusion. More specific notions of rules, such as those assumed when (rigid) rules are opposed to principles (Dworkin, 1977), or when (exclusionary) rules are opposed to first order reasons (Raz, 1975) are not considered in our framework. 4 Earlier discussed in Prakken (1993) pp. 22 3. Another example is discussed by Branting Porter (1991) as an instance of what they call case elaboration . 5 For simplicity ....
Dworkin, R.M. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. London: Duckworth.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles: Perspectives From.. - Gangolly, Hussein (1996) (Correct)
....of public sentiments, it has not been bought by the American public either. Legal positivist conception of obligation is limited by positive legal rules; i.e. to say that one is legally obligated to do something is to say that there is a positive legal rule that states that one is so obligated (Dworkin 1977). The contra positive statement of this conception would assert that if there is no obligation arising out of a positive rule to which one can point, then such an obligation does not exist. Such a conception of obligation can lead to decisions that would be considered unjust even by many ....
....of rules in an all or nothing fashion and the neglect of issues having to do with the lack of a hermeneutic tradition. In the positivist view, if the facts in a given situation satisfy all the conditions in the antecedent of a valid GAAP rule then the consequent of such rule should be observed(Dworkin 1977). Such a conception of accounting rules is not consistent with positing norms such as substance over form or completeness or adequate disclosure since as concepts they are ingredients of society s conception of what is fair financial reporting a conception that is not necessarily ....
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Dworkin, R. (1977), Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Normative Systems Represented By Boolean Quasi-Orderings - Jan Odelstad And (Correct)
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Dworkin, R. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. Duckworth, London.
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