J. Doyle, Reason maintenance and belief revision: Foundations versus coherence theories, in: P. Gardenfors (ed.), Belief Revision, Cambridge University Press, (1992) 29--51.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....in mind that these theories concern the nature of epistemic states not the method employed to move from one epistemic state to another. We shall stick with the more intuitive descriptions of the theories given here. Arguments for and against both theories can be found in G ardenfors [32] and Doyle [22]. Our main concern here is with the (purportedly) coherent AGM framework, due principally to its well developed logical theory. Katsuno and Mendelzon [59] claim that the AGM is well suited to situations in which an agent is reasoning about a static world but does not have full information about ....

Jon Doyle. Reason maintenance and belief revision: Foundations versus coherence theories. In Peter G ardenfors, editor, Belief Revision, pages 29--51. Cambridge University Press, 1992.

....irrelevant. Proposition 3. If IB # IC and # # # then IB # # # IC # # and IB # # # IC # #. We regard this property of infobase change as an advantage over some of the other, more syntactically oriented, approaches to base change. In the context of infobase change, reason maintenance [4] amounts to ensuring that the contraction of IB by a w# # in IB results in the removal of all the w#s that are dependent on # for being in Cn(S(IB) Fuhrmann [5] has given a precise meaning to the idea of a w# being dependent on # (for being in Cn(S(IB) Definition 15. A w# # # L is ....

Jon Doyle. Reason maintenance and belief revision: Foundations versus coherence theories. In Peter Gardenfors, editor, Belief Revision, volume 29 of Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science, pages 29--51. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

....as a language for belief systems, the distinction between speaker and hearer models results clear. This separation and the presence of expressions for belief grounding and justi cation allow the representation of belief structures that satisfy both the foundations and coherence paradigms 7 [4]. Moreover, 4 This situation presents an interesting symmetry with the notion of Cartesian basic belief I think, therefore I am (or Cogito ergo sum ) which becomes immediately True (for the thinker) as soon as it is conceived [23] 5 In this work, a belief is considered grounded when the ....

Doyle, J. (1992) \Reason Maintenance and Belief revision: Foundations vs. Coherence Theories ", in Gardenfors, P., (ed), Belief Revision, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 29-51.

....and only if some justification can be exhibited. The coherence approach focuses on the global Department of Artificial Intelligence, University of Edinburgh, 80 South Bridge, Edinburgh EH1 1HN; Email:fbettina,smaillg uk.ac. edinburgh.aisb 1 For a recent survey of the field, see [Gardenfors 92] Doyle 92a] in that volume discusses foundational and coherence approaches. 1 Computing Belief Revision 2 structure, propositions are believed if they cohere with other beliefs; justifications are not essential. 2 Coherence usually means or includes logical consistency. Central to most coherence ....

Jon Doyle, Reason Maintenance and Belief Revision: Foundations vs. Coherence Theories, in: Peter Gardenfors (ed.), Belief Revision, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 29--51

.... Our contribution towards clarifying the connections between these various approaches is threefold: ffl We show that the two main approaches to belief revision, the foundations and coherence theories, are mathematically equivalent, thus answering a question left open in [Gar90, Doy92] The distinction between syntaxbased approaches to revision and approaches based on (semantic) preferential structures falls along similar lines, and their expressive equivalence is a consequence of this result. ffl We formally clarify the connection between belief revision and non monotonic ....

....those classes. The following are then the main contributions of this paper. We take as point of departure the contrast between approaches to belief revision with respect to the role assigned to the agent s reasons for holding beliefs, which has been the subject of a recent debate [Gar90, Doy92] This role differentiates, as already mentioned, the foundations and the coherence theories of belief revision. These are described in section 2, where we take as our model of foundational belief revision a simple variant of syntax based revision, and a generalized AGM model of revision for the ....

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John Doyle. Reason maintenance and belief revision: Foundations vs. coherence theories. In Peter Gardenfors, editor, Belief Revision. Cambridge University Press, 1992.

....as in (Dubois et al. 1992b) rather than combining the knowledge bases attached to each source before the inference process takes place. Our dichotomy coherence versus foundation is somewhat different from the one used in the literature (Harman, 1986) G rdenfors, 1990) Rao Foo, 1989) (Doyle, 1992), DelVal, 1994) In this paper, we do not assume any particular structure on the beliefs in the knowledge base (contrary for example to RMS defined in (Doyle, 1992) Nor do we assume any (in)dependence relations between beliefs. Moreover, beliefs in a knowledge base are all selfjustifying , ....

.... versus foundation is somewhat different from the one used in the literature (Harman, 1986) G rdenfors, 1990) Rao Foo, 1989) Doyle, 1992) DelVal, 1994) In this paper, we do not assume any particular structure on the beliefs in the knowledge base (contrary for example to RMS defined in (Doyle, 1992)) Nor do we assume any (in)dependence relations between beliefs. Moreover, beliefs in a knowledge base are all selfjustifying , namely all pieces of information are put in the knowledge base as they are and as they come from their sources of information, and we do not add to the knowledge base ....

J. Doyle (1992) Reason maintenance and belief revision: foundations vs coherence theories. In: Belief Revision (P.

....revision systems in the fact that maintenance systems also keep track of the justifications of beliefs. This additional information is put to use to retract beliefs in a sensible way. This style is known as the foundation approach, and its relation to coherence style systems is spelled out in Doyle [ Doyle, 1992 ] A possible formal combination of these two different perspectives is given by theories of belief base revision [ Hansson, 1991 ] Nebel, 1992 ] In such theories a minimal restructuring of belief sets is proposed by means of selecting a finite base of axioms of the beliefs. Contraction and ....

....They prefer the latter over the former style of belief dynamics for reasons of psychological realism and complexity. Gardenfors also claims that argumentation structure can be described in coherence theories of believe revision using the notion of epistemic entrenchment (see subsection 2.1.3. 6) Doyle [ Doyle, 1992 ] is more optimistic about the compatibility of these different perspectives. He refutes the psychological and economic criticisms of [ Gardenfors, 1990 ] and [ Harman, 1986 ] against reason maintenance theories, and maintains that recent developments of both sides show that the theories are ....

Doyle, J. 1992. Reason maintenance and belief revision: Foundations vs. coherence theories. In Gardenfors, P., editor 1992, Belief Revision, Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science 29. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 29--51.

....as belief revision: DN P generates assumptions which are then revised by the operator DR P;S . This differs from almost all the previous approaches to belief revision, either in the context of propositional theories (e.g. 13] or in the context of extended logic programming and RMS (e.g. [7, 25, 30]) where a revision operation is performed after the entire theory is determined contradictory. For a knowledge system with a large collection of data, possibly with frequent update requests, this is a formidable task. In contrast, revision in terms of the operator DR P;S ffi DN P is performed on ....

J. Doyle. Reason maintenance and belief revision: foundations versus coherence theories. In Gardenfors, editor, Belief Revision, pages 29--51. Cambridge University Press, 1992.

.... the Relation between the To appear, without the appendix, in AAAI 94 Coherence and Foundations Theories of Belief Revision Alvaro del Val Robotics Lab Computer Science Department Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 delval cs.stanford.edu Abstract Two recent papers, Gardenfors 1990; Doyle 1992), try to assess the relative merits of the two main approaches to belief revision, the foundations and coherence theories, but leave open the question of the mathematical connections between them. We answer this question by showing that the foundations and coherence theories of belief revision are ....

....beliefs as possible during revision. In the basic approach, all beliefs are in principle accorded the same status, and the agent will keep a belief whenever he or she can consistently do so, even when the original reasons for holding that belief are retracted. Two recent papers, Gardenfors 1990; Doyle 1992), try to assess the relative merits of each approach. Recognizing that the question is unlikely to be solved by informal arguments, both authors consider the question of the mathematical connections between the approaches. Specifically, Gardenfors tries to show that in many cases the notion of a ....

Doyle, J. 1992. Reason maintenance and belief revision: Foundations vs. coherence theories. In Gardenfors, P., ed., Belief Revision. Cambridge University Press.

....the current implementation of AMORD conducts all of its reasoning in a single locale. The RMS must also relabel nodes from in to out or vice versa as necessitated by the reasoning being performed. For more discussion of reason maintenance and nonmonotonic reasoning see [6] 7] 8] 9] [11], and [10] The RMS uses the Reasoning Economy (RECON) to determine which relabelings to perform when. 6.1.3 RECON As mentioned in section 3.4, the Reasoning Economy is built on top of Wellman s WALRAS market oriented programming environment. RECON creates a good for each possible service that ....

Jon Doyle. Reason maintenance and belief revision: Foundations vs. coherence theories. In Peter Gardenfors, editor, Belief Revision, pages 29--51. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

....best performance. Making control decisions rationally raises the problem of infinite regress, since trying to control the cost of making rational control decisions by means of additional rational control decisions creates a tower of deliberations, each one concerned with the level below (as in (Doyle, 1980)) 11 Thus striking a balance between control and reasoning computations means taking effort expended at all these levels into account. In practice, the deliberative information available at higher levels but unavailable at lower ones vanishes as one ascends the reflective tower, and most ....

....We need to investigate how to integrate these theories in useful ways that recognize that meaning, possibility, utility, and probability must all be evaluated with respect to changing purposes and circumstances. 31 Doyle Acknowledgments This paper is an extended version of an invited talk (Doyle, 1990) presented at AAAI90. I thank Ramesh Patil, Peter Szolovits, and Michael Wellman for reading drafts, Rich Thomason for lending me some of his notes, Tom Dean, Othar Hansson, Eric Horvitz, Barton Lipman, Andrew Mayer, Stuart Russell, Joseph Schatz, and David Smith for valuable discussions, and the ....

Doyle Doyle, J. 1991b. Reason maintenance and belief revision: Foundations vs. coherence theories. In Gardenfors, P., editor, Belief Revision. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. To appear.

.... and found that too much expressive ability had been sacrificed for semantic cleanliness and computational efficiency [19, 22] Doyle and Patil produced a major and influential critique of this trend for the KR community [13] Doyle s continuing work on truth maintenance and nonmonotonic reasoning [6, 37, 15, 8, 10, 9, 12] has been complemented in recent years by studies with Michael Wellman (now on the faculty at University of Michigan) of qualitative representations of preference information [52, 14, 53, 16] by studies of the use of economic mechanisms in controlling distributed reasoning and activities [7, 11, ....

J. Doyle. Reason maintenance and belief revision: Foundations vs. coherence theories. In P. Gardenfors, editor, Belief Revision, pages 29--51. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

....of reasoned constitutions so that we may consider reasoning systems that employ a variety of patterns of grounding of conclusions. For example, because humans do not appear to remember or enforce reasons for most of their beliefs, some authors (e.g. Gardenfors, 1990; Harman, 1986) cf. (Doyle, 1992)) criticize the RMS for requiring extensive grounding of all elements (although people do appear excellent at effortlessly constructing rationalizations or supporting arguments sometimes spurious for their beliefs (Gazzaniga, 1985) Our definition of reasoned constitution accommodates these ....

Doyle Doyle, J. (1992). Reason maintenance and belief revision: Foundations vs. coherence theories.

....constraints reflected in the mental state space rather than the nature of the systems of interpretation. This approach suggests evaluating Kyburg s arguments for and against acceptance in terms of what difference acceptance really makes and what costs it really incurs (after the example of [6]) relative to the standard probabilist approaches. In particular, I doubt that accepting beliefs and periodically revising them always improves on probabilistic revision. Kyburg seems to share this doubt in at least one passage of the paper, but the arguments he presents later concerning this ....

J. Doyle. Reason maintenance and belief revision: Foundations vs. coherence theories. In P. Gardenfors, editor, Belief Revision, pages 29--51. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

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J. Doyle, Reason maintenance and belief revision: Foundations versus coherence theories, in: P. Gardenfors (ed.), Belief Revision, Cambridge University Press, (1992) 29--51.

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Doyle,J., Reason maintenance and belief revision: foundation vs. coherence theories., Belief Revision, (P.Gardenfors Ed.) Cambridge University Press, 29-51, 1992.

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Doyle,J., Reason maintenance and belief revision: foundation vs. coherence theories., Belief Revision, (P.Gardenfors Ed.) Cambridge University Press, 29-51, 1992.

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J. Doyle (1991). `Reason Maintenance and Belief Revision: Foundations versus Coherence Theories ', Laboratory for Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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