Doyle, J. (1990): Rational Belief Revision. Presented at the Third International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Stanford Sierra Camp, Cal.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... of attention in AI, 1 which led to a number of different proposals for different applications (Ginsberg 1986; Ginsberg, Smith 1987; Dalal 1988; Gardenfors, Makinson 1988; Winslett 1988; Myers, Smith 1988; Rao, Foo 1989; Nebel 1989; Winslett 1989; Katsuno, Mendelzon 1989; Katsuno, Mendelzon 1990; Doyle 1990). Most of this research has been considerably influenced by approaches in philosophical logic, in particular by Gardenfors and his colleagues (Alchourr on, Gardenfors, Makinson 1985; Gardenfors 1988) who developed the logic of theory change, also called theory of epistemic change. This theory ....

....pair of propositions OE; 2 Cn(C) determine fAg = C OE and fBg = C , and set OE ffl OE if and only if A B. The verification that this is indeed the right epistemic entrenchment ordering is left as an exercise to the reader. 6 BELIEF REVISION AND DEFAULT REASONING Doyle has remarked in (Doyle 1990, App. A) that the adjective nonmonotonic has suffered much careless usage recently in artificial intelligence, and the only thing common to many of its uses is the term nonmonotonic itself. Doyle identified two principal ideas behind the use of this term, namely, that attitudes ....

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Doyle, J. (1990): Rational Belief Revision. Presented at the Third International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Stanford Sierra Camp, Cal.

.... led to a number of different proposals for different applications [ Ginsberg, 1986; Ginsberg and Smith, 1987; Dalal, 1988; Gardenfors and Makinson, 1988; Winslett, 1988; Myers and Smith, 1988; Rao and Foo, 1989; Nebel, 1989; Winslett, 1989; Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1989; Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1990; Doyle, 1990 ] Most of this research has been considerably influenced by approaches in philosophical logic, in particular by Gardenfors and his colleagues [ Alchourr on et al. 1985; Gardenfors, 1988 ] who developed the logic of theory 1 See also [Brachman, 1990] in which practical and well founded ....

.... In this way the rationality criteria serve as regulative ideals. Actual psychological states of belief normally fail to be ideally rational in this sense [G ardenfors, 1988, Section 1. 2] Further, this notion of rationality is quite different from the notion of economic rationality [Doyle, 1990]. the following way: 4 A : x def = i S(A#:x) j x: 4) Such partial meet revisions satisfy unconditionally the first six postulates, also called basic postulates. Furthermore, it is possible to show that all revision operations satisfying the basic postulates are partial meet ....

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Jon Doyle. Rational belief revision. Presented at the Third International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Stanford Sierra Camp, Cal., June 1990.

....all maximally preferred states. Shoham s terminology is in accordance with this interpretation, as he calls v a preference order, and the corresponding logical notions preferential satisfaction and 2 For an illustration of this point, see the treatment of rational belief revision presented in [10]. Belief revision and default reasoning are closely related, as belief revision concerns how beliefs change nonmonotonically with increasing time, while default reasoning concerns how conclusions change nonmonotonically with increasing knowledge. Doyle Wellman God exists doesn t Believe 1 ....

Doyle, J. Rational belief revision. Presented at the Third International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Stanford Sierra Camp, CA, June 1990.

....about novel circumstances, requires much foundational work. The scarcity of work devoted to the rational revision of preferences seems remarkable in view of the attention that has been paid to rational belief revision and the many analogies between belief and preference (but see, for instance, [58, 19, 20, 22, 38, 72, 8]) To some extent, lack of attention to preference revision may reflect a longstanding attitude in economics that preferences change very slowly compared to beliefs, as well as a more general empiricist conception that takes beliefs and belief changes as having something like a rational ....

J. Doyle. Rational belief revision. Presented at the Third International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Stanford Sierra Camp, CA, available at http://www.medg.lcs.mit.edu/doyle/ftp/rbr90.ps, and partially reprinted in [23], June 1990.

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