Searle, J. R. (1987). Minds and brains without programs. In Blakemore, C. & Greenfield, S. (Eds.), Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness, chapter 15, pages 208--233. Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, Ltd.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... in support of the computer metaphor of mind is the one dubbed by Searle as strong AI (Searle, 1980) Searle describes this position as holding that a suitably programmed computer must have a mind in the same sense in which humans have minds if the computer exhibits the right inputs and outputs (Searle, 1980, 1987, 1990, 1992) This characterization is problematic, but the fault is not necessarily Searle s, at least not entirely (see Searle, 1992, Chapter 9, p. 200, and Footnote 2) Often the AI community itself has been too imprecise in articulating its own claims. One problem with this common view of ....

.... The mind brain analogy Searle points out that the strong AI position is often characterized by drawing an analogy between minds and brains on the one hand, and programs and computers, or software and hardware, on the other, i.e. mind:brain: program:computer, or mind:brain: software:hardware (Searle, 1980, 1987, 1992) If this analogy is indeed pervasive, it would not be surprising. Computers and programs are two of the most conspicuous icons of our time. The Chinese room argument is intended to refute this analogy, but such a refutation is unnecessary because the analogy itself is not apt. Translated ....

Searle, J. R. (1987). Minds and brains without programs. In Blakemore, C. & Greenfield, S. (Eds.), Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness, chapter 15, pages 208--233. Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, Ltd.

....serious questions as to the logical completeness of computability in general. Roger Penrose has pointed out that the entire program of strong artificial intelligence in which conceptual models of the brain are based on formal computing models and axioms may thus be doomed to failure (Penrose 1989, Searle 1987, 1990, Churchland Churchland 1990) Spin glasses (Cowan 1988, Stein 1989) are materials with chaotically oriented atomic spins which can reach neither a ferromagnetic equilibrium (spins aligned ) nor a paramagnetic one ( spins cancelling in pairs ) because of longrange spin interactions ....

Searle R.J., (1987), Minds and brains without programs, in Blakemore C., Greenfield S., Mindwaves Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

....responses are stored. The system performs a match between input sentences and schematic structures and produces the appropriate response as given by the schema. Apart from the obvious criticism that Searle has identified problems for such a simplistic computational account of mental processes (Searle, 1984), we can also ask what evidence there is to suggest that humans use this type of schematic processing for their emotional expression. Beck and Clark (1988) published a cognitive theory for depressive disorders which involved maladaptive schemas. It could be argued that PARRY employs a generalised ....

.... events just are neural events according to some form of identity theory) implicit in this is the idea that causal explanations at some macrolevel can be given at some microlevel , where the macrolevel concerns mental processes and the microlevel concerns physical processes (or, in the case of Searle (1984), biological processes) However, there is a reverse side to the reductionist coin: while we may view cognitive theories as being at too high a level to provide us with understanding of how the human brain works, it is also the case that even if we did know all about the synapses, the ....

Searle, J.R. (1984). Minds and brains without programs, in Mindwaves , C. Blakemore and S. Greenfield (Eds.). Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

....the behaviour of biomolecules is doomed to failure undercuts neuroscience which stresses neurons as the primitive computational element as well as classical cognitive science which stresses a cognitive system passing through various representational states. As Penrose (1994, p357) says: 4 Searle (1987) proposed a form of biological materialism, where variable rates of neuron firing relative to different neuronal circuits produce all the different types of mental life we humans experience: mental phenomena, whether conscious or unconscious, whether visual or auditory, pains, tickles, itches, ....

Searle, J.R. (1987). Minds and brains without programs. In C. Blakemore and S. Greenfield (Eds.), Mindwaves, Blackwell.

....formulation (Grice, 1957 and 1968) may not be necessary at this level, something like it is certainly possible, provided it is accepted that consciousness is already introduced at the lower level. At this level also can be placed general theories of consciousness. For instance, Searle s proposal (Searle, 1987) can be reinterpreted as claiming that, no matter which ascription mechanism is chosen at the second level, they all share the common property that justification for the ascription of intentional and mental predicates is based on neural and biological considerations of the brain (i.e. on the ....

Searle, J. R. (1987) Minds and brains without programs, in C. Blakemore and S. Greenfield (eds.) Mindwaves, Blackwell.

....but many have found his defense unconvincing. It seems to many that Searle is committing the mistake of confusing two different systems that have a common location. 2.2 Syntax and Semantics Faced with such criticisms, Searle streamlined his argument to its essence, as follows (Searle, 1984, p. 39; Searle, 1987, pp. 231 232) Axiom 1: Syntax is not sufficient for semantics. Axiom 2: Minds have contents; specifically, they have semantic contents. Axiom 3: Computer programs are entirely defined by their formal, or syntactical, structure. Conclusion: Instantiating a program by itself is never sufficient ....

Searle, J. R. (1987). Minds and brains without programs. In C. Blakemore & S. Greenfield (Eds.), Mindwaves (pp. 209--233). Oxford: Blackwell.

....in terms of neurotransmitters and receptors causing muscle contractions, there is no real understanding of how it is that my intention to raise my arm is related to some biocognitive state whereby my motor neurons are activated at the appropriate time. This is the fundamental problem addressed by Searle (1987) when he tackles the problem of intentional causation: How do mental states have an impact on a physical object such as a human body His answer is to reject the traditional view of causation which assumes two discrete events, where one may be physical and the other mental. Instead, he appeals to ....

Searle. J. R. (1987). Minds and brains without programs. In Mindwaves, C. Blakemore and S. Greenfield (Eds.), Basil Blackwell.

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