| Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In Mind, Language, and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Volume Two, pp. 362--385. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Collection published 1975. |
....components. It is assumed that in order to understand cognition knowledge of the algorithms that the brain is supposed to execute is all that matters. This implies that we have to drop the ideal that there is a unity of science in which all sciences are in principle reducible to physics (e.g. [Putnam 1960, Fodor 1974, Haugeland 1978] It The mind brain dilemma 137 is assumed that there is one special science of cognition which develops a formal logical description of the rules and representations constituting it. The level of implementation is considered of minor importance. Winograd and ....
Putnam H.: Minds and machines, in Hook S. (ed.): Dimensions of Mind, New York University Press, 1960.
....certain odours and perhaps not others. 6 Experience DNA explanations of the source and structure of cognition must be supplemented by clear statements concerning the relationship between biomolecular processes and mentalism if such explanations are to be of interest to cognitive scientists. Putnam (1960) and Fodor (1968) identified the main problem with any scientific approach to mind which attempted to make mental states and processes identical with physical (including neurophysiological, neuroanatomical and biochemical) states and processes. Identity Theory can be understood as a theory of ....
Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In S. Hook (Ed.), Dimensions of Mind, Collier.
.... causal structure that the mind embodies (at an appropriate level of abstraction) The view that it is abstract causal structure that is essential to mentality has been an implicit assumption of the AI research program since Turing (1950) but was first articulated explicitly, in various forms, by Putnam (1960), Armstrong (1970) and Lewis (1970) and has become known as functionalism. From here, it is a very short step to computationalism, the view that computational structure is what is important in capturing the essence of mentality. This step follows from a belief that any abstract causal structure ....
Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In S. Hook (Ed.), Dimensions of mind (pp. 138--164).
....currently known (a form of binding problem ) 7 Content DNA explanations of the source and structure of cognition must be supplemented by clear statements concerning the relationship between biomolecular processes and mentalism if such explanations are to be of interest to cognitive scientists. Putnam (1960) and Fodor (1968) identified the main problem with any scientific approach to mind which attempted to make mental states and processes identical with physical (including neurophysiological, neuroanatomical and biochemical) states and processes. Identity Theory can be understood as a theory of ....
Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In S. Hook (Ed.), Dimensions of Mind, Collier.
No context found.
Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In Mind, Language, and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Volume Two, pp. 362--385. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Collection published 1975.
No context found.
Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and Machines. In S. Hook, ed., Dimensions of Mind. New York: New York University Press.
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Putnam, H. 1960: Minds and Machines, in: (S. Hook ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York Univ. Press, New York.
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Putnam, H. (1960), "Minds and Machines", in S. Hook, ed., Dimensions of Mind, New York: New York University Press.
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Putnam, H., 1975b. Minds and machines, Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 362-385.
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