D. Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a bivariatre interger equation; factoring with high bits known. In Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT '96, volume 1070 of LNCS, pages 178--189. Springer Verlag, 1996.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....statistically zero knowledge with respect to the group member s secrets. In contrast, in [CM98a] the group member is required to send the group manager the product of her secret, a prime of special form, and a random prime; such products are in principle susceptible to an attack due to Coppersmith [Cop96]. Moreover, our scheme is provably coalition resistance against an adaptive adversary, whereas for the scheme by Camenisch and Michels [CM98a] this holds only for a static adversary. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the formal model of a secure group ....

....to the group member s membership secret. The JOIN protocol in the Camenisch Michels scheme is not; in fact, it requires the group member to expose the product of her secret, a prime of special form, and a random prime; such products are in principle susceptible to an attack due to Coppersmith [Cop96]. Although, the parameters of their scheme can be set such that this attack becomes infeasible. Furthermore, the proposed scheme is provably coalition resistant against an adaptive adversary. This o ers an extra advantage: 3) Camenisch and Michels prove their scheme coalition resistant against ....

D. Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a bivariatre interger equation; factoring with high bits known. In Advances in Cryptology | EUROCRYPT '96, volume 1070 of LNCS, pages 178-189. Springer Verlag, 1996.

....statistically zero knowledge with respect to the group member s secrets. In contrast, in [CM98a] the group member is required to send the group manager the product of her secret, a prime of special form, and a random prime; such products are in principle susceptible to an attack due to Coppersmith [Cop96]. Moreover, our scheme is provably coalition resistance against an adaptive adversary, whereas for the scheme by Camenisch and Michels [CM98a] this holds only for a static adversary. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the formal model of a secure group ....

....to the group member s membership secret. The JOIN protocol in the Camenisch Michels scheme is not; in fact, it requires the group member to expose the product of her secret, a prime of special form, and a random prime; such products are in principle susceptible to an attack due to Coppersmith [Cop96]. Although, the parameters of their scheme can be set such that this attack becomes infeasible. Furthermore, the proposed scheme is provably coalition resistant against an adaptive adversary. This o#ers an extra advantage: 3) Camenisch and Michels prove their scheme coalition resistant against ....

D. Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a bivariatre interger equation; factoring with high bits known. In Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT '96, volume 1070 of LNCS, pages 178--189. Springer Verlag, 1996.

....and her commitments to e and z in a groupmember list. Finally, Alice stores the pair (u; e) as her membership key. Of course, 1 , and 2 must be chosen such that e cannot be factored (cf. Section 5.6) and that Assumption 2 holds. In particular 2 1 ( 1 ) 4 must hold (cf. [18]) 5.3 The Generation of a Group Signature Let us first define a group signature and then consider how a group member can compute such a signature. Definition 5. Let , 1 , and 2 be security parameters such that 1, 2 1 g , and 2 g 2 k holds. A group signature sign(xG ....

D. Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a bivariatre interger equation; factoring with high bits known. In U. Maurer, editor, Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT '96, volume 1070 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 178-- 189. Springer Verlag, 1996.

No context found.

D. Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a bivariatre interger equation; factoring with high bits known. In Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT '96, volume 1070 of LNCS, pages 178--189. Springer Verlag, 1996.

No context found.

D. Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a bivariatre interger equation; factoring with high bits known. In Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT '96, volume 1070 of LNCS, pages 178--189. Springer Verlag, 1996.

No context found.

D. Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a bivariatre interger equation; factoring with high bits known. In Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT '96, volume 1070 of LNCS, pages 178--189. Springer Verlag, 1996.

No context found.

D. Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a bivariatre interger equation; factoring with high bits known. In Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT '96, volume 1070 of LNCS, pages 178--189. Springer Verlag, 1996.

No context found.

D. Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a bivariatre interger equation; factoring with high bits known. In Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT '96, volume 1070 of LNCS, pages 178--189. Springer Verlag, 1996.

No context found.

D. Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a Bivariatre interger equation; Factoring with high bits known. In: Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'96, LNCS 1070, pages 178-189. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1996.

No context found.

D. Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a bivariatre interger equation; factoring with high bits known. In Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT '96, volume 1070 of LNCS, pages 178--189. Springer Verlag, 1996.

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