| T. Beth, H.-J. Knobloch, M. Otten, G.J. Simmons, P. Wichmann, \Towards Acceptable Key Escrow Systems", Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Communications and Computer Security, 1994, pp.51-58. |
....have been considered by Aucsmith [1] Third Party Interactions A number of researchers have identi ed the possibility of using a third party service to interact with users and ensure that procedures have been properly followed. The rst paper suggesting this seems to have been by Beth et al. [2] in which they propose a variation on DieHellman key exchange where the third party participates in choosing the session key. A number of potential weaknesses of the scheme were detailed by Horster, Michels and Petersen [14] and they proposed a revised scheme. A signi cantly di erent scheme, but ....
....The most obvious disadvantage of the schemes presented here, in comparison with Desmedt s scheme, is that the third party must be available in order for decryption to take place. This is clearly a considerable overhead. It may be observed that several other schemes require such an overhead [2,13,14]. Furthermore, in distinction to all these schemes the sender does not need to interact with the third party, but only route the message via the third party. In a store andforward application in particular, this is much simpler since there is no real time requirement for interaction. Note also ....
T. Beth, H.-J. Knobloch, M. Otten, G.J. Simmons, P. Wichmann, \Towards Acceptable Key Escrow Systems", Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Communications and Computer Security, 1994, pp.51-58.
.... and solutions To overcome the shortcoming in the Clipper approach that once the interception is allowed by a lawyer the authorities can intercept every further message and also decrypt the monitored older messages, we formulate one requirement which is a slight modification of statement 5 in [BKOS94]. Requirement: If wiretaps are warranted for a precisely defined time interval T , which can be located either in the past, the present or future, authorization by the escrow agency to the investigator must be limited so that exactly this time interval is interceptable. There have been several ....
....the encrypted values EU 1 (KAB;1 ) and EU 2 (KAB;2 ) instead of EU (KAB ) Then the escrow agency reveals the session key K instead of the unit key U . This solution has several drawbacks, as for example the key escrow agents must be involved in every decryption, such that it is not recommended [BKOS94]. 2. Another solution is that the escrow agents could provide a (tamper proof) hardware module that performs the decryption function and doesn t reveal the unit key to the escrow agents [BKOS94] Other hardware based solutions exist [BeOt94] but tamper resistance is essential here. 3. There ....
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T.Beth, H.-J.Knobloch, M.Otten, G.Simmons, P.Wichmann, "Towards Acceptable Key Escrow Systems", Proc. 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Fairfax, Nov. 2--4, (1994), pp. 51--58.
....agency chooses the key and puts it in tamper proof hardware [41] Several objections, both on the social and on the technical fronts, have been raised to these approaches. Also many enhancements and variations, and some alternatives, have been considered. We refer the reader in particular to [15, 16, 10, 8, 17, 24, 22, 26, 30, 42, 5]. The summary from all this work is that no existing proposal seem to be acceptable to all parties involved, and new technical solutions are sought after. 1.2 The climate today Political debate will not make the user versus law enforcement conflict vanish. Even though some would prefer to not ....
T. Beth, H. Knobloch, M. Otten, G. Simmons, and P. Wichmann. Towards acceptable key escrow systems. Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference on Computer and Communications Security , ACM, 1994.
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