Daniel C. Dennett, The intentional stance, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1987.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....theories, which motivate this paper, are discussed in detail in x3; however, some clarification of my general goals in this paper is in order here. Folk psychological notions such as belief and intention provide powerful abstractions with which to specify and model the behavior of complex systems [8, 20]. However, for these concepts to be effectively used in DAI (both science and engineering) they must be given an objective grounding in terms of the architectures that different kinds of systems have and the actions they do. My aim will be to make the social structure of a group of agents ....

Daniel C. Dennett. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

....they satisfy the same formulas of epistemic logic. Finally, in section 6 we show how our approach can be used to ground action selection in the state of the agent, allowing us to verify constructively that the selection of a particular action in a particular environment is correct. Dennett [3] has termed this latter strategy adopting the intentional stance. 2 2 Background We begin by stating some background assumptions which should be satisfied by any model of knowledge ascription applicable to agents with partial knowledge. Our model of agents is deliberately abstract. We assume ....

Daniel C. Dennett. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, 1987.

....Communication between two people is inherently an assumption based process. Since it is never completely possible to directly know the concepts of another person, it is necessary in the course of a conversation to take a stance and rely on assumptions about the other person s thoughts [Den87]. Thus, in a dialog understanding system, there are at least two kinds of assumptions that must be represented: assumptions that the two speakers make, which must be modeled by the system, and assumptions that the system makes about the situation, x the two speakers and their plans, intentions, ....

Daniel C. Dennett. The Intentional Stance. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987. titas89] Toshiro Hasegawa. The ?eatwee Structure Rewrit- ing System Manual. TR-1-0093, ATR, Kyoto, Japan, 1989. (in Japanese).

....desires through motion, sound, form, color and staging. But why do these techniques work The American philosopher Daniel Dennett believes that they work because, in order to understand and predict the behavior of the animate objects around them, people apply what he calls the intentional stance [Den87]. The intentional stance, he argues, involves treating these objects as rational agents whose actions are 33 Figure 3 2: Three characters in the diner environment of (void ) those they deem most likely to further their desires given their beliefs [Den98] Desires are the key to ....

Daniel C. Dennet. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

....true of the world, and dispositions which cause new beliefs or desires to be adopted. This picture has never been developed into any kind of scientific psychology (but see Smedslund [124] for a determined attempt to start such a project) It has, however, 2 been argued (for instance by Dennett [42]) that folk psychology , that is, common sense reasoning about peoples actions in terms of beliefs and desires, is a good description of processes that actually go on at a high level of abstraction in peoples brains. Language use is seen as a form of purposeful behaviour, the object of which is ....

....subjects hidden motivations rather than a new theory of motivation in general. Churchland [22] looked forward to the elimination of folk psychology through its reduction to explanations at the level of neurobiology. The recent resurgence of interest in neural network architectures led Dennett [42] to argue that intentional explanations might still be perfectly valid for a system that could be understood at the neurological level. There is an intermediate position, expressed by Jaynes [76, pp. 28ff] to the effect that the propositional attitudes serve as a tool used by the mind to ....

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Daniel C. Dennett. The intentional stance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

....interacting agents are not required to achieve successful interaction. Even if there is no exact mapping between a mobile robot s physical characteristics and those of a human user, the robot may still be able to convey a message, since communication through action also draws on human common sense [21]. In the next secton we describe how our approach achieves this type of communication. B. Approach: communicating through actions Our goal is to use implicit ways of communication that do not rely on a symbolic language between a human and a robot, but instead to use actions, whose outcomes are ....

Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance, MIT, CAM, 1987.

....about their new neighbours. Humans need to understand the behaviors the robots exhibit towards them, and the mechanisms underlying their social life not how they are designed. Every human observer tries to interpret a system through an anthropomorphic frame, especially in terms of intentions [13]: to make humans willingly interact with robots, the latters have to make sense, to give the impression that their behaviors (towards humans and their conspecifics) are intentional. But, in Collective Robotics, this point is often neglected. Sometimes a human observer is able to attribute an ....

Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987.

....goals, and percepts to other people. This set of metarepresentational abilities, which have been collectively called a theory of mind or the ability to mentalize , allows us to understand the actions and expressions of others within an intentional or goal directed framework (what Dennett [15] has called the intentional stance) The recognition that other individuals have knowledge, perceptions, and intentions that differ from our own is a critical step in a child s development and is believed to be instrumental in self recognition, in providing a perceptual grounding during language ....

....of complex non verbal signals of attention and emotional state. Research from many different disciplines have focused on theory of mind. Students of philosophy have been interested in the understanding of other minds and the representation of knowledge in others. Most recently, Dennett [15] has focused on how organisms naturally adopt an intentional stance and interpret the behaviors of others as if they possess goals, intents, and beliefs. Ethologists have also focused on the issues of theory of mind. Studies of the social skills present in primates and other animals have ....

Daniel C. Dennett. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, 1987.

....use to situations in which the restricted process has led to a breakdown in communication. 1. 1 The problems of belief modelling Understanding peoples states of mind in terms of beliefs, desires and other attitudes is more than a prerequisite of everyday social interaction; many philosophers [6, 7] argue that such categorisations are the best start we have for the detailed scientific analysis of cognition. One tool for such analysis is the generation of models of cognition based on representations of these attitudes. Such models are to be found in computer programs from many disciplines ....

Daniel C. Dennett. The intentional stance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

....goals, and percepts to other people. This set of meta representational abilities, which have been collectively called a theory of mind or the ability to mentalize , allows us to understand the actions and expressions of others within an intentional or goal directed framework (what Dennett [19] has called the intentional stance) The recognition that other individuals have knowledge, perceptions, and intentions that di er from our own is a critical step in a child s development and is believed to be instrumental in self recognition, in providing a perceptual grounding during language ....

....recognition of complex non verbal signals of attention and emotional state. Research from many di erent disciplines has focused on theory of mind. Students of philosophy have been interested in the understanding of other minds and the representation of knowledge in others. Most recently, Dennett [19] has focused on how organisms naturally adopt an intentional stance and interpret the behaviors of others as if they possess goals, intents, and beliefs. Ethologists have also focused on the issues of theory of mind. Studies of the social skills present in primates and other animals have ....

Daniel C. Dennett. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, 1987.

....The framework is intended to provide a basis for the high level specification of behaviour based agents. Keywords: Agent modelling, Planning, Specification of Agent behaviour 1 Introduction The Intentional Deliberation Framework takes what may be loosely described as an intentional stance [8] to the specification of a behaviour based agent. Taking an intentional stance towards an agent involves assuming the existence, within the agent, of attributes that may be construed as mental objects or attitudes. Examples of mental objects or attitudes are beliefs, goals, preferences on goals, ....

Daniel Clement Dennett, The intentional stance, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1987. 291-006 4

....task while providing rigor and flexibility. We motivate a set of definitions of intentions of teams that combine aspects of previous work on intentions, coordination, social commitments, and structure. Social Stance. Two powerful and well known ways of looking at agency are the intentional stance [6, 14], and the knowledge level [15] These approaches legitimize the ascription of intentions to complex physical systems. We implicitly adopt these approaches in defining the intentions of teams. 1 Department of Computer Science, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695 7534, USA, ....

Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

....agents. The notion of agency is intimately connected to ascriptions of belief and intention if something can be considered an agent, it can and must be ascribed at least some relevant beliefs and intentions. That such ascriptions are legitimate has also been argued by McCarthy [9] and Dennett [3]: one only has to realize that groups are, at worst, artificial and complex physical systems. One can do better, however, since the mental properties of groups depend on their members and on how they are structured. Modern theories of intention and belief, e.g. those of Harman, Bratman and ....

Daniel C. Dennett. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

....which language evolved. R. Dunbar, Dun93] Believability. As biological agents humans are specifically attracted to life , watching and studying and talking to other biological agents. Humans seem to be naturally biased to perceive self propelled movement and intentional behavior ( PP95] Den87] indicating a bias to perceive and recognize other biological agents. Humans have a natural tendency to animate and anthromorphize nature ( Wat95] Humans are not the only tool designers in the animal world, but they happen to be the best ones, in terms of creativity of using material and ....

....explicitly model social expertise, e.g. the area of BDI (Belief Desire Intentions, e.g. KGR96] is taking the intentional stance of studying architectures and theories where agents are attributing beliefs, desires, wants, abilities and other mental states to other agents. According to Dennett ( Den87] the behavior of an intentional system can be predicted by the attribution of mental states. The symbolic representation and computational manipulation of beliefs, desires, etc. play a strong role in current intelligent agent research, see [WJ95] However, having found the descriptive account ....

Daniel C. Dennett. The intentional stance. MIT Press, 1987.

....research. We pursue this theme further by motivating a set of definitions of intentions of teams that combine aspects of previous work on intentions, coordination, social commitments, and structure. Social Stance. Two powerful ways of looking at agency are the intentional stance due to Dennett [6] and McCarthy [15] and the knowledge level due to Newell [16] These approaches legitimize the ascription of intentions to complex physical systems. We implicitly adopt these approaches in defining the intentions of teams. Traditionally, the intentional stance supervenes of the design stance, and ....

Daniel C. Dennett. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

....same interface may properly be viewed as an agent by one person and as a tool by another. Nevertheless, people will tend to agree on whether a program is an agent often enough that such a distinction is useful. One can take an agential stance towards a program in the same way as Daniel Dennett [5] proposes a intentional stance as a criteria for deciding whether a program is intelligent . I realize that this view is controversial, and that several influential interface researchers have argued strongly against the desirability of such agents [12] Having an agent operate directly in the ....

Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance, MIT Press/Bradford Books, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

....that an agent can be a robot, a program being executed, an animal or a human being. Some researchers have suggested that an interesting resource in the study of agents is the attribution of mental capabilities to agents, similar to those possessed by humans. By adopting this intentional stance [Den87] MSae90] one obtains a more expressive theory in terms of its explanatory and predictive powers (See [Lif90a] quoted in [Sho90] Consequently, we extend the previous definition to include those concepts which can be useful to the understanding of behaviour of any kind of agent, including ....

Daniel Denett. The Intentional Stance. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

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Daniel C. Dennett, The intentional stance, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1987.

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D. C. Denett, The Intentional Stance, The MIT Press, 1987.

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Daniel C. Dennett, The intentional stance, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1987.

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Daniel C. Denett. The Intentional Stance. The MIT Press, 1987.

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Daniel C. Dennett. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

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Daniel C. Dennett. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

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:87-106, 1971. Daniel C. Dennett. The intentional stance. MIT Press,

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