C. Mitchell, "Limitations of challenge-response entity authentication", Electronics Letters 25 No.17 (Aug. 1989), 1195-1196.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... with problems such as dealing with the asynchronous world [1] Gong and Syverson present fail stop protocols under a restrictive class of protocol design rules, that avoid these attacks under certain conditions [3] Some other attempts have been exclusively directed towards countering reflections [7]. These mechanisms work by including the identity of sender, recipient or both in messages. Suggestions of binding cryptographic keys to their intended use, specialized use of shared keys to identify sender and receiver have been cited in numerous places including [8] 9] 10] 4] but are ....

....from previously completed runs and not from interleaved runs) However, the proof we are going to present will establish that even such behavior does not succeed in breaking a protocol in this scheme. Further, hashing with participants identities (cited as useful in numerous places including [4] [7], 10] prevents other attempts to spoof user identities and launch man in middle type attacks. The proof we are going to present in this paper follows a simple concept to establish the desired results, following a proof structure laid out in [11] If a protocol is secure in the absence of ....

C. Mitchell. Limitations of Challenge-Response Entity Authentication. Electronic Letters, 25(17):1195--1196, August 1989.

....focus on classical challenge response protocols, where the verifier knows the secret associated with the prover, and uses it to verify the response. A considerable amount of work has been carried out on the design and analysis of two party challenge response protocols for entity authentication [9, 3]. In this paper, we consider the multi party case, which, to the best of our knowledge, has been neglected so far. In multi party entity authentica tion, each of the n (n 2) participating parties proves its identity to each of the other parties. Although, in principle, multi party entity ....

C. Mitchell. Limitations of challenge-response entity authentication. IEE Electronics Letters, 25(17), 1989.

....that can help us in creating authentication mechanisms (digital signatures, MACs, symmetric encryption, etc. using them in an effective manner is surprisingly difficult. 4. 1 Message Replay Attacks One of the deadliest attacks against authentication mechanisms is the message replay attack [39] in which the adversary simply takes a previously sent message and sends it again. This attack is deceptively powerful as can be seen by the next example: suppose a user sent a message to his wife saying, I love you . A few years later, after the user has been divorced, an attacker could re send ....

MITCHELL, C. Limitations of challenge-response entity authentication. Electronics letters, 25 (August 1989), 1195--1196.

....that can help us in creating authentication mechanisms (digital signatures, MACs, symmetric encryption, etc. using them in an e ective manner is surprisingly dicult. 4. 1 Message Replay Attacks One of the deadliest attacks against authentication mechanisms is the message replay attack [47] in which the adversary simply takes a previously sent message and sends it again. This attack is deceptively powerful as can be seen by the next example: suppose a user sent a message to his wife saying, I love you . A few years later, after the user has been divorced, an attacker could re send ....

Mitchell, C. Limitations of challenge-response entity authentication. Electronics letters, 25 (August 1989), 1195-1196.

....and B s ephemeral keys g x and g y with keys g x and g y of its choice. E can then compute the session keys formed by A and B (g xy and g xy , respectively) and use these to translate messages exchanged between A and B that are encrypted under the session keys. 2. reflection attack [34]. A s challenges are replayed back to A as messages purportedly from B. 3. interleaving attack [12, 21] The adversary reuses messages transmitted during a run of the protocol in other runs of the protocol. Such attacks are typically very subtle and require little computational overhead. They ....

C. Mitchell, "Limitations of challenge-response entity authentication", Electronics Letters, 25 (August 17, 1989), 1195-1196.

....be generally useful for determining message expiration. Similarly, mechanisms localizing to a particular run are only of value against run external attacks. Another kind of countermeasure is one that indicates who a message is from, who it is to, or both. Some examples of these are discussed in [Mit89] with respect to reflection attacks on particular protocols. The taxonomy delimits the applicability of these sorts of countermeasures as well. One mechanism Mitchell discusses is encrypted from fields, which cryptographically bind the name of the message originator to the message. These will ....

....straight replays. Another mechanism discussed precludes mistaking either sender or receiver of a message via specialized use of shared keys. This will rule out both reflections and third party deflections but not straight replays. Some other related countermeasures are discussed in [Gon93] As in [Mit89] discussion is explicitly limited there to countering reflections. Both of those papers propose introducing asymmetry between messages X sends to Y and those Y sends to X as a simple means of countering replay. This is also proposed in [BGH 93] As mentioned, we should only expect this to ....

C. Mitchell. Limitations of ChallengeResponse Entity Authentication. Electronic Letters, 25(17):1195--1196, August 1989.

....is not achieved. Some alternative methods include: ffl Challenge Response which requires the server to send a challenge to the client, who encrypts it using a secret key known to both, and returns it for verification to the server (for more details see [davies price security networks 1984 ] [1]) ffl Trusted Key Server involves the client and server both participating in a trusted key authentication system, such as Kerberos [2] with whom they each have a secret key. It is used to exchange messages validating the identity of the parties in a session. ffl Public Notary is ....

C. Mitchell, "Limitations of Challenge-Response Entity Authentication," Electronics Letters, 25, no. 17, pp. , 17th Aug. 1989.

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C. Mitchell, "Limitations of challenge-response entity authentication", Electronics Letters 25 No.17 (Aug. 1989), 1195-1196.

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Chris J. Mitchell. Limitations of challenge-response entity authentication. Electronics Letters, 25:1195--1196, 1989.

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C. Mitchell, "Limitation of a challenge- response entity authentication," Electronic Letters, vol. 25, No.17, pp. 1195- 1196, Aug 1989.

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C. Mitchell, "Limitation of a challenge- response entity authentication," Electronic Letters, vol. 25, No.17, pp. 1195- 1196, Aug 1989.

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C.MITCHELL. Limitations of Challenge-Response Entity Authentication , Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Filton Road, Stoke Gifford, Bristol BS12 6QZ, United Kingdom, 19th May 1989. Electronic Letters 17th August 1989, Vol.25 No.17.

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