M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham. Rejoinder to Nessett. ACM Operating Systems Review, 24(2):39--40, April 1990.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... in [100] where a good session key is sent in a message where it is signed rather than encrypted while at the same time, the author is able to construct a proof the protocol ensures that the participants gain confidence in the key; it is claimed to a flaw in the logic; the claim is rebutted in [28]. The argument is that because exposing a secret key violates the assumption that the key is secret, and any arguments based on this flawed assumption must, inevitably, lead to false assertions. The crux of the problem is that the assumption A believes A B is violated by A with the sending of ....

.... Even if only finite protocols are considered, and restrictions are placed on the generation of nonces and encryption keys, security is still undecidable [42] The logics for authentication all make it quite clear that secrecy is a property that can not be analyzed; for a discussion see [100, 28, 133]. In order to discuss with precision the issues related to security in distributed systems, powerful tools are needed. There are logics to analyse whether authentication protocols meet their goals, and under which assumptions. Furthermore, after authentication has been done, the question of ....

BURROWS, M., ABADI, M., AND NEEDHAM, R. M. Rejoinder to Nesset. ACM Operating System Review 24, 2 (Apr. 1990), 39--40.

.... raised the difficulty with this assumption of secrecy [24] no satisfactory answer could be provided, although it is probably unfair to say that the logic of Burrows, Abadi, and Needham (the BAN logic) is flawed because the logic s scope is explicitly defined not to handle the issue of secrecy [7]. Nevertheless, this secrecy assumption is paradoxical in that whether a secret can remain secret may depend crucially on whether the protocol is secure. Thus the assumption cannot be used to derive the security of the protocol unless a separate mechanism can justify this assumption. None of the ....

M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R.M. Needham. Rejoinder to Nessett. ACM Operating Systems Review, 24(2):39--40, April 1990.

....3 Indeed, when Nessett [24] raised the difficulty with this assumption of secrecy, no satisfactory answer could be provided. However, it is probably unfair to say that the logic of Burrows, Abadi, and Needham is flawed the logic s scope is explicitly defined not to cover the issue of secrecy [7]. None of the later extensions of this logic resolves this difficulty. An earlier work by Dolev and Yao [11] proved that protocols using public key cryptosystems [10] and having certain very rigid structures can automatically satisfy the secrecy assumption. However, the restrictions on the ....

M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R.M. Needham. Rejoinder to Nessett. ACM Operating Systems Review, 24(2):39--40, April 1990.

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M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham. Rejoinder to Nessett. ACM Operating Systems Review, 24(2):39--40, April 1990.

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Burrows, M., Abadi, M., and Needham, R. M., 'Rejoinder to Nessett', ACM Operating Systems Review, vol. 24, no. 2, April 1990, pp. 39-40

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M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham. Rejoinder to Nessett. ACM Operating Systems Review, 24(2):39--40, April 1990.

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M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham. Rejoinder to Nessett. ACM Operating Systems Review, 24(2):39--40, April 1990.

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