| J. Vitek. Secure object spaces. In Proc. of 2nd Int. Workshop on Mobile Object Systems, Linz, July 1996. |
....is synchronous; both sender and receivers have to be awakened. In Planet, on the other hand, object passing is asynchronous; the sender and the receiver can communicate objects independently of the other s lifetime. This style of object passing is similar to that in Secure Object Spaces [11]. Since a place might be visited byanumber of inherently enigmatic activities, a place must have a protection mechanism. The protection mechanism should provide at least two functionalities: the computational resources of a place must not be affected by accidental or intentional violations of ....
J. Vitek. Secure object spaces. In Proc. of 2nd Int. Workshop on Mobile Object Systems, Linz, July 1996.
....2, 3, and 4, respectively. Security issues of mobile object systems are vast, and this survey focuses on only the execution mechanism issues. Issues not discussed but related closely to the secure execution mechanisms are those involving language design (e.g. 6] and communication (e.g. [20]) 2 Interpreter Approaches One obvious way to implement a safe mobile object system is to adopt the interpreter based approach, whichinterprets every code by using a software interpreter. The interpreted code can be an intermediate compiled code, frequently called bytecode,ora non compiled ....
J. Vitek. Secure object spaces. In Proc. of 2nd Int. Workshop on Mobile Object Systems, Linz, July 1996.
....representation transmitted over the lines is not modified, either by malicious intent or by errors in the transmission process. Privacy mechanisms ensure that third parties not involved in interCE communication cannot read the information transmitted over the network. IntraCE security, as noted in [24], encompasses security among different EUs, between EUs and the hosting CE, and between the CE and the supporting operating system. Most of these issues are addressed by access control techniques. Access control of EU to CE s resources is based on the identity of EUs, as determined by the ....
Jan Vitek. Secure object spaces. In Proceedings of the 2 nd ECOOP Workshop on Mobile Object Systems, July 1996.
....from the traditional distributed objects paradigm and open a whole new world of considerations, especially in the area of security. For this reason, this work doesn t cover mobile agent systems. Discussions of strongly mobile technologies can be found in [CGPV96, Kat96, SBH96, Vig97, VST96, Vit96] The use of mobile code, especially on the Internet, raises serious security concerns. Because users are not always aware that remote code is being linked with their applications, and because such code has potential access to all of the machine resources, security mechanisms have to be available ....
Jan Vitek. Secure object spaces. In Proceedings of the Second International ECOOP Workshop on Mobile Object Systems, Linz, Austria, July 1996.
....untrusting (or untrusted) platform; hosts, whether fixed or mobile, will grant privileges to visiting objects only as qualifications or identity are proved. For instance, messaging between untrusted objects on a platform may be given specially tuned semantics, such as those in Secure Object Spaces [22] where untrusted objects communicate by exchanging tuples through a passive data area. Metaspaces provide a natural expression of both mobility and the acquisition of properties by objects; in Figure 6, an object s migration from one system to another is shown (arrow #1) After arriving, the ....
Jan Vitek. Secure object spaces. In 2nd International Workshop on Mobile Object Systems, ECOOP '96, 1996.
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