| Joseph Y. Halpern and Riccardo Pucella. Modeling adversaries in a logic for security protocol analysis. In Formal Aspects of Security, First International Conference, FASec 2002. |
.... edges, but P s view does not change when moving across one of them, then delete that edge. The resulting chain tr is called P s observation of the protocol, Obsv P (S; tr) Intuitively, P s observation is just P s own history in the trace. In the spirit of algorithmic knowledge [16, 22], observations Obsv P (S; tr) and Obsv P (S ) are equivalent if they are computationally indistinguishable by P . Definition 9. Given a trace tr from S 0 ending in S, we say that P knows in (S; tr) that logical formula F is true if i) F is true in S, and ii) for each trace tr from S 0 ....
R. Pucella and J. Halpern. Modeling adversaries in a logic for security protocol analysis. In Formal Aspects of Security, 2002 (FASec '02).
No context found.
Joseph Y. Halpern and Riccardo Pucella. Modeling adversaries in a logic for security protocol analysis. In Formal Aspects of Security, First International Conference, FASec 2002.
No context found.
R. Pucella and J. Halpern. Modeling adversaries in a logic for security protocol analysis. In Formal Aspects of Security, 2002 (FASec '02).
No context found.
R. Pucella and J. Halpern. Modeling adversaries in a logic for security protocol analysis. In Formal Aspects of Security, 2002 (FASec '02).
No context found.
R. Pucella and J. Halpern. Modeling adversaries in a logic for security protocol analysis. In Formal Aspects of Security, 2002 (FASec '02).
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