David C. Parkes. Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Annals of Mathematics and AI, 2003. Special Issue on the Foundations of Electronic Commerce, Forthcoming. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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David C. Parkes. Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Annals of Mathematics and AI, 2003. Special Issue on the Foundations of Electronic Commerce, Forthcoming.
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D. C. Parkes. Auction design with costly preference elicitation. In Special Issues of Annals of Mathematics and AI on the Foundations of Electronic Commerce, Forthcoming (2003).
Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation in.. - Lahaie, Parkes (2004) (4 citations) Self-citation (Parkes) (Correct)
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David C. Parkes. Auction design with costly preference elicitation. In Special Issues of Annals of Mathematics and AI on the Foundations of Electronic Commerce, Forthcoming (2003).
Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions - Kothari, Parkes, Suri (2004) (10 citations) Self-citation (Parkes) (Correct)
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David C. Parkes. Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Annals of Mathematics and AI, 2003. Special Issue on the Foundations of Electronic Commerce, Forthcoming.
Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions Using Primal-Dual Algorithms - Mishra, Parkes (2004) Self-citation (Parkes) (Correct)
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David C. Parkes. Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Annals of Mathematics and AI, 2003. Special Issue on the Foundations of Electronic Commerce, Forthcoming.
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D. C. Parkes. Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Annals of Mathematics and AI, 2003. to appear.
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David C. Parkes. Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Annals of Mathematics and AI, 2003. to appear.
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David C. Parkes. Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Annals of Mathematics and AI, 2003. to appear.
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