| D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J.R. Rao and P. Rohatgi. The EM Side-Channel(s). In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES), Springer-Verlag LNCS 2523, 29--45, 2002. |
....which may thus fall into the adversary s hands, and be quite informative at that. For instance, Kocher et al. 17] show that monitoring the electrical power consumed by a smart card running the DES algorithm [22] is enough to retrieve the very secret key In another example, a series of works [23, 2] show that sometimes the electromagnetic radiation emitted by a computation, even measured from a few yards away with a homemade antenna, could suffice to retrieve a secret key. PHYSICALLY OBSERVABLE CRYPTOGRAPHY. Typically, physical observation attacks are soon followed by defensive measures ....
Dakshi Agrawal, Bruce Archambeault, Josyula R. Rao, and Pankaj Rohatgi. The EM side-channel(s). In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Conference (CHES '02), 2002.
....implementation is required. Since their introduction, there has been a lot of work improving the original power attacks (see, e.g. relevant articles in [KP99,KP00,KNP01,KKP02] More recently the first successful attacks based on the analysis of electromagnetic emissions have also been published [AARR] Even though most of the published attacks are not specific to a particular platform, there has usually been an assumption that the underlying platform is either software or an ASIC. There seems to be very little work at the time of writing addressing the feasibility of actual side channel ....
D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J. R. Rao, and P. Rohatgi. The EM Side -- Channel(s). In Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems --- CHES 2002, pages 29--45. Springer-Verlag. LNCS 2523.
.... of the original attacks, e.g. higher order DPA and sliding window DPA and hard and software countermeasures were published [CCD00b,CJR 99b,CJR 99a, Cor99,FR99, GP99,CCD00a,CC00,Sha00,Mes00,MS00] Recently, attacks based on the analysis of electromagnetic emission have also been published [AK96,AARR02]. In the remainder of this publication we do not require an internal collision to be detectable at the output of the cryptographic algorithm. No Author Given The main idea of this contribution is to combine traditional collision attacks with side channel analysis. Traditional collision ....
D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J. R. Rao, and P. Rohatgi. The EM Side -- Channel(s). In C . K. Koc and C. Paar, editors, Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems --- CHES 2002. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
....fashion as the power consumption. It can even be more precise as it is possible to focus to a specific area of the chip. Similarly to the power, the attacks are called Simple Electro Magnetic Analysis (SEMA) and Di#erential Electro Magnetic Analysis (DEMA) For further reference, see [QS01, GMO01, AARR02] The range of attacks is broad. One could be tempted to conclude that smart cards are basically broken down. The reality is more subtle. First, these attacks must be made by highly skilled people and often require expensive hardware. Second, these attacks only break one card at a time and not ....
....with power based attacks. Some people even argue that these attacks are mostly orthogonal with power attacks. In other words, any protection against power attacks will emit radiations and any protection against radiations attacks will have a specific consumption pattern. See [QS00, QS01, GMO01, AARR02] 3. Insecure The range of the attacks can be seen as really impressive. At first sight, the conclusion is simple, smart cards are basically broken down. We must put everything in perspective. First, these attacks must require high skills and often expensive hardware. Second, these attacks ....
D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J. Rao, and P. Rohatgi. The EM SideChannel (s). In Kaliski et al. [KcKKP02], pages 29--45. 34, 121
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D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J.R. Rao and P. Rohatgi. The EM Side-Channel(s). In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES), Springer-Verlag LNCS 2523, 29--45, 2002.
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D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J. Rao, P. Rohatgi, The EM Side-Channel(s), in the proceedings of CHES 2002, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2523, pp 29-45, Redwood City, California, USA, August 2002.
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D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J.R. Rao and P. Rohatgi. The EM Side-Channel(s). In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES), Springer-Verlag LNCS 2523, 29-45, 2002.
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D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J.R. Rao, and P. Rohatgi. The em side-channel(s). In B.S. Kaliski Jr., C .K. Koc, and C. Paar, editors, Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2002, volume 2523 of LNCS, pages 29--45. Springer--Verlag, 2003.
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D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J.R. Rao and P. Rohatgi. The EM Side-Channel(s). In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES), Springer-Verlag LNCS 2523, 29--45, 2002.
No context found.
D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J. R. Rao, and P. Rohatgi. The EM Side-Channel(s). In B. S. Kaliski Jr., . K. Ko, and C. Paar, editors, CHES 2002.
No context found.
D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J.R. Rao and P. Rohatgi. The EM Side-Channel(s). In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES), Springer-Verlag LNCS 2523, 29--45, 2002.
No context found.
D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J.R. Rao and P. Rohatgi. The EM Side-Channel(s). In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES), Springer-Verlag LNCS 2523, 29-45, 2002.
No context found.
D. Agrawal, B. Archambeault, J.R. Rao, and P. Rohatgi. The EM SideChannel (s). In B.S. Kaliski Jr, C .K. Koc, and C. Paar, editors, Wokshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2002.
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