G. Lowe. A hierarchy of authentication specifications. In 43. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1995. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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The Verification of an Industrial Payment Protocol - The Set Purchase (Correct)
....compute the hash of Order Description and Purchase Amount, and the Payment Gateway can compare them. 7. IRRELEVANT PROPERTIES Beside what failed and what succeeded, there are also other properties that are customarily proved for authentication protocols. For instance one can scan Lowe s [10] or Gollmann s [6] classification and check what is verifiable. This is a tricky question because we eliminated fields that are immaterial to the main goals of the protocol but that may be essential for other security properties. For instance we have eliminated request response identifiers which ....
G. Lowe. A hierarchy of authentication specifications. In Proc. of the 10th IEEE Comp. Sec. Found. Workshop, pages 31--43. IEEE Comp. Society Press, 1997.
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....on the protocol and opponent, and techniques relying on theorem proving [Bol96, Pau98] or epistemic logics [BAN89, DMP01] which typically require lengthy expert interaction. Woo and Lam s correspondence assertions [WL93] are safety properties, specifying what is known as injective agreement [Low95]. Given a description of the sequence of messages exchanged by principals in a protocol, we annotate it with labelled events marking the progress of each principal through the protocol. We divide these events into two kinds, begin events and end events. Event labels typically indicate the names of ....
G. Lowe. A hierarchy of authentication specifications. In 10th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 31--43. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1995.
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....b.5) S B : N B At the end of the attack sequence B, accepts the authentication request of A even if A began a session to authenticate itself with E , i.e. there is no correspondence of intentions. This is considered a valid attack to entity authentication by many authors (see, e.g. [27, 16]) Interestingly, the attack exploits the absence of B as intended verifier in message 3. To see that, note that b.3, E forwards to B the message sent by A who is willing to authenticate with E . If the intended verifier (E in this case) were made explicit in the message, such a forwarding would ....
....Safety The purpose of the deduction rules is to generate safe traces, that is traces that provide the intended authentication guarantees for a protocol session. We formulate these guarantees as a safety property for traces following the idea of correspondence between actions of the participants [27, 16]. Intuitively, a trace is safe if every commit A B in the trace is preceded by a corresponding run A action. Formally: Definition 5 (Safety) A trace s is safe if and only if whenever s s 1 : commit A : s 2 , one has s 1 s 1 : run B : s 1 , and s 1 : s 1 : s 2 is ....
G. Lowe. "A Hierarchy of Authentication Specification". In Proceedings of the 10th Computer Security Foundation Workshop. IEEE press, 1997.
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.... cryptographic protocols; see for example Marrero s logic for Brutus [5] Yet others, for example [1, 2] have developed generic requirements that can be applied to any protocol, for example the correspondence requirement developed in [1, 2] But even here it may make sense, as Lowe has argued in [4], to develop families of correspondence requirements suited to di#erent applications rather than a single generic requirement. The next step is to make sure that requirements are easy to read, write, and understand. This, unfortunately, is where temporal languages fall short. Even for relatively ....
G. Lowe. A hierarchy of authentication specifications. In Proceedings of 10th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1997.
Authentication Primitives for Refining Protocol Specifications - Bodei, Degano, Focardi (Correct)
.... is related to the verification of an entity s claimed identity [1] while message authentication should make it possible for the receiver of a message to ascertain its origin [2] In recent years there have been some formalizations of these di#erent aspects of authentication (see, e.g. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16]) These formalizations are crucial for proofs of authentication properties, that sometimes have been automatized (see, e.g. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] # This work has been partially supported by MURST Progetto TOSCA, Progetto AI, TS CFA and Progetto Metodi formali per la Sicurezza . We here ....
G. Lowe. "A Hierarchy of Authentication Specification". In Proc. of the 10th Computer Security Foundation Workshop. IEEE press, 1997.
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