| B. Yang, S. D. Kamvar, and H. Garcia-Molina. Secure Score Management for P2P Systems. Technical report, Stanford University, 2003. |
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B. Yang, S. D. Kamvar, and H. Garcia-Molina. Secure Score Management for P2P Systems. Technical report, Stanford University, 2003.
No context found.
B. Yang, S. D. Kamvar, and H. Garcia-Molina. Secure Score Management for P2P Systems. Technical report, Stanford University, 2003.
....If the peer reuses a token, then anyone who receives two distinct RTRs (queries) with the same RTQ (right to query) can report the RTRs to the broker as evidence of foul play. If no centralized broker is available, we can still limit queries via a distributed quota enforcement system (e.g. [9]) Each peer is allotted a quota of RTQs (e.g. one query per day) RTQs can accumulate over time if not used. A peer can choose to use the RTQ (regardless of whether it really needs a service) or else sell it to peers who wish to buy it. Note also that malicious users cannot send out a bogus ....
B. Yang, S. Kamvar, and H. Garcia-Molina. Secure Score Management in P2P Systems. Technical report, Stanford University, 2003. 6
....problem, with implications for reputation management, incentive systems, and P2P micropayment schemes, among others. An extended discussion of secure score management in P2P networks, and various concrete score management schemes (including a variant of the one presented above) are given in [20]. The main contribution of this work is not in the secure score management scheme, but rather in the core EigenTrust algorithm. We discuss the secure score management scheme because some secure score management scheme is essential to the EigenTrust algorithm. However, it is important to note that ....
....score management scheme because some secure score management scheme is essential to the EigenTrust algorithm. However, it is important to note that the core EigenTrust algorithm may be used with many different secure score management schemes. Second, the secure protocols proposed here and in [20] describe how to use large collections of entities to mitigate singular or groupbased manipulation of the protocol. These protocols are not secured in the traditional sense; rather, we can show that the probability is small that a peer is able to get away with misreporting a score. This is ....
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B. Yang, S. D. Kamvar, and H. Garcia-Molina. Secure Score Management for P2P Systems. Technical report, Stanford University, 2003.
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