| R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. Technical Report, MIT LCS TR429, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 1988. |
....network conditions, it is difficult to determine whether the rate of data reception from a route is fair. Furthermore, disjoint routes to the same receiver can have different fair rates. Due to the difficulties with detecting a misbehaving intermediary that forwards at a lower than fair rate [4] [11], an exciting research direction is a game theoretic approach to forming the distribution hierarchy. Hosts in such optimization framework can choose their own last hop as well as advertise their services for forwarding the data to other hosts. Instead of detecting an unfair reception rate, a ....
R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols With Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, Laboratory for Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1988.
.... for routing protocols was explored using digital signatures [41] or symmetric cryptography based methods: hash chains [25] chains of one time signatures [61] or HMAC [23] Intrusion detection is another topic that researchers focused on, for generic link state [60, 47] or OSPF [59] Perlman [45] designed the Network layer Protocol with Byzantine Robustness (NPBR) which addresses denial of service at the expense of flooding and digital signatures. The problem of byzan tine nodes that simply drop packets (black holes) in wired networks is explored in [17, 12] The approach in [17] is to ....
R.adia Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzan- tine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT LCS TR-429, Octo- ber 1988.
....databases of several hundred nodes. We also suggest a number of work arounds, including one based on using intrusion detection systems to modify routing metrics. 1 Introduction traffic past an enemy controlled point for purposes of eavesdropping or connection hijacking [1] have long been known [2, 3]. In such attacks, an enemy advertises a false route. That is, some node claims to have a better (lower cost) route to a given destination. That will induce other nodes to send traffic for that destination to (or towards) the subverted node, where it can be captured by the enemy. The false ....
Radia Perlman, Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness, Ph.D. thesis, M.I.T., 1988.
.... is an integral part of our routing logic rules for safety [21, 22, 23, 25] Additionally, previous work has proposed extensions or alternatives to contemporary wide area routing protocols that improve certain properties, such as scalability [7] the ability to withstand certain types of failures [34], and defense against malicious or incorrect route advertisements [26] Architectures involving route servers out of band from BGP itself have been proposed as solutions for policy oscillation and route hijacking [1, 18, 19] 6. Conclusion In this paper, we have presented a routing logic: a set ....
PERLMAN, R. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 1988. MIT-LCS-TR-429. http://www.lcs.mit.edu/ publications/specpub.php?id=997.
....by the reputation system entries and it can choose to consider the ratings of other nodes or to rely solely on its own observations. One node can have varying reputation records with other nodes across the network, and the subjective view of each node determines its actions. Byzantine robustness [16] in the sense of being able to tolerate a number of erratically behaving servers or in this case nodes is the goal of a reputation system in mobile ad hoc networks. Here, the detection of malicious nodes by means of the reputation systems has to be followed by a response in order to render these ....
Radia Perlman. Network layer protocols with byzantine robustness. PhD. Thesis Massachussetts Institute of Technology, 1988.
....(DA) Insider Attack, Impersonation Attack, Link State Routing. I. INTRODUCTION Present link state routing protocols are vulnerable to security attacks. There have been several attempts to address this issue. Perlman proposed a link state routing protocol that achieves Byzantine Robustness [10]. Her protocol is highly robust but has a high computational overhead associated with the publickey encryption. Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) 8] link state routing protocol has provision to provide links state routing Packet Authentication (PA) based on a shared key using a oneway hash function ....
R. Perlman, "Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness", MIT/LCS/TR-429, October 1988.
....network conditions, it is difficult to determine whether the rate of data reception from a route is fair. Furthermore, disjoint routes to the same receiver can have different fair rates. Due to the difficulties with detecting a misbehaving intermediary that forwards at a lower than fair rate [4] [11], an exciting research direction is a game theoretic approach to forming the distribution hierarchy. Hosts in such optimization framework can choose their own last hop as well as advertise their services for forwarding the data to other hosts. Instead of detecting an unfair reception rate, a ....
R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols With Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, Laboratory for Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1988.
....by the reputation system entries and it can choose to consider the beliefs of other nodes or to rely solely on its own observations. One node can have varying reputation records with other nodes across the network, and the subjective view of each node determines its actions. Byzantine robustness [14] in the sense of being able to tolerate a number of erratically behaving servers or in this case nodes is the goal of a reputation system in mobile ad hoc networks. Here, the detection of misbehaved nodes by means of the reputation systems has to be followed by a response in order to render these ....
Radia Perlman. Network layer protocols with byzantine robustness. PhD. Thesis Massachussetts Institute of Technology, 1988.
....a more conventional denialof service attack against their intended targets in any event probably without ever needing to subvert the routing system. 8. RELATED WORK There have been several pieces of work on making Internet routing protocols robust against attacks by malicious entities. Perlman [9, 10] presents an approach for sabotageproof routing. The key idea is to use robust ooding to distribute link state packets (LSPs) and the public keys of all nodes throughout the network. Robust data routing is then accomplished by having end hosts construct digitally signed source routes using ....
R. Perlman. \Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness", Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, MIT, August 1988.
....types of attacks and one that destroys the routing infrastructure of the Internet could cause great damage. Secure BGP is based on BGP but uses a public key infrastructure to provide protection against impersonators and liars. The ideas are loosely based upon work previously done by Radia Perlman[6]. Every BGP speaker is given a public and private key so that it can sign messages, proving that it wrote the message. First, the keys are used to set up a secure the connections between BGP speakers with IPsec [4] using at least the authentication options if not also the encryption ones. Then the ....
R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 1988.
....more conventional denialof service attack against their intended targets in any event probably without ever needing to subvert the routing system. 8. RELATED WORK There have been several pieces of work on making Internet routing protocols robust against attacks by malicious enti ties. Periman [9, 10] presents an approach for sabotage proof routing. The key idea is to use robust flooding to distribute link state packets (LSPs) and the public keys of all nodes throughout the network. FI.obust data routing is then accomplished by having end hosts construct digitally signed source routes ....
R. Perlman. "Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness", Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, MIT, August 1988.
....the same company. If the company les Chapter 7 bankruptcy, both AS s will go down. It is also possible that disjoint routes go through the same physical wire, or the same wiring closet. Our future research will try to address this problem. 5. RELATED WORK Previous work on byzantine robustness [16] addressed many of the same security problems we discuss in this paper. There are three major di erences between Perlman s proposal and ours. First we realized that the transit routers do not need to know about the network topology. This optimization makes the transit routers resource ....
R. Perlman. Network layer protocols with byzantine robustness. Technical Report 429, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, 1988.
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R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. Technical Report, MIT LCS TR429, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 1988.
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R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. MIT LCS TR-429, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 1988.
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R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT LCS TR-429, Oct. 1988.
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R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. Technical Report MIT/LCS/TR429, October 1988.
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Radia Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT LCS TR-429, October 1988.
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Radia Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT LCS TR-429, October 1988.
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R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. Technical Report MIT/LCS/TR429, October 1988.
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Perlman, R., Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness, MIT Thesis, August 1988.
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R. Perlman, Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness, MIT LCS TR-429, Oct. 1988.
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R. Perlman, Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness, MIT LCS TR-429, Oct. 1988.
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R. Perlman, Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness, MIT LCS TR-429, Oct. 1988.
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R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT, 1988.
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R. Perlman, Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 1988.
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Radia Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT LCS TR-429, October 1988.
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Radia Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT LCS TR-429, October 1988.
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R. Perlman. "Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness ", Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, MIT, August 1988.
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R. Perlman, Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Aug. 1988.
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R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT, 1988.
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R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 1988.
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R. Perlman, Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT LCS TR-429, October 1988.
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R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT, 1988.
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Perlman, R., Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness, Ph.D. Dissertation, MITLCS TR-429, 1988.
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R. Perlman, "Network Layer Protocols With Byzantine Robustness, " MIT/LCS/TR-429, October, 1988.
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R. Perlman, "Network Layer Protocol with Byzantine Robustness", Ph.D. Thesis, Dept. of EE and CS, MIT, August, 1988.
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Radia Perlman. Network layer protocols with byzantine robustness. PhD. Thesis Massachussetts Institute of Technology, 1988.
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Radia Perlman. Network layer protocols with byzantine robustness. PhD. Thesis Massachussetts Institute of Technology, 1988.
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Radia Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT LCS TR-429, October 1988.
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R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT, 1988.
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R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. Report MIT/LCS/TR 429, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 1988.
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R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 1988.
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R. Perlman, "Network Layer Protocols With Byzantine Robustness," MIT/LCS/TR-429, October, 1988.
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Perlman, R., "Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness ", Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, MIT, August 1988.
No context found.
R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988.
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R. Perlman, Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness,Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Aug. 1988.
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R. Perlman, Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 1988.
No context found.
R. Perlman. Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD thesis, MIT, 1988.
No context found.
R. Perlman, Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Aug. 1988.
No context found.
Perlman, R., "Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness", Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, MIT, August 1988.
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