| C. M. Ellison, B. Frantz, B. Lampson, R. L. Rivest, B. M. Thomas, and T. Ylonen. SPKI certicate theory. RFC 2693, 1999. |
....Such a PKI for infrastructure operators (as opposed to end users) is not unthinkable, as the widely deployed SSL PKI for Web servers demonstrates; however, it cannot necessarily be assumed. In its absence, various ad hoc mechanisms can be used. For example, PGP style Web of trust techniques [16, 2] can be used to propagate routers public keys from node to (trusting) node; using Web or email based protocols, nodes can distribute public keys of nodes they have established con dence in the sources of, and receive such keys in turn from others whose judgments they trust. Similarly, certain ....
C. Ellison, B. Frantz, B. Lampson, R. Rivest, B. Thomas and T. Ylonen. \SPKI Certi cate Theory", RFC 2693, September 1999.
No context found.
C. M. Ellison, B. Frantz, B. Lampson, R. L. Rivest, B. M. Thomas, and T. Ylonen. SPKI certicate theory. RFC 2693, 1999.
No context found.
C. Ellison, B. Frantz, B. Lampson, R. Rivest, B. Thomas, and T. Ylonen. SPKI Certi cate Theory. Technical Report RFC 2693, Network Working Group, Sept 1999.
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC