| G. O'Shea and M. Roe. Child-proof authentication for MIPv6 (CAM). ACM Computer Communications Review, April 2001. |
....the system can easily be penetrated by an adversary who could obtain access to the password by means of a microphone or a camera. Another approach, originally designed for the address ownership problem in Mobile IPv6, is described by Montenegro and Castelluccia in [21] and by O Shea and Roe in [22]. Their idea is to derive the IP address of the node from its public key: first, the public key is hashed with a cryptographic hash function, and then, part of) the hash value is used as part of the IP address of the node. The advantage is that there is no longer need for certificates that bind ....
....will briefly point out at the appropriate places how it can incorporate multiple key pairs per node. Each node must have a node address that is used by the routing protocol. We assume that the node address is generated from the public key of the node by making use of a technique similar to CAM [22] or SUCV [21] In this way, node addresses become verifiable. Note that a malicious node may generate several node addresses for itself and freely distribute them to other nodes. Whether this is a problem very much depends on how the routing protocol is secured. A thorough study of this issue is ....
G. O'Shea and M. Roe. Child-proof authentication for MIPv6 (CAM). ACM Computer Communications Review, April 2001.
.... Generated Addresses A recently discovered technique provides an intermediate level of security below strong public key authentication and above routing based methods (which will be described in the following section) The idea, first introduced in a MIPv6 BU authentication protocol called CAM [OR01], is to form the last 64 bits of the IP address (the interface identifier) by computing a 64 bit one way hash of the node s public signature key. The node signs its location information with the corresponding private key and sends the public key along with the signed data. The recipient hashes the ....
Greg O'Shea and Michael Roe. Child-proof authentication for M1Pv6 (CAM). ACM Computer Communications Review, 31 (2), April 2001.
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G. O'Shea and M. Roe. Child-proof authentication for MIPv6 (CAM). ACM Computer Communications Review, April 2001.
No context found.
G. O'Shea and M. Roe. Child-proof authentication for MIPv6 (CAM). ACM Computer Communications Review, April 2001.
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