M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically biased coin. In Proceedings of the 24th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 11--22, Tucson, 1983. IEEE.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....decryption key, and then obtaining the decryption key from a di#erent source) We show how to solve this problem in section 4. The initial work on fair exchange designed two party and multi party protocols for secure computation that solve the problem of early termination without a trusted party [5, 16, 7, 13]. These protocols are either generic or discuss the specific problem of fair tossing of a random coin. The main drawback of these protocols is that each exchange requires a considerable number of exponentiations and a number of rounds that is linear in the security parameter (and therefore quite ....

M. Luby, S. Micali and C. Racko#, How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically-biased coin, 25th FOCS, pp. 11-21, 1984.

....is a generalization of the notion of fairness. In this section, we give an intuition about the former starting from a common interpretation of the latter. The notion of fairness first appeared in the context of protocols for exchange of secrets, contract signing, and certified electronic mail [10, 11, 7, 27, 38, 65, 85, 75, 83, 88]. More recently, fairness has also been studied in the context of protocols for exchange of documents, electronic sale, and non repudiation [6, 5, 20, 28, 31, 53, 57, 58, 89, 90] The most widely used intuitive interpretation of fairness says that a protocol is fair if no protocol participant can ....

....3.1 Introduction 3.1.1 Preliminaries FR s protocol [42] enables two parties X and Y to exchange documents with the mediation of a third party Z. It was designed to guarantee fair exchange , i.e. no party should be able to 1 We have not included here earlier work on contract signing [10, 11, 88, 65, 85, 27], because they are inefficient (not practical) and not applicable to electronic commerce protocols. 31 gain any advantage by quitting prematurely or otherwise misbehaving. Franklin and Reiter take fair exchange in a strict sense: a party engaged in an exchange should not be able to trick the ....

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically-biased coin. In Proceedings of the 25th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 11--21, 1984.

....under the aforementioned assumptions took much effort, and has not been completely resolved. For instance, defining privacy when the participants are computationally restricted is intrinsically different from the case where they are unrestricted. The fairness problem has been studied early [31] and has been elegantly solved [11] at least theoretically. More recently, people have come up with a general model that tries to encompass all the various properties and assumptions [2, 1, 32] However, with the advent of quantum protocols these models need more study. Yet another issue is the ....

M. Luby, S. Micali, & C. Rackoff (1983). How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically biased coin. In Proc. 24th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Comp. Science, pages 11--22, Tucson. IEEE.

....under the aforementioned assumptions took much effort, and has not been completely resolved. For instance, defining privacy when the participants are computationally restricted is intrinsically different from the case where they are unrestricted. The fairness problem has been studied early [31] and has been elegantly solved [11] at least theoretically. More recently, people have come up with a general model that tries to encompass all the various properties and assumptions [2, 1, 32] However, with the advent of quantum protocols these models need more study. Yet another issue is the ....

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically biased coin. In Proc. 24th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Comp. Science, pages 11--22, Tucson, 1983. IEEE.

....acute for 2 party protocols. Roughly said, a protocol is fair if one party does not get much information before the other party also does. even a single bit may be too much ) The treatment of this subject started with the single bit secret exchange protocol of Luby, Micali and Rackoff [LMR83]. Other results on fairness can be found in [BOGMR85,Blu84,Ted85,GHY85,Yao87,Cle89] Finally Beaver and Goldwasser provided a general treatment of the subject in [BG89] This crucial property will be totally ignored in this thesis as our protocols are not designed to exchange information, but only ....

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically biased coin. In Proceedings of the 24th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 11--22, Tucson, 1983. IEEE.

....fair exchange can ensure that a certified electronic mail is delivered to its destination if and only if a proof of that delivery is delivered to its sender. Early study yielded elegant but typically inefficient solutions to the fair exchange problem and the related contract signing problem [Blu81, Blu83, Yao86, LMR84, VV83, Cle89]. Also in this vein is recent work on ripping offline electronic coins [Jak95] this gives efficient two party solutions to a problem related to fair purchase using off line electronic cash, by removing the main financial incentive for cheating but without guaranteeing fairness. Most recent, ....

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically-biased coin. In Proceedings of the 25th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 11--21, 1984.

....which also arises in the certification of public keys, is outside the scope of this paper. Protocols for 2 party fair exchange can be divided into two categories, on the basis of the possible use of an additional, neutral participant. A number of theoretically important protocols, beginning with [6, 14, 16], avoid the use of a neutral party altogether. A number of practically important protocols use a neutral party, with the Research supported by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, Information Technology Office (DARPA ITO) under contract DABT63 97 C 0031. requirement that the neutral ....

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetricallybiased coin. In IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 11--21, November 1984.

....should not be able to get partial information about more than one of the bits. This paper shows a way to make verifiable this protocol (v Gamma 2 1 Delta Oblivious Bit Transfer ) and shows that it can be used to directly achieve oblivious circuit evaluation [Ki] and fair exchange of bits [MRL], assuming the existence of a non verifiable version of the protocol. 1 Introduction The study of disclosure protocols has greatly evolved recently. Oblivious transfer has now been used for quite a while as a standard primitive tool for construction of cryptographic protocols [Ra] Bl] The ....

....verifiability of v i 2 1 j Oblivious Bit Transfer . The outcome is y 2 . By repeating this technique, all the gates of a circuit can be evaluated easily. 8 Fair OCE A Fair OCE can be obtained by combining an OCE and a Fair Exchange of BIT protocol like the one of Micali, Rackoff and Luby [MRL]. Such a protocol can be achieved easily. Remember that the basic idea of [MRL] s protocol is that Sam and Rachel who want to exchange bits b 0 and b 1 , flip a coin secretly that is slightly biased toward b 0 Phi b 1 . Let ffl = p q be the bias they wish to obtain. Sam commits to q secrets ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Micali, Silvio, Charles Rackoff, Mike Luby, "How to Simultaneously Exchange a Secret Bit by flipping Assymetrically Biased coins", Proceedings of the 24 th FOCS, IEEE, 1983, 11--21.

....of one prime factor, while proving that the bit is valid; being one bit ahead is of negligible advantage to a player who halts the protocol prematurely. When the secrets are single bits, then no deterministic algorithms are known. A probabilistic solution was found by Luby, Micali, and Rackoff [60]: alternating flips of slightly biased coins gradually yield statistical information about the values of the secrets, and quitting leaves one player with the negligible advantage of knowing the outcome of at most one additional coin flip. Vazirani and Vazirani [72] investigated a similar but ....

.... power; otherwise, the adversary could halt when only it had enough bits of the trapdoor key to determine the result (e.g. by exhaustive search of all completions of the key) Beaver and Goldwasser [13] present a different way of achieving fairness for boolean functions (similar to Luby et al. [60]) under the weaker assumption that an Oblivious Transfer protocol exists. It also does not rely on the computational equivalence of the adversary and the honest players. Instead of gradually revealing an encryption key that hides the output, what is gradually revealed is a series of values ....

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff, "How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically-biased coin," IEEE FOCS 1984, 11-21.

....The certified electronic mail problem is similar to the contract signing problem above. The goal is to achieve a simultaneous exchange of an electronic letter M and a signed receipt for M from the recipient. Another exchange problem is the simultaneous exchange of secrets. This has been studied in [25, 155, 110, 161]. 9.2 Zero Knowledge Protocols The previous section listed a number of cryptographic protocol applications. In this section we review the theory that has been developed to prove that these protocols are secure, and to design protocols that are provably secure by construction . 9.2.1 ....

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically biased coin. In Proceedings of the 24th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 11--22, IEEE, Tucson, 1983.

....critical test case for the cryptography community as the notion of security grew in sophistication over the years. Oblivious Transfer [26] 23] 34] is a fundamental two party protocol that transfers a bit with uncertainty; it is discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.2. Secret exchange [28] 31] [107] [89] 140] is a two party protocol that transfers a message in each direction with certainty; it is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.4. Electronic money [38] 39] is a collection of protocols (e.g, withdrawal, purchase, deposit) that implement payment schemes without any physical ....

....of one prime factor, while proving that the bit is valid; being one bit ahead is of negligible advantage to a player who halts the protocol prematurely. When the secrets are single bits, then no deterministic algorithms are known. A probabilistic solution was found by Luby, Micali, and Rackoff [107]: alternating flips of slightly biased coins gradually yield statistical information about the values of the secrets, and quitting leaves one player with the negligible advantage of knowing the outcome of at most one additional coin flip. Vazirani and Vazirani [137] investigated a similar but ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff, "How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically-biased coin," IEEE FOCS 1984, 11--21.

....critical test case for the cryptography community as the notion of security grew in sophistication over the years. Oblivious Transfer [23] 21] 29] is a fundamental two party protocol that transfers a bit with uncertainty; it is discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.2. Secret exchange [25] 27] [76] [64] 95] is a two party protocol that transfers a message in each direction with certainty; it is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.4. Electronic money [32] 33] is a collection of protocols (e.g, withdrawal, purchase, deposit) that implement payment schemes without any physical ....

....of one prime factor, while proving that the bit is valid; being one bit ahead is of negligible advantage to a player who halts the protocol prematurely. When the secrets are single bits, then no deterministic algorithms are known. A probabilistic solution was found by Luby, Micali, and Rackoff [76]: alternating flips of slightly biased coins gradually yield statistical information about the values of the secrets, and quitting leaves one player with the negligible advantage of knowing the outcome of at most one additional coin flip. Vazirani and Vazirani [92] investigated a similar but ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff, "How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically-biased coin," IEEE FOCS 1984, 11-21.

....to compute it obliviously, so that at the end of the game they both have the value v = f(xA ; xB ) but neither knows anything else. There are protocols for this task, and they are quite complex. We refer the reader to [10, 39] 10.1. 6 Simultaneous Secret Exchange Protocol This has been studied in [33, 181, 119, 186]. The protocol given here is an example of a protocol that seems to work at first glance, but is in actuality open to cheating for similar reasons that the above oblivious transfer protocol was open to cheating. The common input consists of 1 k ; ff 2 EnA (s A ) fi 2 EnB (s B ) nA , and nB , ....

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically biased coin. In Proc. 24th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Comp. Science, pages 11--22, Tucson, 1983. IEEE.

No context found.

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically biased coin. In Proceedings of the 24th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 11--22, Tucson, 1983. IEEE.

No context found.

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Racko#. How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically-biased coin. In Proc. 24th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 11--21, 1983.

No context found.

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically biased coin. In Proceedings of the 25 th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 11--21, 1984.

No context found.

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically biased coin. In Proceedings of the YDZ th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 11--21, 1984.

No context found.

Luby, M., Micali, S., and Rackoff, C., "How to Simultaneously Exchange a Secret Bit by Flipping a Symmetrically-Biased Coin", Proc. of the 24th IEEE Symp. on Foundation of Computer Science, 1983, pp. 11-21.

No context found.

M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff, How to simultaneously exchange secret bit by flipping a symmetrically-biased coin, Proceedings of FOCS'83, pp. 23-30, 1983.

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