P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin. Efficient auctions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:341--388, 2000. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction - Parkes, Ungar (2002) (1 citation) (Correct)
.... [54] Ascending price auctions allow bidders to compute optimal strategies with approximate preference information [45, chapter 7] Additional reasons to prefer ascending price over sealed bid auctions include reduced information revelation [52] and better performance in commonvalue settings [18, 50]. A number of efficient ascending price auctions have been proposed in the literature for special cases of the combinatorial allocation problem; for example, by Demange et al. 22] for the unit demand case, by Ausubel [5] for homogeneous items with diminishing marginal returns, and recently by ....
Partha Dasgupta and Eric S Maskin. Efficient auctions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:341-388, 2000.
Trust-Based Mechanism Design - Dash, Ramchurn, Jennings (2004) (Correct)
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P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin. Efficient auctions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:341--388, 2000.
A Combinatorial Auction Protocol among Versatile Experts.. - Takayuki Ito Graduate (2004) (Correct)
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P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin. Efficient auctions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXV:341--388, 2000.
Trust-Based Mechanism Design - Dash, Ramchurn, Jennings (Correct)
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P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin. Efficient auctions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:341--388, 2000.
A Mechanism for Multiple Goods and Interdependent - Dash (Correct)
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P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin. Efficient auctions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:341-- 388, 2000.
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