G. J. Simmons. A cartesian product construction for unconditionally secure authentication codes that permit arbitration, Journal of Cryptology 2 (1990), 77--104.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....8, 9] In this model, the transmitter and the receiver are both honest and trust each other. However, it is not always the case that the two parties want to trust each other. Inspired by this problem, Simmons introduced an extended model, A model, in which there is a fourth person, an arbiter [10, 11]. In this model, caution is taken against deception of the transmitter and the receiver as well as that of the opponent. The arbiter has access to all key information of the transmitter and the receiver, and solves disputes between them. We denote by ER the set of keys of the receiver and by E T ....

G.J.Simmons, "A Cartesian Product Construction for Unconditionally Secure Authentication Codes that Permit Arbitration", Journal of Cryptology, Vol.2, no.2, 1990, pp.77--104 (1990).

....(A code) the transmitter and the receiver are using the same encoding rule and are thus trusting each other [1] 5] However, it is no always the case that the two communicating parties want to trust each other. Inspired by this problem Simmons has introduced an extended authentication model [6, 7], here referred to as the authentication model with arbitration (A code) In this model caution is taken against deception from both outsiders (opponent) and insiders (transmitter and receiver) The model includes a fourth person, called the arbiter. The arbiter has access to all key ....

G.J.Simmons, "A Cartesian Product Construction for Unconditionally Secure Authentication Codes that Permit Arbitration", in Journal of Cryptology, Vol.2, no.2, 1990, pp.77--104.

....an attacker floods the receiver with bogus packets supposedly containing a signature. Since signature verification is often computationally expensive, the receiver is overwhelmed verifying bogus signatures. Researchers proposed information theoretically secure broadcast authentication mechanisms [10, 11, 12, 13, 20, 34, 35, 36]. These protocols have a high overhead in large groups with many receivers. Canetti et al. construct a broadcast authentication protocol based on k different keys to authenticate every message with k different MAC s [7] Every receiver knows m keys and can hence verify m MAC s. The keys are ....

G. Simmons. A cartesian product construction for unconditionally secure authentication codes that permit arbitration. Journal of Cryptology, 2(2):77--104, 1990.

....of A codes, the transmitter and the receiver are both honest and trust each other. However, it is not always the case that the two parties want to trust each other. Inspired by this problem, Simmons introduced an extended model, A code model, in which there is a fourth person, an arbiter [10, 11]. In this model, caution is taken against deception of the transmitter and the receiver as well as that of the opponent. The arbiter has access to all key information of the transmitter and the receiver, and solves disputes between them. Then there are essentially five different kinds of ....

G.J.Simmons. "A Cartesian Product Construction for Unconditionally Secure Authentication Codes that Permit Arbitration ". In Journal of Crypt!ology, vol.2, no.2, pages 77--104, 1990.

....the number of receivers, is the failure probability, and e = 2:718. For small values of , and a xed , our lower bound of O( log n) asymptotically matches their upper bound. In the information theoretic model, Multicast MACs were introduced by Desmedt, Frankel, and Yung [3] see also Simmons [16] for the somewhat related notion of authentication codes with arbitration) They gave two constructions for secure MMACs. Kurosawa and Obana [8] derived elegant lower bounds on the probability of success in impersonation and substitution attacks. They showed that the DFY construction is optimal. ....

G. Simmons, \A cartesian product construction for unconditionally secure authentication codes that permit arbitration", J. Cryptology, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 77-104, 1990.

....of A codes, the transmitter and the receiver are both honest and trust each other. However, it is not always the case that the two parties want to trust each other. Inspired by this problem, Simmons introduced an extended model, A 2 code model, in which there is a fourth person, an arbiter [17, 18]. In this model, caution is taken against deception by the transmitter and the receiver as well as that by the opponent. The arbiter has access to all key information of the transmitter and the receiver, and solves disputes between them. Then there are essentially five different kinds of ....

G. J. Simmons. "A Cartesian Product Construction for Unconditionally Secure Authentication Codes that Permit Arbitration ". In Journal of Cryptology, vol.2, no.2, pages 77--104, 1990.

....if techniques from the theory of unconditionally secure authentication codes can be used to derive bounds relevant to commitment schemes. More generally, are there connections between commitment schemes and certain types of authentication codes (e.g. authentication codes with arbitration; see [13]) that would allow the rich theory of authentication codes to be applied in a straightforard way to obtain results of interest concerning commitment schemes There are certainly some super cial resemblences, both in construction methods and bounds. However, one possibly signi cant di erence is ....

G.J. Simmons. A Cartesian product construction for unconditionally secure authentication codes that permit arbitration. J. Cryptology, Vol. 2, 1990, 77-104. 11

....1= where n is the number of receivers, is the failure probability, and e = 2:718. For small values of , and a xed , our lower bound of O( log n) matches their upper bound. In the information theoretic model, Multicast MACs were introduced by Desmedt, Frankel, and Yung [2] see also Simmons [12] for the somewhat related notion of authentication codes with arbitration) They gave two constructions for secure MMACs. Kurosawa and Obana [7] derived elegant lower bounds on the probability of success in impersonation and substitution attacks. They showed that the DFY construction is ....

G. Simmons, \A cartesian product construction for unconditionally secure authentication codes that permit arbitration", J. Cryptology, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 77-104, 1990.

....of A codes, the transmitter and the receiver are both honest and trust each other. However, it is not always the case that the two parties want to trust each other. Inspired by this problem, Simmons introduced an extended model, A 2 code model, in which there is a fourth person, an arbiter [10, 11]. In this model, caution is taken against deception of the transmitter and the receiver as well as that of the opponent. The arbiter has access to all key information of the transmitter and the receiver, and solves disputes between them. Then there are essentially five different kinds of ....

G.J.Simmons. "A Cartesian Product Construction for Unconditionally Secure Authentication Codes that Permit Arbitration ". In Journal of Crypt!ology, vol.2, no.2, pages 77--104, 1990.

....(A code) the transmitter and the receiver are using the same encoding rule and are thus trusting each other [1] 5] However, it is no always the case that the two communicating parties want to trust each other. Inspired by this problem Simmons has introduced an extended authentication model [6, 7], here referred to as the authentication model with arbitration (A 2 code) In this model caution is taken against deception from both outsiders (opponent) and insiders (transmitter and receiver) The model includes a fourth person, called the arbiter. The arbiter has access to all key ....

G.J.Simmons, "A Cartesian Product Construction for Unconditionally Secure Authentication Codes that Permit Arbitration", in Journal of Cryptology, Vol.2, no.2, 1990, pp.77--104.

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G. J. Simmons. A cartesian product construction for unconditionally secure authentication codes that permit arbitration, Journal of Cryptology 2 (1990), 77--104.

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