D. C. Parkes. Price-based information certificates for minimal-revelation combinatorial auctions. In Padget et al., editor, Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV,LNAI 2531, pages 103--122. Springer-Verlag, 2002.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

No context found.

D. C. Parkes. Price-based information certificates for minimal-revelation combinatorial auctions. In Padget et al., editor, Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV,LNAI 2531, pages 103--122. Springer-Verlag, 2002.

No context found.

David C. Parkes. Price-based information certificates for minimal-revelation combinatorial auctions. In Padget et al., editor, Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV,LNAI 2531, pages 103--122. Springer-Verlag, 2002.

No context found.

Parkes, D. C.: 2002, `Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions'. In: Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems, Vol. 2531 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence. pp. 103--122.

....once, also supports the allocative efficiency benefits of iterative auctions for agents with costly preference elicitation. A key motivation for ascending price combinatorial auctions (e.g. PU00a, WW00] is to avoid the unreasonable preference revelation in sealed bid auctions. Recently, Parkes [Par02] derived a tight price based lower bound to describe the information revelation required in an efficient combinatorial auction, for any particular problem instance. Related work has considered theoretical and empirical properties of automated preference elicitation for non price based ....

David C. Parkes. Price-based information certificates for minimal-revelation combinatorial auctions. In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems, volume 2531 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence. 2002.

....We show an equivalence with respect to the class of incremental revelation mechanisms (IRMs) This class of mechanisms generalizes the class of DRMs, providing agents with a strategyspace that allows them to provide incremental information about their type to the mechanism. Following Parkes [31], let a query language, define a set of preference . A query, D 5 Z [ is a mapping from the possible types of agent to a subset of types. Given a query, then the response, An oracle based communication model can be interpreted as a model of costly preference elicitation, ....

.... advocates price based methods, noting that information to verify a set of prices are competitive equilibrium prices (such that there is a single allocation that maximizes the surplus to all agents and the revenue to the seller) is both necessary and sufficient to determine the efficient allocation [31]. A natural, and seemingly important, direction for theoretical mechanism design is to fix the preference elicitation language, and then consider different models for the cost of queries within the language and derive optimal mechanisms. A first best definition of optimality would look for a ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Parkes, D. C.: 2002, `Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions'. In: Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems, Vol. 2531 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence.

....participants, which can in itself be useful to reduce the ability of a participant to determine when iBEA is in Phase II. Recent analysis provides new justification for the role of price based iterative combinatorial auctions in the design of mechanisms with minimal preference elicitation. Parkes [47] shows an information equivalence between computing Universal CE prices and computing the outcome of the VCG mechanism, for a large class of preference elicitation languages. With this in mind, it is interesting to study the role of proxy bidding agents in structuring preference elicitation ....

David C Parkes. Price-based information certificates for minimal-revelation combinatorial auctions. In Proc. Jth Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce Workshop, Colocated with the First Int. Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Bologna, Italy., July 15 2002. Forthcoming.

.... consider the accuracy to which they should refine their values, and in which parts of the outcome space to focus, all in response to feedback about the bids from other participants [4] Preference elicitation has previously been considered in the context of iterative combinatorial auctions (e.g. [5, 2]) In this paper, we examine the preference elicitation properties of iterative multiattribute auctions, and in particular we consider the effect Harvard College, Cambridge, MA 02138. Email: sunderam fas.harvard.edu. Supported in part by the Harvard College Research Fund. Corresponding author. ....

D.C. Parkes. Price-based information certificates for minimal-rcvclation combinatorial auctions. In Agent Mediated Electronic Commeree IV, LNAI 2531, pages 103 122, 2002.

No context found.

Parkes, David C. (2002). "Price-Based Information Certificates for MinimalRevelation Combinatorial Auctions," in Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Padget et al. (eds), LNAI 253#, #03-#22, Springer-Verlag.

No context found.

D. Parkes. Price-based information certificates for minimalrevelation combinatorial auctions. Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, LNAI 2531:103--122, 2002.

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC