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Security Extension for UNI and NNI i - Working Group Oamp (Correct)
....set of security services between the TCP layer and the application and (2) public key based authentication and key management. One is the Secure Shell (SSH) Yl95, Yl96, Cara01, SSH, SSHarch, SSHtrans, SSHauth, SSHcon] and the other is the Secure Sockets Layer or Transport Layer Security (SSL TLS) [Fre96, RFC2246, RFC2712, Res01] system commonly used to secure Web sessions. One major advantage to these systems is that they can be inserted between the application and the operating system with minimal difficulty. On the other hand, one drawback to these systems is that SSH and SSL TLS only secure TCP, not UDP, ICMP, or ....
Rescorla, E., SSL and TLS, Addison-Wesley, 2001.
Single Sign-On Using Trusted Platforms - Pashalidis, Mitchell (2003) (Correct)
....to the SP might result in successful impersonation. It is therefore of great importance to authenticate the origin of the Integrity Challenge and authentication request message (step 1 in section 3. 3) This can be achieved, for example, using an SSL TLS channel with server side certificates [18] in conjunction with the security extensions for DNS [7] or a suitable challenge response protocol involving message signing [20] The attack is prevented as long as the user inspects the SPID (step 2 in section 3.3) and makes sure that it indeed represents the desired SP. As the authentication ....
Eric Rescorla. SSL and TLS. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 2001.
Enhancing e-commerce security using GSM authentication - Khu-smith, Mitchell (2002) (Correct)
....user. 1 Introduction In an e commerce transaction, a consumer typically makes a payment using a debit credit card. The communications link between the consumer PC and the merchant server is usually protected against eavesdropping using Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) [5]. Even so, a number of security threats remain. One reason for these remaining vulnerabilities is that SSL TLS does not obligate client authentication. As a result, it is not easy to verify if the person who is making a payment is the legitimate cardholder. A malicious user, who may have obtained ....
E. Rescorla. SSL and TLS. Addison Wesley, Reading Massachusetts, 2001.
SSL splitting: securely serving data from untrusted caches - Chris Lesniewski-Laas And (2003) (Correct)
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RESCORLA, E. SSL and TLS. Addison-Wesley, 2001.
Impostor: A Single Sign-On System for Use from Untrusted.. - Pashalidis, Mitchell (Correct)
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E. Rescorla, SSL and TLS. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 2001.
A Taxonomy of Single Sign-On Systems - Pashalidis, Mitchell (2003) (Correct)
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Eric Rescorla. SSL and TLS. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 2001.
Using EMV Cards for Single Sign-On - Pashalidis, Mitchell (Correct)
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Eric Rescorla. SSL and TLS. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 2001.
Security Standards for the Global Information Grid - Gary Buda Booz (2001) (2 citations) (Correct)
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Rescorla, E., SSL and TLS Addison-Wesley, 2001.
Using GSM/UMTS for Single Sign-On - Pashalidis, Mitchell (Correct)
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Eric Rescorla. SSL and TLS. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 2001.
Using LDAP from Java+Tomcat and - Python Zope Holger (2003) (Correct)
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Erich Rescorla, SSL and TLS, Addison-Wesley 2001.
Single Sign-On Using Trusted Platforms - Pashalidis, Mitchell (2003) (Correct)
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Eric Rescorla. SSL and TLS. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 2001.
Enabling Access to Mass Storage - Gordon Jensen Synge (2003) (Correct)
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Eric Rescorla. SSL and TLS. Addison Wesley, 2001.
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