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Plaintext Awareness via Key Registration - Herzog, Liskov, Micali (9 citations) Self-citation (Herzog) (Correct)
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Herzog, J.: Computational soundness for formal adversaries. Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2002)
Plaintext Awareness Via Key Registration - Moses (9 citations) Self-citation (Herzog) (Correct)
....scheme (G; E; D) is ideal if 8APPT ; 8S A; 8M 62 C [S] 8 polynomials q; 8 suciently large n : Here, supp(D) means the support of distribution D. However, our results are subject to one technical limitation: S must be acyclic. A formal de nition of an acyclic set can be found in [13]. Informally, it means that if K 1 encrypts K 2 in S K 2 encrypts K 3 , and so on, this sequence never loops back on itself. Hence, we revise the security condition: De nition 3. An encryption scheme (G; E; D) is ideal if the adversary cannot create something outside the closure: 8APPT ....
....not in C [S] Consider the parse tree of M . Each node in this tree is a message. Furthermore, if the adversary can create an encoding of an internal node of this tree with some probability p, then either This is a reasonable assumption for most real world protocols, for reasons discussed in [13] Encryption now uses both of the sender s public and private keys, in addition to the recipient s public key, so that it has access to the sender s signature generation key. 1. That node is in C [S] or 2. The adversary can, with probability almost p, create encodings of both children. To ....
Jonathan Herzog. Computational soundness for formal adversaries. Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 2002.
A Computational Interpretation of Dolev-Yao Adversaries - Herzog (2003) (7 citations) Self-citation (Herzog) (Correct)
.... String [ f g is the decryption algorithm. Note that the key generation and encryption algorithms are randomized. It is possible to strengthen the adversary by allowing it to pick the values of its own nonces and keys. This technical issue contains no interesting details, and is discussed in [9]. algorithm are not taken from the tape. Hence, encrypt(M ; K) remains a distribution even if t is xed. Now that we have introduced the security parameter, we can re ne our notion of small probabilities. By this, we mean negligible: De nition 4 (Negligible) A function f : N R ....
....in some element of S, and K 2 encrypts K 3 , and so on, this sequence of keys encrypting keys never loops back on itself. A rigorous de nition can be found in [1] Our results build on those of Abadi and Rogaway [1] and we require acyclic sets simply because they do. However, as discussed in [9], this is a realistic assumption for the trac of most real world protocols. Hence, we arrive at our nal security condition: De nition 5 (Ideal Encryption) An encryption scheme (G; E; D) is ideal if, when used in [ 8 APPT ; 8 acyclic S A; 8M 62 C [S] 8 polynomials q; 8 ....
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Jonathan Herzog. Computational soundness for formal adversaries. Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 2002.
A Cryptographically Sound Dolev-Yao Style Security Proof of the.. - Backes (2004) (Correct)
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J. Herzog. Computational Soundness of Formal Adversaries. PhD thesis, MIT, 2002.
Low-level Ideal Signatures and General Integrity Idealization - Backes, Pfitzmann, Waidner (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
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J. Herzog. Computational soundness of formal adversaries. Master Thesis, MIT, 2002.
Modelling and Security Analysis of Authenticated Group Key.. - Pereira (2003) (4 citations) (Correct)
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J. Herzog. Computational soundness of formal adversaries. Master's thesis, MIT, 2002.
Symmetric Encryption in Automatic Analyses for Confidentiality.. - Laud (2004) (18 citations) (Correct)
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Jonathan Herzog. Computational Soundness of Formal Adversaries. Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 2002.
Computational Soundness for Standard Assumptions of Formal.. - Herzog (2004) (3 citations) (Correct)
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Jonathan Herzog. Computational soundness for formal adversaries. Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 2002.
Symmetric Encryption in Automatic Analyses for Confidentiality.. - Laud (2004) (18 citations) (Correct)
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J. Herzog, "Computational Soundness of Formal Adversaries," Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sept. 2002.
New Tools in Cryptography: Mutually Independent Commitments.. - Liskov (2004) (Correct)
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Jonathan Herzog. Computational soundness for formal adversaries. Master's thesis, MIT, 2002.
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