| M. Abadi. Private authentication. In Proceedings of the 2002 Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, pages 27--40. Springer-Verlag, 2003. |
.... without dummy traffic) s is im s value opaque; r is im r value opaque Conversation agent Attacker may not know both sender and recipient for any conversation sr is 2 value opaque Privacy (relationship anonymity) Attacker may not determine the relationship between any 2 agents (e.g. [SMA95, Aba02]) is 2 value opaque Table 1: Definitions of anonymity and privacy based on opaqueness. 26 invest terms such as unlinkability, unobservability, privacy, etc. with different meaning. Our descriptions are not intended to be a definitive dictionary of anonymity terms (cf. PKS01] but rather an ....
....to the attacker, and sending it to C pretending to be A . Since the attacker can tell the difference between f ok g Ke and NC , he can infer from C s response whether A is a patient. The attack on Protocol 2 is similar to the attack described by Abadi in the context of private authentication [Aba02]. 4.8 Pseudonymity We have already remarked in section 2.5 how the notion of function view can be extended to express a larger class of information hiding properties. For example, one could add a fourth component to the function knowledge triple to record information about the cardinality of ....
M. Abadi. Private authentication. In Proc. Workshop on Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PET), 2002. To appear.
....to the ongoing study of security protocols and of their properties. More specifically, this paper presents the analysis of a security protocol in the applied pi calculus [2] a recent variant of the pi calculus. The protocol in question is one for private authentication (the second protocol of [1]) Its analysis is worthwhile for several reasons: The protocol is for a standard purpose, namely establishing a session (with associated cryptographic keys) and it is concerned with standard security properties, such as authenticity and secrecy. Therefore, the analysis of the protocol ....
....principals. Suppose that B is one of them, and that B is willing to communicate with A and to prove its identity to A. After providing these proofs, in the subsequent session, A and B may make sensitive requests from each other and may reveal sensitive data to each other. We study a protocol (from [1]) that enables A and B to establish an authenticated communication channel. By following the protocol, A and B should not have to indicate their identity and presence to any third parties. In this section, we review the protocol informally. We start by outlining its assumptions, then describe its ....
Martn Abadi. Private authentication. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2002.
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M. Abadi. Private authentication. In Proceedings of the 2002 Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, pages 27--40. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
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M. Abadi. Private authentication. Manuscript, May 2001.
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M. Abadi. Private authentication. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2002.
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