U. Maurer. Secure Multi-Party Computation Made Simple. In G. Persiano, editor, Third Conference on Security in Communication Networks (SCN'02), volume 2576 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 14--28. Springer-Verlag, 2003. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Efficient Multi-Party Computation over Rings - Cramer, Fehr, Ishai, Kushilevitz (2003) (Correct)
....notion of secret sharing in the sense that the bound between the player sets that can reconstruct the secret (the sets in # ) and those that have no information about it (the sets in is not tight. Furthermore, it would lead to more general necessary conditions on (#, for secure MPC [23, 35], in contrast to the Q and Q conditions considered here. consistent with s A and s and those consistent with s A and s # . Therefore, s A gives no Shannon information about s. This implies (perfect) privacy. Note that since every Abelian group G is a Z module, an ISP gives rise to a ....
U. Maurer. Secure multi-party computation made simple. In Proc. of SCN '02, LNCS 2576, pp. 14-28, 2002.
Secure Multi-Party Computation from any Linear Secret.. - Nikov, Nikova, Preneel (2003) (Correct)
....subsets of participants that are qualified to recover the secret s F (F finite field) in the set of possible secret values. It is common to model cheating by considering an adversary who may corrupt some subset of the players. One can distinguish between passive and active corruption, see [8, 14] for recent results. Passive corruption means that the adversary obtains the complete information held by the corrupted players, but the players execute the protocol correctly. Active corruption means that the adversary takes full control of the corrupted players. Active corruption is strictly ....
....of adaptive adversary. Since the adversary we can tolerate is at least Q adversary (see [11] and since the condition Q is equivalent to #A # # A = and to # # A #A ) we have that the honest players structure has no intersection with the adversary structure. Recently Maurer [14] proved the following theorem. Theorem 4. 14] General perfect information theoretically secure MPC secure against a (# 1 , #A ) adversary is possible if and only if P #A . It is easy to rewrite the above theorem into the following form. a (# 1 , #A ) adversary is possible if and only ....
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U. Maurer, Secure Multi-Party Computation Made Simple, 3rd Conference on Security in Communication Networks, September 12-13,
Secure Multi-Party Computation with Security Modules - Benenson, Gärtner, Kesdogan (2004) (Correct)
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U. Maurer. Secure Multi-Party Computation Made Simple. In G. Persiano, editor, Third Conference on Security in Communication Networks (SCN'02), volume 2576 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 14--28. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
Secure Multi-party Computation for selecting a solution according .. - Silaghi (2004) (Correct)
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U. M. Maurer. Secure multi-party computation made simple. In SCN, pages 14--28, 2000.
Secure Multi-Player Protocols: Fundamentals, Generality, and.. - Fehr (2003) (Correct)
No context found.
Ueli Maurer. Secure multi-party computation made simple. In 3rd Conference on Security in Communication Networks (SCN '02), volume 2576 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2003.
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