W. Lu and M. Sundareshan, "Secure Communication in Internet Environments: A Hierarchical Key Management Scheme for End-to-End Encryption", IEEE Transactions on Communications, Vol. 37, No. 10, Pg. 1014, 1 October 1989.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... Protocol Protocol Analysis First Author Specification Type I Type II Type III Type IV Abadi [2] Bieber [5] Blumer [6] 6] Britton [8] Burrows [11] 12] Calvelli [13] Campbell [14] Dolev [23] Gaarder [25] Gong [28] 29] Gray [35] Kailar [36] Kasami [38] Kemmerer [40] 40] 40] Longley [42] 43] Lu [44] Mao [45] Meadows [48] 48] 46] 47] 48] 49] Merritt [50] Millen [51] Moser [53] Nessett [56] Rangan [59] Rubin [63] Sidhu [67] Snekkenes [68] 69] 70] Syverson [77] 77] 73] 74] 75] 79] 78] 72] 77] Toussaint [81] 82] 83] Varadharajan [86] 87] 88] 86] 87] 88] Van Oorschot [85] ....

W. P. Lu and M. K. Sundareshan. Secure communication in Internet environments: A hierarchical key management scheme for end-to-end encryption. IEEE Transactions on Communications, 37(10):1014--1023, October 1989.

....Laboratory, University of Cambridge 1 A Logic of Authentication Authentication protocols are both essential to security in distributed systems and notoriously obscure. A typical authentication protocol involves only two or three parties (called principals) and a few messages between them (see [1, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19] for example) The intended outcome is that the parties obtain a guarantee that they are dealing with each other. In addition, the parties sometimes acquire a new shared secret, such as a session key. The exchanges are brief, but many of the authentication protocols found in the literature contain ....

....outcome is that the parties obtain a guarantee that they are dealing with each other. In addition, the parties sometimes acquire a new shared secret, such as a session key. The exchanges are brief, but many of the authentication protocols found in the literature contain serious security flaws ([1, 10, 14, 19] for example) The logic of authentication described in the first part of this report has helped us in analyzing certain aspects of authentication protocols. Our logic consists of a simple set of inference rules, in a notation designed specifically for the study of authentication protocols. 1 ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

W.P. Lu and M.K. Sundareshan. Secure Communication in Internet Environments: A Hierarchical Key Management Scheme for End-To-End Encryption, IEEE Transactions on Communications Vol. 37, No. 10, October 1989, pp. 1014--1023.

....term rewriting properties of cryptographic systems. This is the approach followed by Dolev and Yao s public key model [8] upon which our model is based, and the model of Kasami, Yanamura, and Mori [12] also used by Lu and Sundareshan in the verification of a hierarchical key management protocol [16]. Although our model is based on the Dolev Yao model, it is more similar to the Kasami Yanamura Mori model in that Dolev and Yao concentrate on protocols that can be completely modeled as term rewriting systems and for which efficient algorithms for deciding security problems can be found, while ....

W.-P. Lu and M. K. Sundareshan. Secure communication in internet environments: A hierarchical key management scheme for end-to-end encryption. IEEE Transactions on Communications, 37(10):1014-- 1023, October 1989.

.... Honeyman Protocol Protocol Analysis First Author Specification Type I Type II Type III Type IV Abadi [1] Bieber [2] Blumer [3] 3] Britton [4] Burrows [7] 8] Calvelli [9] Campbell [10] Dolev [16] Gaarder [18] Gong [19] 20] Gray [26] Kailar [27] Kasami [28] Kemmerer [29] 29] 29] Longley [30] Lu [31] Mao [32] Meadows [35] 35] 33] 34] 35] 36] Millen [37] Moser [39] Nessett [42] Rangan [44] Sidhu [50] Snekkenes [51] 52] 53] Syverson [60] 60] 56] 57] 58] 59] 61] 55] 60] Varadharajan [62] 63] 64] 62] 63] 64] Woo [67] 67] Table 1: The Focus of Research in the Specification and ....

W. P. Lu and M. K. Sundareshan. Secure communication in Internet environments: A hierarchical key management scheme for end-to-end encryption. IEEE Transactions on Communications, 37(10):1014-- 1023, October 1989.

....actual applicability of our guidelines, we draw these examples from the literature. Some of the oddities and errors that we analyze have been documented previously (in particular, in [4] Other examples are new: protocols by Denning and Sacco [6] Hickman (Netscape) 11, 10] Lu and Sundareshan [14], Varadharajan, Allen, and Black [31] and Woo and Lam [34] We believe they are all instructive. Generally, we pick examples from the authentication literature, but the principles are applicable elsewhere, for example to electronic cash protocols (e.g. 17] We focus on traditional ....

W.P. Lu and M.K. Sundareshan. "Secure Communication in Internet Environments: A Hierarchical Key Management Scheme for EndTo -End Encryption". IEEE Transactions on Communications Vol. 37, No. 10, October 1989, pp. 1014--1023.

No context found.

W. Lu and M. Sundareshan, "Secure Communication in Internet Environments: A Hierarchical Key Management Scheme for End-to-End Encryption", IEEE Transactions on Communications, Vol. 37, No. 10, Pg. 1014, 1 October 1989.

No context found.

Lu, W.P., and Sundereshan, M.K., "Secure Communication in Internet Environments: A Hierarchical Key Management Scheme for End-to-End Encryption", IEEE Transactions on Communications, Volume 37, Number 10, October 1989, pp. 1014-1023.

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