| M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th STACS, pages 675--686. Springer LNCS 2607, 2003. |
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M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th STACS, pages 675--686. Springer LNCS 2607, 2003.
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M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. Research Report RZ 3468, IBM Research, 2002.
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M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of LNCS, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
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M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
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M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In 20th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS'03), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Germany, 2003.
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M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of LNCS, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
No context found.
M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
No context found.
M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. Research Report RZ 3468, IBM Research, 2002.
No context found.
M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
No context found.
M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. Research Report RZ 3468, IBM Research, 2002.
No context found.
M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In 20th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS'03), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Germany, 2003.
No context found.
M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
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M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
....et al. we can state that Canetti s work enjoys a more general composition theorem and has moreover addressed more cryptographic primitives so far. On the other hand, the models of Pfitzmann et al. are more rigorously defined and early examples of tool supported proofs in their models exist [5, 4], using PVS [32] Moreover, the recently published universally composable cryptographic library [6] may pave the way to formal verification of large security protocols within their models. Outline. In Section 2 we review the reactive models for synchronous and asynchronous time. In Section 3, we ....
....subsequent remarks (stating that the theorem holds as well for the restricted version async,H of simulatability) yielding Sys 1 sync Sys 3 . This proof technique is applicable to almost all theorems that rely on simulatability. As the most important example, we name the preservation theorem [36, 4], which states that integrity properties expressed in lineartime logic are preserved under simulatability. The proof of this theorem is difficult and comprises several pages for both models. Using our work, the synchronous proof could as well be omitted. However, this proof techniques is ....
M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
.... : EA out v (ok, u) r t 1 # If v believes to speak with u at time t 1 # #t 0 t 1 : # then there exists a past time t 0 EA in u (new prot, v) r t 0 # in which u started a protocol with v The notion of a system Sys fulfilling an integrity property Req essentially comes in two flavors [4]. Perfect fulfillment, Sys Req , means that the integrity property holds for all traces arising in runs of Sys (a well defined notion from the underlying model [22] Computational fulfillment, Sys Req , means that the property only holds for polynomially bounded users and adversaries, and ....
....u . 5 Proof of the Cryptographic Realization If Theorem 4.1 has been proven, it follows easily that the Needham Schroeder Lowe protocol based on the real cryptographic library computationally fulfills the integrity requirement Req . The main tool is the following preservation theorem from [4]. Theorem 5.1 (Preservation of Integrity Properties (Sketch) Let two systems Sys 1 , Sys 2 be given such that Sys 1 is at least as secure as Sys 2 (written Sys 1 sec Sys 2 ) Let Req be an integrity requirement for both Sys 1 and Sys 2 , and let Sys 2 Req . Then also Sys 1 Req . # Let ....
M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
....where participants can make new inputs many times, e.g. start new sessions like key exchanges, was first fully defined in [33] with extensions to asynchronous systems in [34, 10] We use the IO automata model of Pfitzmann Waidner. First examples of tool supported proofs in that model exists [6, 5], using PVS [31] Earlier, but less complete or less abstract reactive simulatability notions exist in [26, 23] The reactive simulatability papers already had the goal of bridging the gap between abstract and concrete cryptographic systems. However, so far they abstracted from cryptography so ....
M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted veri- fication of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), 2003. To appear.
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M. Backes and I. Christian Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In STACS 2003, pages 675--686, 2003.
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M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of LNCS, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
No context found.
M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
No context found.
M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of LNCS, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
No context found.
M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically sound and machine-assisted verification of security protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), volume 2607 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 675--686. Springer, 2003.
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Michael Backes and Christian Jacobi II. Cryptographically Sound and MachineAssisted Verification of Security Protocols. In Helmut Alt and Michel Habib, editors, STACS 2003.
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M. Backes and C. Jacobi II, "Cryptographically Sound and MachineAssisted Verification of Security Protocols," in STACS 2003.
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