F. Liang, D. K. Y. Yau, and J. C. S. Lui, "On Defending Against Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks With Server-Centric Router Throttles, " Dept of Computer Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, Tech. Rep. TR-01-008, 2001. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Detecting Reflector Attacks by Sharing Beliefs - Peng, Leckie, Ramamohanarao (Correct)
....has been done to defend against DDoS attacks. There are two types of approaches. One is to solve the IP source address authentication problem, using techniques such as Probabilistic Packet Marking [2] and ICMP messages [3] Another approach is to control the DDoS attack traffic by ratelimiting [4] [5]. However, all the schemes are based on the assumption that the attack traffic volume is tremendously large in the attack path. However, this is not true when the DDoS attack traffic comes from a large number of highly distributed sources. Another promising trace back scheme proposed by Snoeren ....
D. K. Y. Yau, J. C. S. Lui, and F. Liang, "Defending against distributed denial-of-service attacks with max-min fair server-centric router throttles, " in Proceedings of IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service (IWQoS), Miami Beach, FL, May 2002.
Detecting Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Using.. - Peng, Leckie.. (2002) (Correct)
....traffic. The second challenge is to detect the bandwidth attack as soon as possible without raising a false 2 alarm, so that the victim has more time to take action against the attacker. Previously proposed approaches rely on monitoring the volume of traffic that is received by the victim [18][32][3] A major drawback of these approaches is that they do not provide a way to differentiate flash crowds from DDoS attacks. Due to the inherently bursty nature of Internet traffic, a sudden increase of in traffic may be mistaken as an attack. If we delay our response in order to ensure that the ....
David K. Y. Yau, John C. S. Lui, and Feng Liang. Defending against distributed denial-of-service attacks with max-min fair server-centric router throttles. In Proceedings of IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service (IWQoS), Miami Beach, FL, May 2002.
Enabling Secure IP Telephony in Enterprise Networks - Reynolds (2001) (Correct)
....traffic to detect the presence of a SYN flood attack. Their algorithm was used as a basis for the algorithms presented in this work. Also, in [35] the method of EWMA (Exponentially Weighted Moving Average) is used to detect DoS attacks against QoS in a DiffServ networking environment. Yau et al. [68] developed a scheme to include throttles on the network routes that use a leaky bucket approach to reduce the incoming rate of traffic to targeted servers. Another approach to countering DoS attacks at the network infrastructure is the use of Pushback and Aggregate Congestion Control [36, 19, 28] ....
D. Yau, J. Lui, and F. Liang. Defending against distributed denial-of-service attacks with max-min fair server-centric router throttles. In Proceedings of IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service (IWQoS), Miami Beach, May 2002.
Secure IP Telephony using Multi-layered Protection - Reynolds, Ghosal (Correct)
....E.164 numbers depending on the severity of the attack [24] 8. Related Work Detection and protection of DoS attacks has been a popular topic in recent years. The trend has been to focus on either protection and or reduction of the impact of an attack or detection of an attack. Yau et al. [31] developed a scheme to include throttles in the network routers that use a leaky bucket approach to reduce the incoming rate of traffic to targeted servers. Another approach to countering DoS attacks at the network infrastructure is the use of Pushback and Aggregate Congestion Control [18, 10, ....
D. Yau, J. Lui, and F. Liang. Defending against distributed denial-of-service attacks with max-min fair server-centric router throttles. In Proceedings of IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service (IWQoS), Miami Beach, May 2002.
Protection from Distributed Denial of Service Attack.. - Peng, Leckie.. (2003) (Correct)
....denial of service attacks, for example, the reflector attack [15] The most difficult part for defending against DDoS attacks is that it is very hard to differentiate between normal traffic and attack traffic. This is the fundamental problem of the Internet. For example, rate limiting schemes [22][12] punish the good traffic as well as the bad traffic. A key observation that we can use in our defense against DDoS attacks is that DDoS attack traffic tends to use randomly spoofed source addresses to disguise their true identities. Thus, the problem becomes how to differentiate between a ....
David K. Y. Yau, John C. S. Lui, and Feng Liang. Defending against distributed denial-of-service attacks with max-min fair server-centric router throttles. In Proceedings of IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service (IWQoS), Miami Beach, FL, May 2002.
Defending against Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks.. - Yau, Lui, Liang, Yam (2005) (8 citations) Self-citation (Liang Yau Lui) (Correct)
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F. Liang, D. K. Y. Yau, and J. C. S. Lui, "On Defending Against Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks With Server-Centric Router Throttles, " Dept of Computer Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, Tech. Rep. TR-01-008, 2001.
You Can Run, But You Can't Hide: An Effective Methodology to.. - Law, Lui, al. (2002) Self-citation (Yau Lui) (Correct)
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D. K. Y. Yau, J. C. S. Lui, and F. Liang. Defending against distributed denial-of-service attacks with max-min fair server-centric router throttles. In IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service (IWQoS), May 2002.
Defending Against Low-rate TCP Attacks: Dynamic Detection and .. - Haibin Sun John (2004) Self-citation (Yau Lui) (Correct)
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D. K. Yau, J. C. Lui, F. Liang, and Y. Yeung. Defending against distributed denial-of-service attacks with max-min fair server-centric router throttles. Accepted for publication in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 13(1), February 2005.
You Can Run, But You Can't Hide: An Effective Statistical.. - Law, Lui, Yau (2005) Self-citation (Yau Lui) (Correct)
No context found.
D.K.Y. Yau, J.C.S. Lui, F. Liang, and Y. Yeung, "Defending against Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks with Max-Min Fair ServerCentric Router Throttles," Proc. 10th IEEE Int'l Workshop Quality of Service, 2002.
You Can Run, But You Can't Hide: An Effective Statistical.. - Law, Lui, Yau (2005) Self-citation (Yau Lui) (Correct)
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D.K.Y. Yau, J.C.S. Lui, and F.Liang,"DefendingAgainst Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks with Max-Min Fair ServerCentric Router Throttles," Proc. IEEE Int'l Workshop Quality of Service (IWQoS), May 2002.
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D. K. Y. Yau, J. C. S. Lui, and F. Liang, "Defending Against Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks with Max-Min Fair Server-Centric Router Throttles," Tenth IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service, pp. 35--44, May 2002.
A Scalable Set-Union Counting Approach to Pushing Back DDoS.. - Kwok, Cai, Hwang (2004) (Correct)
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D. K. Y. Yau, J. C. S. Lui, and F. Liang, "Defending Against Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks with Max-Min Fair Server-Centric Router Throttles," Proc. 2002 IEEE Workshop on Quality of Service.
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D. K. Yau, J. C. Lui, and F. Liang. Defending against distributed denial-of-service attacks with max-min fair server-centric router throttles. In Proc. IEEE International Workshopon Quality of Service, pages 35-44, May
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