CERT. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm. http://www. cert.org/advisories/ca-2001-26.html. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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A Cooperative Immunization System for an Untrusting.. - Anagnostakis.. (2003) (3 citations) (Correct)
....as viruses, no longer use legitimate remote execution interfaces to acquire a bounded number of nodes. Rather, they exploit bugs and loopholes and install themselves on machines where they are unwanted. They often try to grow without bound, attempting to infect every machine accessible to them [2], 1] 3] In the best case, these viruses simply steal cycles. However, they can easily have more destructive payloads: delete files and or otherwise damage the host machines, steal sensitive data, participate in a denial of service attack, etc. The Slammer worm [3] did in fact cause ATM ....
CERT Advisory CA-2001-26: Nimda Worm. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-26.html, September 2001.
Role Classification of Hosts within Enterprise.. - Tan, Poletto.. (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
....activities, including: Establishing a topology. A network s topology has a significant impact on its cost, security, and performance. An increasingly important aspect of topology design is network segmentation. In an effort to provide fault isolation and mitigate the spread of worms like Nimda [3] and Code Red [2] enterprises segment their networks using firewalls [4] routers, VLANs [7] and other technologies. Establishing policies. Different users of a network have different privileges. Some users may have unlimited access to external networks while others may have restricted access. ....
CERT COORDINATION CENTER. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26: Nimda Worm. http://www.cert. org/advisories/CA-2001-26.html, September 2001.
Finding and Containing Enemies Within the Walls With.. - Ganger, Economou.. (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
....since the NI sees exactly what the host receives and sends. For example, the NI can easily tell if a host is ignoring SYN ACK packets, as would be the case if it is participating in a SYN bomb DoS attack. Third, the random propagation approach used by the recent Code Red worm [8] and follow ons [7, 9, 35]) can be readily identified by the abnormal behavior of contacting large numbers of randomly chosen IP addresses with no corresponding DNS translations. To detect this, a self securing NI can shadow its host s DNS cache and check the IP address of each new connection against it. The main ....
CERT. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm, September 18, 2001. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-26.html.
Self-Securing Network Interfaces: What, Why and How - Ganger, Economou, Bielski (2002) (Correct)
....approach of sending email warnings. Specifically, once a new virus is discovered, the administrator can update all selfsecuring NIs to identify propagation attempts to and from their hosts, prevent them, and identify machines already infected. Second, the recent Code Red worm [8] and follow ons [9, 41]) can be readily identified by the traffic pattern at a self securing NI. Specifically, these worms spread exponentially by the abnormal behavior of targeting large numbers of randomly chosen IP addresses with no corresponding DNS translations. Digging deeply into network traffic, as promoted ....
CERT. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm, September 18, 2001. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-26.html.
Towards a more stateful and accurate HoneyTank Nicolas.. - Universite Catholique De (Correct)
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CERT. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm. http://www. cert.org/advisories/ca-2001-26.html.
An Analysis Of The Vulnerability Discovery Process In - Web Browsers Sung-Whan (Correct)
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CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-26.html, April 2006.
A Worst-Case Worm - Nicholas Weaver Vern (2004) (Correct)
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CERT. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm, http://www.cert.org/advisories/ca-2001-26.html.
Worm Evolution Tracking via Timing Analysis - Moheeb Abu Rajab (Correct)
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CERT. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm. http:// www.cert.org/advisories/ca-2001-26.html.
Opportunistic Measurement: Extracting Insight from.. - Casado, Garfinkel, .. (2005) (Correct)
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CERT advisory CA-2001-26 nimda worm. http://www.cert.org/ advisories/CA-2001-26.html.
On Scalable Attack Detection in the Network - Ramana Rao Kompella (2004) (2 citations) (Correct)
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Cert advisory ca-2001-26 nimda worm. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-26.html.
Using Predators to Combat Worms and Viruses: - Simulation-Based Study Ajay (Correct)
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Cert advisory ca-2001-26 nimda worm. http://www.cert.org/advisories/ca-2001-26.html.
Views, Reactions and Impact of Digitally-Signed Mail in.. - Simson Garfinkel Jeffrey (Correct)
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CERT Coordination Center: CERT advisory ca-2001-26 nimda worm. Technical report, CERT Coordination Center, Pittsburgh, PA (2001)
Slowing Down Internet Worms - Chen, Tang (2004) (5 citations) (Correct)
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C. E. R. Team. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-26.html, July 2001.
Visualisation for Intrusion Detection - Hooking the Worm - Axelsson (2003) (3 citations) (Correct)
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CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm. CERT advisory by CERT/CC, Email: cert@cert.org, CERT Coordination Center, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890, U.S.A., 18 September revised 25 September 2001. http://www.cert.org.
Netbait: a Distributed Worm Detection Service - Chun, Lee, Weatherspoon (2003) (11 citations) (Correct)
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CERT. Cert advisory ca-2001-26: Nimda worm, September 2001.
Email Virus Propagation Modeling and Analysis - Zou, Towsley, Gong (6 citations) (Correct)
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CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-26.html
A Virtual Honeypot Framework - Provos (2003) (6 citations) (Correct)
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CERT. Cert advisory ca-2001-26 nimda worm. www. cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-26.html, September 2001.
Throttling Viruses: Restricting propagation to defeat malicious .. - Williamson (2002) (59 citations) (Correct)
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CERT. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm, Sept. 2001. Available at http://www.cert.org/ advisories/CA-2001-26.html.
A Worst-Case Worm - Nicholas Weaver Vern (Correct)
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CERT. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm, http://www.cert.org/advisories/ca-2001-26.html.
Large Scale Malicious Code: A Research Agenda - Weaver, Paxson, Staniford.. (2003) (4 citations) (Correct)
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CERT. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm, http://www.cert.org/advisories/ca-2001-26.html.
Netbait: a Distributed Worm Detection Service - Chun, Lee, Weatherspoon (2003) (11 citations) (Correct)
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CERT. Cert advisory ca-2001-26: Nimda worm, September 2001.
A Taxonomy of Computer Worms - Weaver, Paxson, Staniford, Cunningham (2003) (19 citations) (Correct)
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CERT. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm, http://www.cert.org/advisories/ca-2001-26.html.
Netbait: a Distributed Worm Detection Service - Chun, Lee, Weatherspoon (2002) (11 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
CERT. Cert advisory ca-2001-26: Nimda worm, September 2001.
Throttling Viruses: Restricting propagation to defeat malicious .. - Williamson (2002) (59 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
CERT. CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 Nimda Worm, Sept. 2001. Available at http://www.cert.org/ advisories/CA-2001-26.html.
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