William A. Arbaugh, David J. Farber, and Jonathan M. Smith. A secure and reliable bootstrap architecture. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA), pages 65-71, 4-7 May 1997. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
Finding and Containing Enemies Within the Walls With.. - Ganger, Economou.. (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
....and its most privileged users must not be able to reconfigure or disable the NI s policies. Alerts about suspicious activity will be sent to administrative systems via the same secure channels. Prior work provides solid mechanisms for remote policy configuration of this sort, and recent research [4, 6, 14, 19] and practice [2, 22] clarifies their application to distributed firewall configuration. 2.3 Self securing NI features A self securing NI performs intrusion detection on a host s network traffic, impedes communication when compromise is detected (if so configured) and normalizes odd traffic. ....
....to the destination. The administrative interface for the current prototype consists of a directly connected terminal interface. Clearly, this is not appropriate for practical management of per host self securing NIs. We plan to adopt one of the well established cryptography based protocols [2, 4, 6, 14, 19, 22] for remotely distributing policy updates and receiving alerts. 3.3 Discussion Our prototype is still young, with the main goal of allowing us to experiment with NI embedded scanners. Although it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, we believe that its software architecture is valuable. ....
William A. Arbaugh, David J. Farber, and Jonathan M. Smith. A secure and reliable bootstrap architecture. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA, 4--7 May 1997.
Self-Securing Network Interfaces: What, Why and How - Ganger, Economou, Bielski (2002) (Correct)
....around. This approach also decouples the NI enforced policies from the host software; even the host OS and its mostprivileged users should not be able to reconfigure or disable the NI s policies. Prior work provides solid mechanisms for remote policy configuration of this sort, and recent research [5, 7, 17, 20] and practice [2, 24] clarifies their application to distributed firewall configuration. In addition to configuration over the network, alerts about suspicious activity will be sent to administrative systems via the network. The same secure channels used for configuration can be reused for this ....
....from use of the current prototype. The administrative interface for the current prototype consists of a directly connected terminal interface. Clearly, this is not appropriate for practical management of per host self securing NIs. Fortunately, well established cryptography based protocols [2, 5, 7, 17, 20, 24] exist for remotely distributing policy updates and receiving alerts. The current prototype also does not preclude scanners from excessive resource utilization, instead relying on the underlying FreeBSD kernel to timeshare. A real NI kernel implementation would need to explicitly prevent any ....
William A. Arbaugh, David J. Farber, and Jonathan M. Smith. A secure and reliable bootstrap architecture. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA, 4--7 May 1997.
Secure Continuous Biometric-Enhanced Authentication - Andrew Klosterman Gregory (2000) Self-citation (Secure) (Correct)
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William A. Arbaugh, David J. Farber, and Jonathan M. Smith. A secure and reliable bootstrap architecture. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA), pages 65-71, 4-7 May 1997.
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