| S. Staniford, J. A. Hoagland, and J. M. McAlerney. Practical Automated Detection of Stealthy Portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10:105--136, 2002. |
....IP ranges where: A = random number not equal to 10,127,172 or 192, B = 0 255, C = 1 255 and D = 1 254. The primary function of the worm is to email passwords and related system information to ixltd postone.com [1, 14, 25] 4. 2 Scan Types We broadly categorize scans into four well known types [22]. 1. Vertical Scan is defined as a sequential or random scan of multiple (more than 5) ports of a single IP address from the same source during a one hour period. These are usually an attempt to survey which of several well known vulnerabilities applies to this host and are also known as strobe ....
.... scans Aug 2001 July 2002, over 32, 24 and 16 aggregates Figure 17: Projection of non worm scans Aug 2001 July 2002, over 32, 24 and 16 aggregates cept of developing an infrastructure that would pool resources in order to more rapidly and more effectively respond to attacks and intrusions [6, 10, 22]. There are many issues involved in the creation of such an infrastructure, not the least of which is understanding its potential for success. Given the fact that there is likely to be little synchronization of timestamps between daily firewall logs in our data set, we did not attempt to evaluate ....
Stuart Staniford, James Hoagland, and Joseph McAlerney. Practical Automated Detection of Stealthy Portscans. In Journal of Computer Security, 2002.
....similarity between classes of alerts) and cannot discover the causal relationships between related alerts that do not share similar features. A similar approach along with several heuristics was used to evaluate the strength of connections between alerts (events) to detect stealthy portscans [12]. Though the heuristics can be potentially extended to general alert correlation problems, it cannot fully discover the causal relationships between related alerts, either. Another approach was proposed to learn alert correlation models by applying machine learning techniques to training data ....
....It is usually up to the human users to discover the connections between alerts. However, in the intrusion intensive situations, the IDSs may generate large amount of alerts, making manual correlation of alerts a very difficult task. We have discussed the previous alert correlation techniques [2, 3, 12, 13] in the introduction. Our alert correlation approach is complementary to these methods; using the specific knowledge about various types of intrusions (i.e. the prerequisites and consequences of intrusions) our approach is able to discover the causal relationships between related alerts and ....
S. Staniford, J.A. Hoagland, and J.M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. To appear in Journal of Computer Security.
....overlap with TR 2001 13 and TR 2002 01. The intention of this technical report is to provide a full version for the paper to appear in ACM CCS 02 [14] Several alert correlation methods have been proposed to address this problem. These methods fall into three classes. The first class (e.g. Spice [17], the probabilistic alert correlation [19] and the MIRADOR method [4] correlates alerts based on the similarities between alert attributes. Though they are effective for correlating some alerts (e.g. alerts with the same source and destination IP addresses) they cannot fully discover the ....
S. Staniford, J.A. Hoagland, and J.M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. To appear in Journal of Computer Security, 2002.
....In [20] a probabilistic method was used to correlate alerts using similarity between their features. However, this method depends on parameters selected by human experts (e.g. similarity between classes of alerts) and is not suitable for fully discovering causal relationships between alerts. In [19], a similar approach was applied to detect stealthy portscans along with several heuristics. Though some such heuristics (e.g. feature separation heuristics [19] may be extended to the general alert correlation problem, the approach cannot fully recover the causal relationships between alerts, ....
....experts (e.g. similarity between classes of alerts) and is not suitable for fully discovering causal relationships between alerts. In [19] a similar approach was applied to detect stealthy portscans along with several heuristics. Though some such heuristics (e.g. feature separation heuristics [19]) may be extended to the general alert correlation problem, the approach cannot fully recover the causal relationships between alerts, either. Techniques for aggregating and correlating alerts have been proposed by others [6] In particular, the correlation method in [6] uses a consequence ....
S. Staniford, J.A. Hoagland, and J.M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. To appear in Journal of Computer Security.
....detection. An overview of these projects and a general treatment of data mining in computer security can be found in a recent book edited by Barbara and Jajodia [4] Data mining for fraud detection is investigated by Fawcett and Provost [15] and by Chan and Stolfo [10] Alarm correlation systems [12, 14, 40, 42] try to group alarms so that the alarms of the same group pertain to the same phenomenon (e.g. the same attack) In that way, they o#er a more condensed view on the security issues raised by an IDS. The work by Dain and Cunningham [12] is noteworthy as it uses data mining techniques to learn ....
S. Staniford, J. A. Hoagland, and J. M. McAlerney. Practical Automated Detection of Stealthy Portscans. In ACM Computer and Communications Security IDS Workshop, pages 1--7, 2000.
....parameters like the number of total connection arrivals in a certain period of time, the inter arrival time between packets or the number of packets to from a certain machine. These parameters can be used to detect port scans or denial of service attempts. Most current network based systems [12, 13, 2, 17] rely on trac models to perform the bulk of their anomaly detection. The application model attempts to incorporate application speci c knowledge. Unfortunately, such models [3] are currently very simple and include mainly additional TCP header information or count the number of bytes that are ....
Stuart Staniford, James A. Hoagland, and Joseph M. , McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. In Proceedings of the IDS Workshop of the 7th Computer and Communications Security Conference, Athens, 2000.
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S. Staniford, J. A. Hoagland, and J. M. McAlerney. Practical Automated Detection of Stealthy Portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10:105--136, 2002.
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Stuart Staniford, James A. Hoagland, and Joseph M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10(1/2):105-- 136, 2002.
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Staniford, S., Hoagland, J., and McAlerney, J. 2002. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security 10, 1/2, 105--136.
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STANIFORD, S., HOAGLAND, J., AND MCALERNEY, J. M. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. In Proceedings of the IDS Workshop of the 7th Computer and Communications Security Conference (2000).
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S. Staniford, J.A. Hoagland, and J.M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10(1/2):105--136, 2002.
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S. Staniford, J. Hoagland, and J. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10(1/2):105--136, 2002.
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S. Staniford, J. Hoagland, and J. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10(1/2):105--136, 2002.
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S. Staniford, J.A. Hoagland, and J.M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10(1/2):105--136, 2002.
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Staniford, S., Hoagland, J., McAlerney, J.: Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. To appear in Journal of Computer Security (2002)
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Staniford, S., Hoagland, J. A., and McAlerney, J. M. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. In In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (2000).
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S. Staniford, J. Hoagland, and J. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10(1/2):105--136, 2002.
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S. Staniford, J.A. Hoagland, and J.M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. J. of Computer Security, 10(1/2):105--136, 2002.
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S. Staniford, J. Hoagland, and J. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. In Proceedings of the ACM CCS IDS Workshop, November 2000.
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S. Staniford, J. Hoagland, and J. McAlerney. Practical Automated Detection of Stealthy Portscans. In Proceedings of the ACM CCS IDS Workshop, November 2000.
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S. Staniford, J. Hoagland, and J. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. In Proceedings of the Seventh ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Athens, Greece, 2000.
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Stuart Staniford, James Hoagland, and Joseph McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10(1):105--136, 2002.
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S. Staniford, J. Hoagland, and J. McAlerney, "Practical Automated Detection of Stealthy Portscans," presented at ACM CCS IDS Workshop, Athens, Greece, 2000.
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S. Staniford, J. A. Hoagland, and J. M. McAlerney. Practical Automated Detection of Stealthy Portscans. To appear in the Journal of Computer Security, 2002. Available at http://www.silicondefense.com/ research/pubs.htm.
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Stuart Staniford, James Hoagland, and Joseph McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10(1):105--136, 2002.
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S. Staniford, J. A. Hoagland, and J. M. McAlerney. Practical Automated Detection of Stealthy Portscans. In ACM Computer and Communications Security IDS Workshop, pages 1--7, 2000.
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S. Staniford, J. A. Hoagland, and J. M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Athens, Greece, 2000.
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S. Staniford, J. A. Hoagland, and J. M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10:105--136, 2002.
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S. Staniford, J. A. Hoagland, and J. M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Athens, Greece, 2000.
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S. Staniford, J. Hoagland, and J. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10(1/2), 2002.
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Stuart Staniford, James A. Hoagland, and Joseph M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10:105--136, 2002.
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S. Staniford, J. Hoagland, and J. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. In Proceedings of the Seventh ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Athens, Greece, 2000.
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S. Staniford, J. Hoagland, and J. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. In Proceedings of the ACM CCS IDS Workshop, November 2000.
No context found.
S. Staniford, J.A. Hoagland, and J.M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. To appear in Journal of Computer Security, 2002.
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Staniford, S., Hoagland, J., McAlerney, J.: Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. To appear in Journal of Computer Security (2002)
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S. Staniford, J. Hoagland, and J. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. To appear in Journal of Computer Security, 2002.
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