| Jonathan Stone and Craig Partridge. When the checksum and the data disagree. In ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2000. |
....If left untreated, however, failures can combine with severe unforeseen consequences. Thus, we end with our sixth guideline: Guideline 76: Expose errors As an example, the recent investigation of TCP checksum failures resulted in the discovery that data was being corrupted at hosts or routers [28]. Because these failures were discovered at the receiver and then ignored (once the packet was discarded) the sending host received no indication that anything was amiss, other than a negligible increase in the rate of retransmissions. As another example, researchers have recently found a flaw in ....
Jonathan Stone and Craig Partridge. When the checksum and the data disagree. In ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2000.
....to see it only when the ISP took off its filters while troubleshooting an unrelated problem. If instead of quietly dropping all buggy announcements, the ISP had informed its customer of the misconfiguration, it would have been fixed much sooner. This problem is analogous to the one observed in [39], where hosts and routers silently dropped packets with a bad checksum, which left no information for finding broken routers. Currently, there is no systematic way in which misconfigurations are detected. In most instances, they are detected because of connectivity problems, BGP table blow ups, ....
J. Stone and C. Partridge. When the Checksum and the Data Disagree. In ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2000.
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