E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In Crypto'97, volume 1294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 513--525. Springer-Verlag, 1998.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....of cryptosystems in the presence of faults was launched by newspaper publications that cited a Bellcore press release New Threat Model Breaks Crypto Codes. Thereafter, several researchers reported some possible implications in both public key [12] 3] 8] 9] 17] 20] and private key [4], 9] 13] cryptography. The method presented in this paper improves the Bellcore s result, later published in [5] in the following way. Their method requires two Chinese remaindering signatures on the same message, one correct and one faulty, whereas our version requires the message and only ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In B. S. Kaliski Jr., editor, Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '97, pp. 513--525. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1294. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1997.

....files to reduce network bandwidth rather than storage usage. Convergent encryption deliberately leaks information. Other research has studied unintentional leaks through side channels [22] such as computational timing[238 measured power consumption [24] or response to injected faults [5]. Like convergent encryption, BEAR[3 derives an encryption key from a partial plaintext hash. Song et al. 35] developed techniques for searching encrypted data. SALAD has similarities to the distributed indexing systems Chord [3rd Pastry[3tr and Tapestry [40] all of which are based on ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir, "Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems", CRYPTO '91, 1991, pp. 156171.

....Physically observable cryptography captures the passive half of a physical adversary. The active half consists of an adversary that can tamper with the content of a cryptographic device (e.g. flip a few bits in memory, or alter somehow the code of the algorithm itself) Attacks (e.g. [4, 8, 6, 5, 25]) defenses (e.g. 23, 20] and models (e.g. 12] in the active case are already under investigation, but their full understanding will ultimately depend on a full understanding of the passive case. Perfectly shielded hardware, so that all computation performed in it leaks nothing to the ....

Eli Biham and Adi Shamir. Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In Burton S. Kaliski, Jr., editor, Advances in Cryptology---CRYPTO '97, volume 1294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 513-- 525. Springer-Verlag, 17--21 August 1997.

....both non invasive attacks in that the processing device need not be altered or damaged in any way during the attack. Other side channel attacks which are progressively more intrusive include timing attacks [21] electro magnetic radiation analysis [13] and glitch and fault analysis based attacks [9]. In their review of sidechannel cryptanalysis, Kelsey et al. state: 1 We believe attacks based on cache hit ratio in large S box ciphers like Blowfish, CAST and Khufu are possible. 14, Section 7] We show precisely how cache profiles can aid the recovery of secret information, thereby ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO), volume 1294. Springer-Verlag, August 1997.

....both non invasive attacks in that the processing device need not be altered or damaged in any way during the attack. Other side channel attacks which are progressively more intrusive include timing attacks [12] electro magnetic radiation analysis [7] and glitch and fault analysis based attacks [5]. In their review of sidechannel cryptanalysis, Kelsey et al. 8] state: We believe attacks based on cache hit ratio in large S box ciphers like Blowfish, CAST and Khufu are possible. 8, Section 7] 1 We show precisely how cache profiles can aid the recovery of secret information, thereby ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO), volume 1294. Springer-Verlag, August 1997.

....we are concerned with attacks on the host but not with direct attacks on the card; we assume that the card owner wants to safeguard the remote keys and that an attacker can only communicate with the card via its official communication channels. See, e.g. Boneh et al. 7] and Biham and Shamir [5], for a discussion of direct attacks on cards. Note as well that the remotely keyed encryption problem is different from the one of having a smartcard take advantage of a host s superior processing power in order to do a publickey computation without leaking the input to the host. For a ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir, "Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, " in Advances in Cryptology -- Crypto '97, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1294, Springer, Berlin, pp. 513--525, 1997.

....microprobe technology, from cellular biology s tool chest, etching techniques to extract information from tamper resistant devices. They have shown that transient glitches power clock signals frequently missed tamper detection circuitry. These glitches used variety differential fault analyses [Biham97]. differential fault analysis, adversary causes some loosely controlled faulty behavior device, which enables adversary extract secrets from device. These recent advances low cost attack technology demonstrate that NASD require careful design active defense to counter even a low budget educated ....

Biham, and Shamir, "Differential Fault Analysis Secret Key Cryptosystems," Advances Cryptology (CRYPTO Lecture Notes Computer Science Vol. 1294,

....discussion of the drawbacks of Chaum s wallet with observer techniques. Since in many applications it is completely unacceptable to rely solely on the tamper resistance of consumer devices (see, for instance, Kocher [46] Anderson and Kuhn [1, 2] Boneh, DeMillo, and Lipton [6] Biham and Shamir [4, 5], and Kocher, Jaffe, and Jun [47] we will resort to other 31 techniques to prevent subliminal channels. The improved techniques originate from Brands [10, 11, 13] Secure integration of smartcards Our first design goal is to make sure that Alice cannot show a Digital Credential without the ....

Eli Biham and Adi Shamir. Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In Burton S. Kaliski Jr., editor, Advances in Cryptology--CRYPTO '97, volume 1294 of Lecture

.... Soon after the first attack by Boneh et al. a University of Singapore team proposed a fault based attack against tamperproof RSA devices based on two fault models [10] Biham and Shamir presented a fault based side channel attack called Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) against DES [11]. DFA can find the last DES round key using less than 200 cipher texts. Floyd et al. developed a DFA attack on RC5 [12] Biham and Shamir extended their fault model to show that DFA can uncover the structure of an unknown cryptosystem implemented in a smart card. Their fault model was based on ....

E. Biham, A. Shamir, "Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems", Proceedings of Crypto'97, 1997.

....refer to the software, present on a user device, that implements the user functionality of an electronic payment system. The increased security of smart cards will prevent small scale abuse. However, determined adversaries are likely to be able to overcome the tamper resistance, as illustrated by [AK96, BDL97, BS97]. Such schemes must not be considered tamper proof, and require additional security mechanisms as present in traditional electronic cash. Further details of smart card technology and security are available in [Fan97, Hen97, RE97] However, due to their limited computational and storage ....

....[KOO99] discussed in Section 3.3.3, uses a secret broker key on all user smart cards. The secret al..lows the card to generate any hash chain that the broker can generate. Thus the card can respond to a vendor request for the next hash value from a specific broker chain as payment. As noted in [AK96, BDL97, BS97], tamper resistance may be overcome. For this reason it seems sensible to avoid large scale deployment of schemes whose security relies wholly on it. 3.3.6 Probability Based Schemes In the previous micropayment schemes, each and every payment is usually processed by the vendor and later verified ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '97 Proceedings, pp. 513-25, Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol. 1294. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1997.

....biology s tool chest, and dry etching techniques to extract information from tamper resistant devices. They have shown that transient glitches in power or clock signals are frequently missed by tamper detection circuitry. These glitches can be used in a variety of differential fault analyses [Biham97]. In differential fault analysis, the adversary causes some loosely controlled faulty behavior in a device, which enables the adversary to extract secrets from the device. These recent advances in low cost attack technology demonstrate that NASD require careful design and active defense to counter ....

Biham, E., and Shamir, A. "Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems," Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO 97), Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 1294, 1997, pp. 513-525.

....NMR scanning, and electronic emanations. 21 With many algorithms it is possible to reconstruct the key from these side channels. While total resistance to side channel cryptanalysis is probably impossible, we note that Twofish executes in constant time on most processors. Fault analysis [BDL97, BS97] can be used to successfully cryptanalyze this cipher. Again, we believe that total resistance to fault analysis is an impossible design constraint for a cipher. The resistance to fault analysis of any block cipher can be improved using classical fault tolerance techniques. 8.10 Attacking ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir, "Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems," Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '97 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1997, pp. 513--525.

....These methods have been well studied because they can be applied by analyzing only one part of a system s architecture an algorithm s mathematical structure. A correct implementation of a strong protocol is not necessarily secure. For example, failures can be caused by defective computations[5,4] and information leaked during secret key operations. Attacks using timing information[7,11]as well as data collected using invasive measuring techniques[2,1]have been demonstrated. The U.S. government has invested considerable resources in the classified TEMPEST program to prevent sensitive ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir, "Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, " Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of CRYPTO '97, Springer-Verlag, August 1997, pp. 513-525.

....then be possible to mount a conventional differential style attack using the data that is already available and information about the secret encryption key might be extracted. It should be anticipated that this work will be extended in its scope and applicability as further research takes place [4]. In this attack on DES (which is also a style of attack that can be readily extended to other block ciphers including triple DES and to both encryption and decryption operations) the important issue is not exactly where the errors take place but quite how many and at approximately which point in ....

....implementations. Biham and Shamir have extended their work on differential fault analysis to cases where the key might be recovered even when the specifics of the encryption algorithm are unknown and even to deducing the structure and eventually the details of some unknown encryption algorithm [4]. This fascinating work provides evidence for the view held by some that it is difficult to keep the details of a secret cipher hidden from analysis even when secure tamperproof hardware is used. Another interesting style of attack considers the effect of making a permanent change to the ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. To appear in Proceedings of Crypto '97.

....we know, neither statistical cryptanalysis [22] nor partitioning cryptanalysis [14] provides a less complex attack than differential or linear cryptanalysis. 5. 10 Fault Analysis We have not been concerned in this design to build in any particular protection against attacks based on induced faults [3, 10, 11]. If an attacker can progressively remove the machine instructions by which this cipher is implemented, or progressively destroy selected gates, or progressively modify the bits of the key register, then he can clearly extract the key. We tend to the view that an attacker with the ability to ....

E Biham, A Shamir, "Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems", in Advances in Cryptology --- Crypto 97, Springer LNCS v 1294 pp 513--525

....would be against comparable devices using many other block ciphers. Much the same should hold for attackers who attempt to exploit compromising electromagnetic radiation. 5. 12 Fault Analysis We have not been concerned to build in any particular protection against attacks based on induced faults [5, 13, 14]. If an attacker can progressively remove the machine instructions by which this cipher is implemented, or progressively destroy selected gates, or progressively modify the bits of the key register, then he can clearly extract the key. An attacker with the ability to modify the implementation ....

E Biham, A Shamir, "Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems", in Advances in Cryptology --- Crypto 97, Springer LNCS v 1294 pp 513--525

No context found.

E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In Crypto'97, volume 1294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 513--525. Springer-Verlag, 1998.

No context found.

E. Biham and A. Shamir. "Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems", in Prceedings of Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '97, LNCS 1294, pp. 513-525, 1997.

No context found.

E. Biham and A. Shamir. "Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems", in Prceedings of Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '97, LNCS 1294, pp. 513-525, 1997.

No context found.

E. Biham and A. Shamir, "Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems," Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1294, pp. 513--525, 1997.

No context found.

E. Biham and A. Shamir. "Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems", in Prceedings of Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '97, LNCS 1294, pp. 513-525, 1997.

No context found.

E. Biham and A. Shamir, "Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. " In Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '97, LNCS 1294, pp. 513--525. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1997.

No context found.

E. Biham and A. Shamir, "Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems", CRYPTO '91, 1991, pp. 156171.

No context found.

Eli Biham and Adi Shamir, "Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems", Advances in Cryptology - CRY?TO '97, p.5 l 3-525.

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