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G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically unique and cryptographically verifiable(sucv) identifiers and addresses. NDSS'02, February 2002.

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Coping with False Accusations in Misbehavior Reputation.. - Buchegger, Le Boudec (2003)   (4 citations)  (Correct)

....node by slightly decreasing its # and increasing its #. We assume su#cient identity persistence for a reputation system to work, i.e. that nodes cannot change their identity too easily. This can partly be achieved by using cryptographically generated identities that prevent impersonation [14]. For the creation of new identities, expensive pseudonyms could be used. By means of simulation we evaluated the robustness of our approach against the types of liars described above, and its e#ciency at detecting malicious nodes. The simulation results indicate that our system largely reduces ....

G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically unique and cryptographically verifiable(sucv) identifiers and addresses. NDSS'02, February 2002.


Mobility Helps Security in Ad Hoc Networks - Capkun, Hubaux, Buttyán (2003)   (4 citations)  (Correct)

....their personal device. Finally, the system can easily be penetrated by an adversary who could obtain access to the password by means of a microphone or a camera. Another approach, originally designed for the address ownership problem in Mobile IPv6, is described by Montenegro and Castelluccia in [21] and by O Shea and Roe in [22] Their idea is to derive the IP address of the node from its public key: first, the public key is hashed with a cryptographic hash function, and then, part of) the hash value is used as part of the IP address of the node. The advantage is that there is no longer ....

....point out at the appropriate places how it can incorporate multiple key pairs per node. Each node must have a node address that is used by the routing protocol. We assume that the node address is generated from the public key of the node by making use of a technique similar to CAM [22] or SUCV [21]. In this way, node addresses become verifiable. Note that a malicious node may generate several node addresses for itself and freely distribute them to other nodes. Whether this is a problem very much depends on how the routing protocol is secured. A thorough study of this issue is left for ....

G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically unique and cryptographically verifiable (SUCV) identifiers and addresses. In Proceedings of the 9th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2002.


An Anonymous On Demand Routing Protocol with Untraceable.. - Kong, Hong, Gerla   (Correct)

....will be repeated until the source receives the onion it originally sent out. There are many methods to implement the globally unique sequence number, for example, applying collision resistant one way hash functions on node s unique identity pseudonyms can generate statistically unique values [34]. Upon receiving different RREQ packets, the destination can initiate the same RREP procedure to realize multiple anonymous paths between itself and the source. We leave the decision to be made by implementation defined policies. During the RREP phase, the protocol uses local broadcasts with ....

G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable (SUCV) Identifiers and Addresses. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2002.


ANODR: ANonymous On Demand Routing with Untraceable Routes for.. - Kong, Hong (2003)   (5 citations)  (Correct)

....key encryption can play an important role in anonymous route discovery. In There are many methods to implement the globally unique sequence number, for example, applying collision resistant one way hash functions on node s unique identity pseudonyms can generate statistically unique values [20]. A PO PO B PO C PO D PO = A PO = B PO = C PO = D A PK A A,src,N A PK A PK B B B,A,N A,src,N A PK A PK B PK C B C C,B,N , B,A,N , A,src,N PK A PK B PK C PK D D,C,N , C,B,N B,A,N , A,src,N D C B A Figure 1: ANODR PO: Anonymous route discovery using public ....

G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable (SUCV) Identifiers and Addresses. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2002.


Report on a Working Session on Security in Wireless Ad Hoc.. - Buttyán, Hubaux (2002)   (3 citations)  (Correct)

.... can trust all other nodes in the impromptu network for any type of operation (for example, engaging in some cooperative and perhaps confidential activity) This paper improves on previous efforts to secure group authorization (including membership) We do so by employing crypto based identifiers [23] for node and group identification, and then use these in authorization certificates. These allow groups (or nodes) to authorize nodes (or other groups) 10] Our approach enables highly flexible and robust impromptu security services in an inherently distributed fashion. Previous work on ....

.... A node autoconfigures its (crypto based) identifier (CBID) by doing the following: Create a pair of public and private keys (PK and SK) Create its CBID: CBID = hash(PK) Note that the hash function can be applied over more than just the public key (e.g. a salt or some other values) [23]. Given the secure correspondence between identity and public key, the latter can be communicated by the node itself. This simplifies key management, since no third parties need to be involved either in creating or distributing the public keys. Provided the bit length of the CBID s is large ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable (SUCV) identifiers and addresses. In Proceedings of the 9th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), February 2002.


A Robust Reputation System for P2P and Mobile Ad-hoc Networks - Buchegger, Le Boudec (2004)   (2 citations)  (Correct)

No context found.

G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically unique and cryptographically verifiable(sucv) identifiers and addresses. NDSS'02, February 2002.


Toward Secure Key Distribution in Truly Ad-Hoc Networks - Aram Khalili Jonathan (2003)   (6 citations)  (Correct)

No context found.

G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable (SUCV) Identifiers and Addresses. In Proceedings of the 2002.


Secure Long Term Communities in Ad Hoc Networks - Prigent, Bidan, al. (2003)   (Correct)

No context found.

C. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable (SUCV) identifiers and addresses. In NDSS'02, Feb. 2002.


Mobility Helps Peer-to-Peer Security - Capkun, Hubaux, Buttyán (2005)   (Correct)

No context found.

G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable (SUCV) Identifiers and Addresses. In Proceedings of NDSS, 2002.


BISS: Building Secure Routing out of an Incomplete Set of.. - Capkun, Hubaux (2003)   (1 citation)  (Correct)

No context found.

G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable (SUCV) Identifiers and Addresses. In Proceedings of NDSS, 2002.


A Robust Reputation System for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks - Buchegger, Le Boudec (2003)   (4 citations)  (Correct)

No context found.

G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically unique and cryptographically verifiable(sucv) identifiers and addresses. NDSS'02, February 2002.


A Robust Reputation System for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks - Buchegger, Le Boudec (2003)   (4 citations)  (Correct)

No context found.

G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically unique and cryptographically verifiable(sucv) identifiers and addresses. NDSS'02, February 2002.


A Robust Reputation System for P2P and Mobile Ad-hoc Networks - Buchegger, Le Boudec (2004)   (2 citations)  (Correct)

No context found.

G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically unique and cryptographically verifiable(sucv) identifiers and addresses. NDSS'02, February 2002.

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