| G. Delzanno and S. Etalle. Proof theory, transformations, and logic programming for debugging security protocols. In A. Pettorossi, editor, Proc. Eleventh International Workshop on Logic Program Synthesis and Transformation - LOPSTR 2001, LNCS, pages 76-91. Springer-Verlag, 2002. |
....force unjust authentication. Unfortunately, the design of cryptographic protocols appears to be rather error prone: a great deal of published protocols has later been shown to contain errors prejudicing their safety. This stimulated research on formal verification of security protocols (see e.g. [6, 3, 10, 12, 9, 15, 14, 13, 5, 7, 4]) Security protocols are specified for accomplishing certain security goals. Unfortunately, in some cases there exist no standard definitions for the properties one needs to enforce. For example, a precise notion of authentication is still a topic of research. In this paper we present an ....
G. Delzanno and S. Etalle. Proof theory, transformations, and logic programming for debugging security protocols. In A. Pettorossi, editor, Proc. Eleventh International Workshop on Logic Program Synthesis and Transformation - LOPSTR 2001, LNCS, pages 76-91. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
....We begin the description of our approach with an example of the power we expect of LicenseScript. The notation we use is multiset rewriting (a multi set is a set in which elements are not necessarily unique) Basically, multiset rewriting is the notation of the coordination language Gamma [1] In [3] we have already employed an extension of multiset rewriting for the specification and the verification of security protocols. 2.1 Multiset Rewriting The core of a license consists of a multiset M and of a set of rules R. The multiset can be regarded as the memory where data is stored, and the ....
G. Delzanno and S. Etalle. Proof theory, transformations, and logic programming for debugging security protocols. In A. Pettorossi, editor, Proc. Eleventh International Workshop on Logic Program Synthesis and Transformation -- LOPSTR 2001.
....to force unjust authentication. Unfortunately, the design of cryptographic protocols appears to be rather error prone. A great deal of published protocols has later been shown to contain errors prejudicing their safety. This stimulated research on formal verification of security protocols see e.g. [19, 10, 28, 31, 27, 35, 36, 32, 17, 18]. In this setting several approaches are based on Dolev and Yao s [19] where it is proposed to test a protocol explicitly against a hostile intruder who has complete control over the network, and who can intercept and forge messages. By an exhaustive search, one can establish whether the protocol ....
....we are including 2 A roles, 2 B roles and checking secrecy of two nonces (one for each session) Operationally speaking, the main di#erence between our system and MS lies in the fact that we check the constraints as soon as possible while producing the run. This is in line with our earlier paper [17] (although the system presented here has better performance) In MS first all (complete) runs are generated and then it is checked which runs yield a solvable constraint: in our system we anticipate failure, therefore reducing the search space. A more detailed comparison of the e#ciency of both ....
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G. Delzanno and S. Etalle. Proof theory, transformations, and logic programming for debugging security protocols. In A. Pettorossi, editor, Proc. Eleventh International Workshop on Logic Program Synthesis and Transformation -- LOPSTR 2001, LNCS, pages 76--91. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
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G. Delzanno and S. Etalie. Proof theory, transformations, and logic programming for debugging security protocols. In A. Pettorossi, editor, Proc. Eleventh International Workshop on Logic Program Synthesis and Transformation - LOPSTR 2001, LNCS, pages 76-91. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
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