F. Brandt, "Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds," in Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC) (R. Wright, ed.), vol. 2742 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 223-- 238. Springer-Verlag, 2003. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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An Algorithm Applicable to Clearing Combinatorial Exchanges - Silaghi (2002) (Correct)
....intractability assumptions, when at most a minority of the participants ( 1 3) can make coalition, there exist cryptographic protocols that are safe even against active attacks [CCD88a] Example 1. 2 Fully private (M 1) st price auctions , secure against any collusion, have been described in [Bra02a] Many existing cryptographic protocols are targeted to the computation of functions based on addition and multiplication. Optimization problems are e#ciently approached by branching algorithms (e.g. branch and bound, but these show to be di#cult to implement securely [Sil02c] In this ....
....the highest possible value of a tuple (e.g. h F ) Make values into di#erential bids with the non zero term y, y = 1) This can 8 be done by calling the algorithm we propose in Figure 1. 5. Apply any of the known standard secure protocols to determine the winner di#erential bid (see [Bra02b, Bra02a]) 3.2 Detailed Protocol Assume a Distributed FDDM with n agents. By s(i) we denote i s share of the secret 1 . We say that a tuple t i is in a larger tuple t when the projection of t on the variables of t i yields t i . for each tuple t i in FDM(A i ) 2. According to Shamir s scheme, each ....
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Felix Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. preliminary draft, August 2002.
(Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions - Brandt, Sandholm (2004) Self-citation (Brandt) (Correct)
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F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In R. N. Wright, editor, Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC), volume 2742 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 223--238. Springer, 2003.
(Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions - Brandt, Sandholm (2004) Self-citation (Brandt) (Correct)
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F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In R. N. Wright, editor, Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC), volume 2742 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 223--238. Springer, 2003.
On Correctness and Privacy in Distributed Mechanisms - Brandt, Sandholm (2004) Self-citation (Brandt) (Correct)
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F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In R. N. Wright, editor, Proc. of 7th Conference on Financial Cryptography, volume 2742 of LNCS, pages 223--238. Springer, 2003.
Deception in Electronic Auctions - Brandt (2003) Self-citation (Brandt) (Correct)
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F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2003. to appear.
(Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions - Brandt, Sandholm (2004) Self-citation (Brandt) (Correct)
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F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In R. N. Wright, editor, Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC), volume 2742 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 223--238. Springer, 2003.
On Correctness and Privacy in Distributed Mechanisms - Brandt, Sandholm (2004) Self-citation (Brandt) (Correct)
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F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In R. N. Wright, editor, Proc. of 7th Conference on Financial Cryptography, volume 2742 of LNCS, pages 223--238. Springer, 2003.
Private Public Choice - Brandt (2003) Self-citation (Brandt) (Correct)
....trustworthiness of system operators, cryptography provides the tools to ensure privacy in other ways. This report intends to bring the fields of mechanism design and secure multiparty computation together by generalizing our results already obtained in the area of cryptographic auction protocols [ Brandt, 2002; 2003 ] We aim at constructing secure social choice mechanisms by distributing the mechanism computation on the participants themselves. This is achieved by using multiparty computation that is not based on any trusted fraction (threshold) assumptions. We show that the main reason for thresholds in ....
....introduce a third party that publishes the outcome after it received all shares. This third party does not learn confidential information. It is only assumed not to leave the protocol prematurely. We learned that in auctions with a single seller, it is practical to assign this role to the seller [ Brandt, 2002; 2003 ] Providing a secure broadcast channel can eliminate the second threshold. As shown in [ Pedersen, 1991 ] verifiable secret sharing can only provide unconditional security of either the shares correctness or the secret, but not both. The latter seems much more practical since it means that ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2003. to appear.
Design Issues For Electronic Auctions - Jarrod Trevathan And (2004) (Correct)
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F. Brandt, "Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds," in Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC) (R. Wright, ed.), vol. 2742 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 223-- 238. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
Security, Anonymity and Trust - In Electronic Auctions (Correct)
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Brandt, F. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In the Seventh Annual Proceedings of Financial Cryptography (FC'03) (2003).
Secure Generalized Vickrey Auction without Third-party Servers - Yokoo, Suzuki (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
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F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. Proceedings of Seventh International Financial Cryptography Conference (FC-2003), 2003.
A Scheme for Timed-Release Public Key Based Authenticated.. - Osipkov, Kim, Cheon (2004) (Correct)
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F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In In Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC), 2003.
Literature Review - Trevathan (2004) (Correct)
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Felix Brandt. Fully Private Auctions in a Constant Number of Rounds. Seventh Annual Proceedings of Financial Cryptography, FC'03, January, 2003.
Design Issues for Electronic Auctions - Trevathan, Ghodosi, Read (2005) (Correct)
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Felix Brandt. Fully Private Auctions in a Constant Number of Rounds. Seventh Annual Proceedings of Financial Cryptography, FC'03, January, 2003. 14
On Cheating in Sealed-Bid Auctions - Porter, Shoham (2003) (Correct)
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F. Brandt, Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds, Proceedings of Financial Cryptography Conference, 2003.
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