L. Buttyan and JP. Hubaux, "Rational Exchange: A Formal Model Based on Game Theory," in Proceedings of 2nd International Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 2001.  Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
Formal Methods for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis: Emerging.. - Meadows (2003) (4 citations) (Correct)
....MOCHA, that is based on a game semantics to check for fairness and timeliness in non repudiation protocols. This semantics gives a more natural way of expressing these properties, which depend upon liveness as well as safety, than a trace based semantics. More recently, Buttyan and Hubaux [14] have developed a game theoretic model for exchange protocols, in which a protocol is modeled as a game in which strategies for principals are assigned payoffs. They then formalize the notion of rational exchange: an exchange protocol is deemed rational if the strategies available to the parties ....
L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Rational exchange -- a formal model based on game theory. In 2nd International Workshop on Electronic Commerce (WELCOM'01), 16-17 November 2001.
What Makes a Cryptographic Protocol Secure? The Evolution of.. - Meadows (2003) (Correct)
.... Examples include the work of Meadows on a model for the analysis of protocols resistance to denial of service [21] where requirements are specified in terms of a comparison between resources expended by a responder versus resources expended by an initiator; the work of Butty an and Hubaux [6] on rational exchange protocols, in which a protocol is modeled as a game in which all principals are assigned payoffs, and an exchange protocol is deemed rational if the strategies available to all participants form a Nash equilibrium; and the work of Shmatikov on anonymity protocols and contract ....
L. Butty'an and J.-P. Hubaux. Rational exchange -- a formal model based on game theory. In 2nd International Workshop on Electronic Commerce (WELCOM'01), 16-17 November 2001.
Detection and Handling of MAC Layer Misbehavior in Wireless.. - Kyasanur, Vaidya (2002) (15 citations) (Correct)
....are designed to reach an optimal operating point called the Nash equilibrium . At this operating point, no node can get more bandwidth by unilaterally deviating from the protocol (if nodes collude, they might get better bandwidth) These approaches assume that the misbehaving nodes are rational [14] i.e. misbehaving nodes exhibit greedy misbehavior and are interested primarily in improving their share of bandwidth. So, the misbehaving nodes are not expected to attempt to degrade the bandwidth share of other nodes if such an attempt fails to improve the share of bandwidth obtained by the ....
L. Buttyan and J. P. Hubaux, "Rational Exchange -- A Formal Model Based on Game Theory," in Proceedings of 2nd International Workshop on Electronic Commerce (WELCOM 2001.
Report on a Working Session on Security in Wireless Ad Hoc.. - Buttyán, Hubaux (2002) (3 citations) Self-citation (Hubaux) (Correct)
....have a fairly good understanding of the concept. However, currently, rational exchange is not well understood, and often confused with fair exchange. Our goal is, therefore, to clarify this situation. In order to do so, we propose a formal model of exchange protocols, which is based on game theory [5]. We model the situation in which parties of a given exchange protocol find themselves as a game. We call this game the protocol game. The protocol game encodes all the possible interactions of the protocol parties. The protocol parties are modeled as players. The protocol itself (as a set of ....
L. Butty an and J.-P. Hubaux. Rational exchange -- a formal model based on game theory. In Proceedings International Workshop on Electronic Commerce (WELCOM), November 2001.
A Formal Analysis of Syverson's Rational Exchange Protocol - Buttyán, Hubaux, Čapkun (2002) (1 citation) Self-citation (Buttyan Hubaux) (Correct)
....true fairness, and as such, it may provide in c fl 2002 IEEE. In Proceedings of the 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, June 2002. http: www.terminodes.org teresting solutions to the exchange problem in applications where fair exchange would be impossible or inefficient. In [3], we propose a formal model for rational exchange protocols, which is based on game theory. In this model, an exchange protocol is represented as a set of strategies (one strategy for each party) in a game that is constructed from the protocol description. Rational exchange is formally defined in ....
....Syverson s rational exchange protocol proposed in [9] For this reason, we first introduce the protocol game model and the formal definition of rational exchange within this model in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. We keep the presentation brief, since this material has already been presented in [3]. However, for completeness and for making this paper easier to follow, we preferred not to omit this part. Then, in Section 5, we construct the protocol game of the Syverson protocol and prove that it satisfies the definition of rational exchange assuming that the communication between the ....
L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Rational exchange -- a formal model based on game theory. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Electronic Commerce (WELCOM), November 2001.
FAIR: Fee Arbitrated Incentive Architecture in Wireless.. - Mok, Mistry, Chung, Li (Correct)
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L. Buttyan and JP. Hubaux, "Rational Exchange: A Formal Model Based on Game Theory," in Proceedings of 2nd International Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 2001.
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