Warneryd, K. (1993). Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 532--546. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
The learning barrier: Moving from innate to learned systems of.. - Oliphant (1998) (7 citations) (Correct)
....predator it indicates appears to be specified innately (Hauser, 1996) That communicative behavior tends to be encoded genetically is, perhaps, largely explained by the fact that natural selection provides a very effective means of tuning innate systems of communication. Game theoretic approaches (Warneryd, 1993; Blume, Kim, and Sobel, 1993; Kim and Sobel, 1995; Skyrms, 1996) and an increasingly large literature of computational modeling work (Werner and Dyer, 1991; Oliphant, 1993; Oliphant, 1996; MacLennan and Burghardt, 1994; Ackley and Littman, 1994; Levin, 1995; Cangelosi and Parisi, 1996; Bullock, ....
Warneryd, K. (1993). Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 532--546.
Formal Approaches to Innate and Learned Communication: Laying.. - Oliphant (1997) (8 citations) (Correct)
....interest. That is to say that both sender and receiver have a fitness related stake in the outcome of a communicative exchange. Through the use of evolutionary game theory, it has been shown analytically that optimal communication is the only outcome that is evolutionarily stable in this situation (Warneryd, 1993; Blume, Kim, and Sobel, 1993; Kim and Sobel, 1995; Skyrms, 1996) Furthermore, it can 35 Success Failure Transmitter 1.0 0.0 Receiver 1.0 0.0 Figure IV.3: Payoff matrix for common interest communication. Both the sender and the receiver get a high (1.0) payoff when communication between them is ....
Warneryd, K. (1993). Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability.
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